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ABSTRACT
This thesis is based on a quantitative analysis of Time 
magazine's coverage of the Vietnam War. It demonstrates that 
Time held a pro-war bias in 1967, was neutral during 1968, and 
turned strongly against the war from 1969 through 1974. From 
mid-1969 on, some articles factually misrepresented what was 
happening in Vietnam in such a way as to promote the goals of 
the anti-war movement. If events admitted of both a pro-war 
and an anti-war interpretation Time published almost 
exclusively the anti-war view. By 1972, administration 
supporters had published a large body of verifiable evidence 
(summarized in chapter 3) demonstrating that progress was 
being made toward winning the war. Time reported on almost 
none of this evidence. Consequently, this thesis concludes 
that the previous authors who have written «üüout the media's 
role in the war (Herbert Cans, Clarence Wyatt and Daniel 
Hallin) were incorrect: Time's heavily biased anti-war
coverage did in fact hurt the war effort.
XXI
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INTRODUCTION
During the Vietnam War and since, conservative Americans 
have believed that a liberal press hurt the war effort by 
taking an anti-war stance. In this view, the media's constant 
criticism helped turn neutral Americans against the war, and 
convinced the Communists that there was no need to negotiate 
because the pressure of public opinion would eventually force 
a unilateral American withdrawal.
The historical community, however, has challenged the 
conservative view. Herbert Cans' book. Deciding What's News, 
argued that the routines of objective journalism and the 
institutional nature of the media prevented journalists from 
selecting the news on an ideological basis.' In this view 
journalists strove for objectivity, and used a variety of 
techniques to balance the news coverage. They had to because 
if any particular publication were perceived to be biased, it 
would lose credibility and its audience. Daniel Hailin's
'Herbert Cans, Deciding What's News (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1979), pp.175, 182-86, 190.
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2book. The "Uncensored" War, and Clarence Wyatt's Paper 
Soldiers both supported Gams. They argued that the corporate 
American media had really represented the estaüalishment view 
of the war from start to finish. The press had continued to 
publish mainly pro-war stories as late as 1968, long after 
reporters in the field and protesters at home had begun to 
raise serious questions. After 1968 the media did begin to 
oppose the war, but only after Congress amd public opinion had 
turned against it. Even then, the press continued to give the 
administration a significant amount of support. If the media 
had been truly anti-war, it would have turned more harshly 
against the war. The press could have gone much farther than 
it did, for example, in condemning the My Lai massacre. Daniel 
Hailin's quemtitative analysis of the New York Times Vietnam 
War coverage during the early 1960s also estekblished that the 
press did not report evidence which it had discovered (or 
easily could have) if that evidence did not support the 
Kennedy administration's official line on the war.^
This paper seeks to shed further light on the controversy 
with a quantitative analysis of all of the Vietnam War 
coverage printed in Time magazine from July 1967 through 
December 1974. First the pro-war and anti-war positions were 
defined, then the articles were divided into pro-war, anti­
war, and neutral categories. Articles normally took one slant
^Daniel Hallin, The "Uncensored" War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), pp.8-9, 214-15, and chapter two.
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3for a paragraph or two, then changed to a different bias for 
a while before switching again. Thus to quantify the content, 
each section of each article was measured in column inches. 
For example, if an article started with nine column inches 
(Cl) of neutral coverage, I marked it off and wrote a short 
summary of what was in those nine Cl. Thus my notebook entries 
look like this:
December 22, 1969 
p. 22 9 Cl neutral Time is not sure when negotiations
will come or what the terms might be.
3 Cl pro-war The U.S. "must show aggressor from 
Peking to Havana that so called wars of liberation will not 
be allowed to succeed.”
1 Cl anti-war However, the war, "has proved to be 
[too] costly in lives, dollars, and international prestige."
Using these criteria. Time held a pro-war stance in 
1967, was neutral through most of 1968, and turned strongly 
against the war in 1969. From mid-1970 on Time's numerical 
bias was over 17 to 1 anti-war. Many stories factually 
misrepresented what was happening in Vietnam in such a way as 
to promote the goals of the anti-war movement. Following the 
1968 Tet Offensive, Time gave the pro-war view little or no 
space and published almost exclusively the anti-war 
interpretation. Also, by 1970 administration spokesmen and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
supporters had published a considerable body of verifiable 
evidence showing significant progress toward winning the war. 
Time published almost none of this evidence.
Time Incorporated's editor-in-chief, Hedley Donovan, 
announced in a 1971 editorial that although there was good 
reason to think progress was being made in Vietnamization, the 
United States should withdraw all of its forces from Vietnam 
as quickly as possible even if it meant losing a war which 
could have been won.^ Time also recognized earlier in 1971 
that to many Americans a victory in Vietnam would be "the 
final outrage."* In April of 1971 Time stated that it 
sympathized with the idea that America ought, as a matter of 
principle, to suffer defeat on the battlefield.^ These were 
some of the most extreme anti-war positions it was possible to 
take. Time stated that Hedley Donovan's anti-war editorial had 
evolved from a series of speeches which Donovan had given in 
support of the anti-war movement.
This thesis will argue that in the late 1960s and early 
1970s Time magazine's ideological bias again prevented it 
from reporting evidence that it was aware of or easily could 
have discovered. The difference was that in the later years, 
unlike the early 1960s, it was the media's anti-war bias which 
prevented it from publishing the pro-war view of events and
^Time, June 14, 1971, pp. 28-30.
*Ibid.. March 1, 1971, p. 10. 
^Ibid.. April 5, 1971, p. 12.
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5the evidence supporting it.
As late as September 1970 Time reported that over the 
previous four months "the doves have been beaten [on all 
proposed pieces of anti-war legislation, and] public opinion 
polls show that public support of the President's policies 
remains strong. Thus, it is the conclusion of this paper 
that from mid-1969 on Time did not represent the establishment 
nearly so well as it represented the anti-war movement. This 
is significant because these were the critical years in 
deciding how much assistance America would give to South 
Vietnam after the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops.
In addition to examining the bias in Time, this thesis 
will also raise the question of whether an anti-war bias has 
existed in the mainstreeua historiography of the war. Wyatt, 
for example, wrote that recent content analysis of the news 
had shown that it mainly reported official sources with 
relatively little dissent. At the time that Wyatt published, 
Peter Breastrup had already published his study of the media's 
coverage of the 1968 Tet Offensive, Big Story. Breastrup 
conviningly demonstated that the media completely ignored 
official sources including General William Westmoreland, 
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff General Earle Wheeler, analyst Douglas Pike and 
President Lyndon Johnson. These men accurately described the 
offensive as a crushing defeat for the Viet Cong. However,
*Ibid.. September 26, 1970, p. 25.
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6instead of publishing the information provided by official 
spokesmen, which turned out to be factually correct, the media 
falsely reported that the Viet Cong were winning a great 
battlefield victory.
This was an unprecedented situation. Never before had the 
Amerian media flatly refused to report the official 
battlefield analysis of the United States army. Even if army 
spokespersons had turned out to be wrong, it would seem to be 
very significemt that the media completely prevented the 
Amerian people from receiving their government's official 
analysis. George Herring wrote that reporters groaned in 
disbelielf when General William Westmoreland explained the 
battlefield situation. Apparently on the assumption that 
Westmoreland was deceiving them, media sources then created 
the false interpretation that America was being defeated on 
the battlefield. Media sources continued to publish their 
factually mistaken anti-war view for several weeks, long after 
it was obvious that the Communists had been badly defeated.
In any other war this remarkable behavior would have 
drawn intense scrutiny from historians. Breastrup describes 
the coverage as a "failure of the media" and a "distortion of 
reality." How could it have happened? One would expect the 
historical community to seriously question this unprecedented 
behavior. Was subsequent coverage equally biased against 
accurate official sources? Yet the mainstream historiography 
of the war has not questioned the anti-administration bias of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7the media's Tet Offensive coverage. To the contrary, Wyatt's 
preface flatly denies that it happened.
Wyatt's thesis is that the Nixon administration's 
manipulation of the news was largely beyond the journalists' 
ability to resist. Under this pressure, the media published 
the statements of official sources with relatively little 
dissent. Consequently, the media had in fact not been an 
opponent of either the military or the governing
administrations. Wyatt does not indicate that coverage of the 
Tet offensive was an exception to the rule.
Likewise, Ambassador Martin Herz's quantitative analysis 
of media coverage in 1972 was published prior to Paper
Soldiers. Herz demonstated that in covering the December 1972 
bombings the media published the views of administration 
critics many times more often them the interpretation of 
administration spokespersons. Again, Wyatt does not indicate 
that the 1972 coverage was an abberation. He does not argue 
that Herz and Braestrup were wrong. He simply ignors the 
meaning of their work.
Daniel Hallin's The 'Uncensored War was also published 
prior to Paper Soldiers. Hallin argues that certain 
institutional constraints limited the extent to which the 
media was free to turn against the war. Still, "journalists
clearly did not think of themselves simply as 'soldiers of the
typewriter' whose mission was to serve the war effort." Every 
administration during the war "had periodic crises in its
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8ability to 'manage* this more independent or adversarial news 
media, and over the years the volume of 'negative* coverage 
increased so dramatically that there seems little doubt that 
the news coverage did indeed contribute to the public war­
weariness . Hallin noted that editorial comment by
journalists turned two to one against the war after the Tet 
offensive. None of this is consistant with the exceptionally 
strong lemguage used in Wyatt's thesis and conclusions.
Beyond this, pages 196-197 of Paper Soldiers argues that 
in the 1970 Cambodian incursion and Opperation Lam Son 719 in 
1971 the media were able to see through the false optimism 
being offered by administration spokesperson, and published a 
much more pessimistic interpretation. The argument presented 
in these pages directly contradict Wyatt's thesis (and indeed 
the title of his book), at least as regards these battles in 
1970 and 1971.
Wyatt appears to have used the available evidence 
selectively, publishing those parts that support his 
interpretation and ignoring the evidence that contradicts his 
position. The unacceptably selective use of evidence in Paper 
Soldiers is particularly significant because Dr. George 
Herring, author of the standard text book used in many 
university classes on the Vietnam War, America's Longest War, 
was Clarence Wyatt's thesis advisor (while Paper Soldiers was 
being written as a doctoral dissertation).
^Hallin, "Uncensored" War, pp. 6-7
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9This thesis will argue that just as Wyatt emd Herring 
have ignored Herz, Breastrup, Hallin, and the evidence of 
pages 196-197 of Wyatt's own book, the mainstream 
historiography of the war has consistantly ignored those 
published sources which seem to undermine their emti-war 
interpretation of events.
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PROLOGUE
In the late nineteenth century France added Indochina 
(Vietnam, Cambodia amd Laos) to its colonial empire. When 
Germam armies occupied France during World War II and Japanese 
armies over-ran Vietnam, French power was broken for several 
years. In that period a nationalist movement arose, known as 
the Viet Minh. When Japan withdrew from Vietnam, a new 
government led by Ho Chi Minh asserted Vietnamese 
independence. France, however, refused to recognize the 
regime. In 1946 it sent troops to Vietnam in an attempt to 
reassert French colonial hegemony.
Because the most widely revered Vietnamese nationalist 
leaders were also communists, Russia and China assisted the 
Viet Minh with military and economic aid. With this assistance 
they were able to win the crucial battle of Dien Bien Phu, 
effectively forcing France out of the war. Under the auspices 
of an internationally regulated cease-fire agreement, France 
withdrew its forces from North Vietnam, while the Communists 
withdrew from the South.
The Geneva agreement recognized the Communists as the
10
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legitimate government in North Vietnam, and allowed France two 
years in which to withdraw from the South. The terms under 
which North emd South were to reunite, however, were 
ambiguous. Dr. Douglas Pike asserted that, "The Agreements are 
not clear in meaning or intent. Sir Robert Thompson states 
that, "the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities," was 
signed by the various parties, but the, "final Declaration was 
not signed by any members of the conference . . . .  [And] its 
standing in international law has since been much disputed. 
The Declaration called for free elections in the summer of 
1956, but as Pike points out, "it did not specify elections 
for what . . .  a single legislature for the entire country, or 
elections as a referendum," on reunification, "or elections to 
choose between Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai - Ngo Dien Diem, or 
whatever."
Pike continued, "There is no unanimity of view among 
international lawyers on the question," of which government 
constituted legal authority in Vietnam. Some jurists, "take 
the tack that there [were] two states in Vietnam, neither of 
which [could] claim total permanent sovereignty." Both the 
Northern Communist regime and the new Southern government 
were, "of a caretaker nature, which legally should pass out of
Douglas Pike, War. Peace and the Viet Cona (Cambridge: 
M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 157-62. All of Dr. Pike's quotes on 
this page and the next come from this source.
’sir Robert Thompson, Peace Is Not At Hand (New York: 
McKay, 1974), pp. 7-8.
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existence upon the creation of a new single state of Vietnam. " 
The new government of President Ngo Dien Diem in South 
Vietnam argued, with American support, that elections in North 
Vietnam could not be free. Since the North had the larger 
population, even if all the people in the South were opposed 
to the specific terms of unification being offered in 1956 
they would still be outvoted by the Communist controlled block 
in the numerically larger North. Approximately one-third of 
the population of South Vietnam was made up of the religious 
sects, the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, the Catholic refugees from the 
North, the Chinese business community, and the military 
officer class.'’ Throughout the Viet Minh War these groups 
had demonstrated their amti-communism. Urban South Vietnam was 
also noted for its failure to support the Viet Minh against 
the French. These groups represented about one-half of the 
population, all told. Of the remaining half at least the 
upper-class land owners were strongly anti-communist.
under these circumstances President Diem argued that 
nothing in the spirit of the Geneva agreements required the 
southerners to allow a communist totalitarian government to be 
imposed upon them against their will. Thompson stated that if 
a similar vote had been applied to East and West Germany or 
North and South Korea, the numerically larger non-communist 
blocks would certainly have prevailed. "That argument silenced 
Russia," which had initially supported the North Vietnamese
'®Pike, War, p. 81.
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demand for elections, but then retreated."
The London Economist confirmed in 1973 that, "lawyers 
could spend a long time arguing whether this is what the 1954 
Geneva agreements intended." The Economist has an 
international reputation as one of the world's finest news 
publications. It is not a spokespiece of right wing views. It 
consistently referred to the war as a tragedy for a variety of 
reasons. When subjected to quantitative amalysis, the great 
bulk of its coverage fell in the neutral category. It applied 
the same values to the Vietnam war as it applied to any of its 
other coverage. These principles led the Economist to the 
editorial opinion that "the Americans were right to respond to 
South Vietnam's original and repeated appeals for help."'^ 
This made sense in light of the American liberal ideals as set 
forth in the first ten amendments to the United States 
Constitution. This Bill of Rights guaranteed protection for 
the individuals right to freedom of expression in speech, the 
press, art and literature, and protection of the individual's 
private property from seizure by the government without the 
consent of the people's freely elected representatives. 
Helping a people resist the imposition of an unwanted 
communist totalitarian government was well within the 
tradition of American liberal ideals.
Beyond the moral and political aspects, there were U.S.
"Thompson, Peace. p. 8,
’^ he London Economist. January 6, 1973, p. 11.
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security considerations. President Dvight O. Eisenhower warned 
that if North amd South Vietnam became united under Ho Chi 
Minh, trouble would follow. Eisenhower believed that communist 
insurgents, with weapons supplied by Russia amd China, would 
conquer Cambodia and Laos. Eisenhower was correct about this. 
Vietnamese guerrillas helped to develop the Khmer Rouge and 
Pathet Lao organizations which eventually overthrew the 
governments of Cambodia and Laos.
Eisenhower believed that the communists would not stop 
with Cambodia amd Laos. He expected them to foster 
insurrections in Thailand, Malaya, amd Indonesia. No one can 
say whether these efforts would have succeeded if America had 
not opposed the Communists in 1954. If they had, however, the 
balance of power in the world would have been consideratbly 
different. That scenario would have created a new Communist 
block containing approximately one fifth of the world's 
population. It would have given the Chinese and Russian 
insurrection specialists a greater degree of prestige and 
momentum. If this had translated into more vigorous Latin 
American insurgencies, leaders in the United States of the 
1950s and 1960s would surely have reacted as if these events 
were a threat to national security. Thus it was by no means 
impossible that an unopposed Communist expansion in 1954 could 
have eventually created a situation which Americans would have 
seen as genuinely threatening their security. Arguably, then, 
there were quite legitimate reasons for the United States to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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assist South Vietnam in 1954.
Unfortunately the Diem government quickly became 
unpopular in South Vietnam. By i960 more than half of the 
rural population supported the Viet Cong insurgency. In the 
late 1950s and early 1960s as U.S. military aid increased, one 
might have asserted that the United States was militarily 
imposing a hated dictator on an unwilling people. A change in 
policy seemed warranted.
Because of the Viet Minh's popularity in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, prominent observers advised the Americem 
government to reject a military buildup in Vietnam and 
concentrate on counter insurgency. Bernard Fall warned that the 
situation was fraught with heavy political overtones: "To win 
the military battle but lose the political war could well 
become the U.S. fate in Vietneun."'^ Hans Horganthau advised 
the Kennedy administration "to avoid military responses [and] 
force political reforms upon the Diem regime."'* Robert 
Komer, who headed the allied counterinsurgency effort in 1967 
stated that there was no "dearth of advice on how to fight an 
insurgency through land reform, rural development programs, 
paraumil itary and police techniques."'^ General Edward
'^ Newsweek. August, 20, 1962, p. 40.
'*Charles DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1990) p. 84.
'®R.W. Komer, Bureaucracy At War (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1986), p. 4. The rest of the paragraph comes 
from this page.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
16
Lemdsdale "dissented with vigor” from the military buildup 
policy amd recommended counter insurgency. Dennis Duncamson and 
Sir Robert Thompson of the British Advisory Mission in Saigon, 
"gave similar operational advice, " as did the Michigan State 
University Advisory Group.
President John F. Kennedy, however, chose to steadily 
increase the number of military advisors to the Army of the 
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) (as well as the flow of weapons and 
supplies). When this proved insufficient. President Lyndon 
Johnson committed American air power. The introduction of 
massive American firepower did not sit well with liberals. 
Although it may have had some marginal military value in 
slowing the flow of Communist war supplies, bombing North 
VietneuB did not seem likely to make South Vietnamese peasants 
turn their support from the Viet Cong to the Saigon 
government. Walter Lippman stated that, "an American air war 
against North Vietnam was as foolish as it was immoral."'* 
Predicteüaly the bombing failed to turn the war around. With 
the ARVN on the verge of defeat in 1965, Lippman wrote that 
Americans would have to pay for the "grievous mistake" of a 
failing Vietnam policy. Historian Charles DeBenedetti 
concluded, "They would pay either with their pride through a 
political settlement or with their lives in an extended 
war.President Johnson chose to commit U.S. ground forces.
'^DeBenedetti, Ordeal. p. 94. 
'^ Ibid. p. 102.
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When American troops landed in 1965, their mission was to 
make war on the hundreds of thousemds of South Vietnamese who 
were trying to overthrow their government. While American 
liberals could have endorsed the use of known 
counterinsurgency techniques (the introduction of democratic 
local government, combined with assistance in local security 
and economic development), simply killing the 40 percent of 
the population which lived in Communist controlled areas could 
not be justified. Under these circumstances the liberal anti­
war movement arose in America.
The world had changed since 1954. The Communist 
insurgency in Malaya had been defeated. Governments there and 
in Indonesia were more steUt>le. Some economic development had 
occurred.'* President Eisenhower's Domino Theory was probably 
less valid in 1965 than it had been a decade earlier. But even 
if one believed that Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia were still 
vulnerable, it would not have seemed necessary for the United 
States to militarily defeat the Communists in order to protect 
the remainder of Southeast Asia.'’ The mere existence of an 
effective ARVN probably would have been enough to fulfill 
America's national security objectives. It would have given 
allied counterinsurgency experts enough time to implement the 
techniques which they had been arguing would win the war. If
'^Thompson, Peace, pp. 32-33.
'’sir Robert Thompson, No Exit From Vietnam (New York; 
David McKay Company), 1970.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
an effective ARVN had existed at all, it seems unlikely that 
the Communists would have diverted resources for a large scale 
undertaking in another country. It does not seem probable that 
they would have chosen such a strategy, but even if the 
Communists had wished to do so their long supply line through 
Laos and Cambodia would have been vulnerable to an ARVN 
assault.
In order to meet U.S. security objectives, then, it was 
only necessary to insure against the collapse of the Saigon 
government, while working to improve South Vietnam's military 
performance. Some aggressive combat was required of American 
forces in 1965 to stave off immediate defeat, but having 
accomplished this much, as Sir Robert Thompson asks, "The 
question was 'What next?. ' A limited application of 
American power would have required neither large numbers of 
American troops and casualties, nor the expenditure of massive 
quantities of American ordinance against Vietnamese civilians. 
Also, it would not have cost $150 billion. Even if South 
Vietnam had never proved viable, eventually American forces 
could have withdrawn, secure in the knowledge that Thailand, 
Malaya and Indonesia had developed sufficiently that they were 
no longer easy targets for insurgency or conquest. Time Inc. 's 
editor-in-chief Hedley Donovan made this argument in a 1971 
editorial/" Donovan stated that America had achieved its
“ifeiâ., p. 134.
"Time. June 14, 1971, pp. 28-30.
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national security purpose because the other nations of South 
East Asia were no longer at risk.
President Johnson emd General William Westmoreland, 
however, chose a more aggressive policy. They attempted to 
militarily defeat the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regular 
army. Westmoreland stated his priorities in his book, à 
Soldier Reports; "a commander . . . wins no battles by sitting 
back . . . .  if we avoided battle, we would never succeed. We 
could never destroy the big units," if American troops did not 
aggressively pursue them into their elusive sanctuaries.^ 
Thus American combat troops fought the Communists throughout 
South Vietnam, and American airpower was used against targets 
in North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
Thompson, however, argued that this strategy was a 
mistake. If Westmoreland had used aggressive small unit 
patrols near the vital population centers he could have 
detected Communist main force attacks, and used superior 
American mobility to bring in the reserves. Battles fought in 
the open agricultural lands would have forced the Communists 
to expose themselves, allowing American fire power to 
overwhelm them. The Viet Cong would have been unchallenged in 
the vast unpopulated areas of mountainous jungle, but they 
would have been cut off from their source of supplies and 
recruits. Such a strategy would have taken much longer, and
22General Willieua Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden 
City New York: Doubleday and Company, 1976), pp. 144, 150.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I
. , l i
20
might never have actually defeated the Communist armies, but 
American success did not depend on defeating them. The lover 
level of American involvement would have made the war more 
palatable to critics during the time required to improve South 
Vietnamese performance. The United States, however, chose 
General Westmoreland's more aggressive search and destroy 
strategy.
Unhappy as they were with the American military buildup, 
"The great majority of antiwar critics . . . rejected the
demand for immediate withdrawal as politically infeasible, 
dishonorable in view of Washington ' s past commitments, " and an 
abandonment of the legitimate goal of checking Communist 
aggression.^ Still liberals were concerned about "the kind 
of war being waged. America was causing "untold harm to 
the people of Vietnam. During 1965 anti-war forces sent at 
least 1,500, "Vietnam-related messages per week," to the 
Johnson administration emphasizing "the immorality of the 
war. B-52 raids over North Vietnam called forth, "a moral 
judgement on the war's basic inhumanity."
In March 1965 the anti-war forces developed the "idea of 
a teach-in to focus attention 'on this war, its consequences
^DeBenedetti, Ordeal. p. 97. 
p. 99.
“ifeid.. p. 100.
26Ibid., p. 106. The next quote comes from this page also
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and ways to stop i t . T h e  technique was an instant 
success. One hundred and twenty universities held teach-ins 
during 1965. As the level of U.S. commitment grew, critics 
also developed the argument that America was wasting limited 
resources. The nation needed to "choose between devoting its 
resources and energies to maintaining military superiority and 
international hegemony or rechanneling those resources and 
energies to meeting the desperate needs of its people.
Moreover memy anti-war activists were "not necessarily 
opposed to all war, but rather to a military subjugation of 
newly emerging nations. Liberals also focused on the
inequities of the draft, which allowed the wealthy, college 
bound upper classes to avoid service while the poor could not. 
It also forced unwilling American boys to go to Vietnam where 
they inevitably beceune part of the immoral process of killing 
innocent civilians. Draft resistance developed into a personal 
commitment for many anti-war liberals.*"
In 1966 three marines were court martialed and sentenced 
to life imprisonment for, "killing civilians while on patrol 
near Tribinh." Grimly, Hans Morganthau predicted that "the 
real moral heros of this war" would be those officers who quit
p. 108. 
”lbid.. p. 111. 
” ibid, p.136
"ibid., pp. 166-67,
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their commands rather than participate in the indiscriminate 
killing of civilians.Journalists and activists who visited 
North Vietnam "documented the fact of tragic civilian 
destruction," caused by American bombing." With South 
Vietnamese civilian casualties averaging more than 2,000 per 
week, the United States appeared to be destroying the country 
it was supposed to be saving and corrupting itself in the 
process."
Martin Luther King stated that, "I could never again 
raise my voice against the violence of the oppressed in the 
ghettos without first having spoken clearly to the greatest 
purveyor of violence in the world today— my own 
government. "" King called for a bombing halt, defensive 
enclave strategy, and a negotiated settlement. At the 
beginning of 1968, like Martin Luther King, "Most liberals 
still resisted immediate withdrawal" but they could not 
support the methods by which the war was being fought."
In the spring of 1968 the Tet Offensive shocked America's 
confidence. It caused President Johnson to drop out of the 
Democratic primaries and to open negotiations with the
p. 168. 
"ibiâ., p. 169.
f p. 170. 
^Ibid.. pp. 172-73. 
"Uaid., p. 194.
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Communists." When negotiations failed, the war dragged on 
through 1969. Although President Nixon amnounced the 
unilateral (phased) withdrawal of American troops, the 
fighting continued. The obvious question was if, "Even with a 
half-million troops and a punishing three year air war, the 
United States had failed" to significantly limit Hanoi's 
ability to make war, how were the South Vietnamese supposed to 
hold out after the Americans left? "What purpose could now be 
served by continued fighting?"" Anti-war forces began to 
acknowledge "open acceptance of American failure in 
Vietnam."" They called for immediate American withdrawal. In 
November 1969, "Perhaps a half-million Americans gathered" on 
the Mall in Washington, D.c. "to rescue the nation from the
39war makers. " When the story of the My Lai massacre came to 
light, it only added fuel to the fire. The war was "a bad 
down-hill careening nightmare, entirely out of rational 
control.
President Nixon, however, proved to be an effective 
opponent. His "policy of negotiation and Vietnamization
General Westmoreland states on page 233 of A Soldier 
Reports that Johnson told him in November 1967 that he had 
decided not to seek reelection because of health problems.
"ueBenedetti, Ordeal. p. 238.
“ifeiâ. , pp. 240, 248, 257.
"ifeiâ., p. 262.
, p. 267.
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largely denied an issue to anti-war" activists.The problem 
was that since Nixon had already committed the nation to a 
unilateral withdrawal of American troops, it was difficult to 
convince a majority of the public that the immediate 
withdrawal of all troops should be the minimum requirement of 
a moral society. One anti-war response to this problem was, 
"to challenge the legitimacy of the Thieu government. "" If 
South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu could be shown to 
be a brutal military dictator who did not enjoy the support of 
the South vietncunese people, then it would be much harder for 
Nixon to justify the continued fighting. If Thieu were in fact 
forcing the war upon a populace who would have preferred to 
negotiate a settlement, then further U.S. support of 
Vietnamization was clearly immoral. Peace activists "regarded 
Vietnamization as a mercenary policy which would perpetuate 
violence in Vietnam indefinitely. Liberals began 
denouncing Thieu as a tyrant.^ Because Thieu "would not 
submit to free elections and could not survive them . . . .  
the Saigon regime . . . was itself the real barrier to a peace 
settlement."^" American liberals found themselves "unhappily 
moving to the side of those who would prefer . . .  an American
, p. 268. 
"ifeid-f p. 268.
, p. 295.
, p. 312. 
"ibid.. pp. 353, 313.
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defeat to Vietnamization."" Randall Woods states that for 
one of the most powerful anti-war activists, the chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William Fulbright, the 
war's basic immorality meant that "The worst thing that could 
have happened in Vietnam was for America to have won a 
military victory.""
In the spring of 1970 American troops attacked Communist 
strongholds in Cambodia. This move injected new vigor into the 
forces opposing the war as "the president unilaterally 
expanded it into Indochina. "" At this point the war caused 
one of its worst side effects in America. Student unrest in 
the wake of the Cambodian incursion brought the national guard 
to the Kent State University campus. When guardsmen shot four 
students to death, the tragedy reached new dimensions.
Still Nixon fought on. Despite years of protest, the 
killing continued. Many members of the anti-war movement 
became exhausted and bitter in 1971 and 1972." The President 
was able to continue prosecuting the war and remained popular 
enough to win a landslide reelection in 1972. Nixon and 
Kissenger's 1973 peace treaty gained the release of American 
prisoners and brought the troops home, "with honor." But for
"ifeidw p.
"Randal Woods, Fulbriohti a Bioaraphy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 538.
"üeBenedetti, Ordeal. p. 272.
"ibid., pp. 294, 297.
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informed American liberals the war was not over. Peace 
activists, "drew a distinction between the end of overt 
American combat and continuing U.S. intervention in the 
struggle for power in Indochina." Nixon still pursued his 
"political objective of an allied anticommunist South Vietnam. 
In that respect peace was still elusive amd Vietnam yet an 
American dilemma.""
Because anti-war forces considered the Thieu regime to be 
the "real barrier to a peace settlement," that most Vietnamese 
wanted, it was morally imperative for the United States to 
"withhold further military auid political assistance," to the 
South Vietnamese.Morality also required America to "end 
the bombing of Cambodia and military aid to Lon Nol." Anti-war 
forces could at least taüce satisfaction in achieving these 
goals. Congress forced Nixon to end U.S. air support of Lon 
Nol in the summer of 1973. In South Vietnam the United States 
continued to give some aid, but it was not enough to allow 
the ARVN to fight effectively. Sir Robert Thompson wrote that 
during 1973 the ARVN was aüale to use only one-fifth as much 
ammunition and one-tenth as much gasoline as it had used in 
1971, even though the war was still being fought at a rate 
which killed 12,778 ARVN personnel (while 14,647 had died in
1 9 7 1 ) George Herring states that after the Paris
"ibid", P* 349. The next quote is from p. 349 also, 
"^ibid.. p. 353. The next quote is from p. 353 also, 
^^hompson. Peace, p. 156.
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agreements, "Congress drastically cut back aid to South 
Vietnam . . . .  air force operations had to be curtailed by as 
much as 50 percent because of shortages of gasoline and spare 
parts. Ammunition and other supplies had to be severely 
rationed. The inescapable signs of waning American support had 
a devastating effect on morale."" After America withdrew. 
South Vietnam collapsed relatively quickly.
This essentially liberal interpretation of the anti-war 
movement, as compelling as it seems, leaves several questions 
unanswered. The underlying assumptions are that continued U.S. 
assistance to South Vietnam was immoral because: one, victory 
was impossible; and two, the unpopular military dictator, 
Thieu, was forcing the South Vietnamese people to continue a 
war which they did not want to fight. Historian Charles 
DeBenedetti argues, for example, that President Nixon, 
"perpetuated the illusion that . . . the United States could 
secure an independently viable, noncommunist regime in South 
Vietnam."" George Herring states that no amount of support 
would have been "enough to save an army that refused to fight 
. . . . the American effort to create a bastion of anti­
communism South of the seventeenth parallel was probably 
doomed from the start."" Randall Woods believed that "the
"George Herring, America's Longest War (New York: McKay, 
1996), p. 293.
"oeBenedetti, Ordeal. p.247
"Herring, War, pp. 296, 298.
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situation vas that Hanoi had only to wait and refuse to make 
concessions; eventually the Americans would be gone and the 
pitifully weak Thieu would be summarily dispatched.
But these assumptions must be challenged. Russia and 
China had been supplying the North Vietnamese with all of the 
weapons, ammunition, fuel they had used to fight the war. 
After the 1972 Easter Offensive the Communists spent $2.5 
billion rebuilding the North's army with the most advemced 
artillery, tanks, and MIG aircraft in the Russiem arsenal." 
Informed liberals also knew that the Viet Cong's normal daily 
fighting tactics eunounted to war by perpetual atrocity." 
What if there had been good reason to believe that the South 
Vietnamese wanted to defend themselves from this ruthless, 
externally funded attempt to militarily impose totalitarian 
communism on them? Such evidence would render the liberal 
position, that morality required the United States to refuse 
them the means to defend themselves, extremely difficult to 
justify.
A great deal of evidence exists supporting the conclusion 
that South Vietnamese forces fought hard and defeated their
"woods, Fulbright. p. 561.
"Douglas Pike, Vietnam and the Soviet Union (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p. 125.
"liffiê,February 9, 1968, p.22-26; May 10, 1968, p.37; June 
21, 1968, p.27; October, 31, 1969, p.32-33; November 28, 1969, 
p. 19; December 5, 1969, p.29; June 22, 1970 p.34; May 15, 
1972, p.30; August 21, 1972, p.17. See also, Gunter Levy, 
America In Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 
pp. 272-78.
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communist adversary in the Tet Offensive, the Cambodian 
incursion. Operation Lam Son 719, the Easter Offensive, and in 
local security battles. Equally prominent is the evidence that 
the Communist position grew steadily weaker as a consequence 
of each of these defeats. This material is presented in 
chapters two and three below.
Herring, DeBenedetti, and Woods assert that, "the 
American effort was doomed from the start." This opinion 
appears in virtually every mainstream history of the war. 
Nevertheless there exists a substantial body of evidence 
contradicting the assertion that the war was impossible to 
win.
A second question about the assumptions which underlay 
the liberal interpretation of the war arises from the 
assertion that President Thieu was a brutal and unpopular 
military dictator who forced the South Vietneunese to fight on 
when they would have preferred to negotiate an end to the war. 
DeBenedetti argues that the Saigon/U.S.A. report "documented 
the barbarous repression of the Thieu regime. In this respect 
it got to the bottom of the matter of Vietnam . . . [because] 
'We do not have the right and do not have the capacity to save 
a political regime abroad that does not have the respect of 
its own people.'"" If America withdrew its support the 
Communists were bound to win but "that could not be as bad as 
the repression and destruction wrought by Saigon" and its
"DeBenedetti, Ordeal. p. 269.
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American defenders. "  George Herring added that America 
"stubbornly supported Thieu long after it was evident the 
President had no backing within his own country.
Again, there is a considerable body of evidence which 
contradicts these opinions. Dr. Howard Penniman, Professor of 
Government at Georgetown University, investigated the charges 
that the Thieu regime was brutally repressive. He found that 
there were twenty-seven Vietnamese language newspapers 
operating in April 1972. There were, "five pro-goveimment, 
eight anti-govemment, nine independent and five religious," 
publications. During 1970, 1971, and the early part of 1972 
(when the research was conducted), "no daily newspaper had 
been suspended and no editor or newsman jailed or fined," 
although anti-govemment editorials were frequently 
published." Dr. Lucian W. Pye of the Center for 
International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
stated in 1971 that, "compared with most Asian societies South 
Vietnam remains relatively open." Dr. John P. Roche, 
Professor of Politics at Brandies University wrote that South 
Vietnam had, "a considerably higher specific democratic 
gravity than some 100 members of the United Nations." U.S.
“ibid., p. 322,
^^Herring, War, p. 297.
"Howard Penniman, Elections In South Vietnam (Washington, 
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1972), p. 159. The next quote is from p. 188, and 
the following is from the back cover of the book.
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Commanding General William Westmoreland described Thieu as 
being "honest and candid . . . .  a master of timing. He was 
patient and cautious . . .  a deft handler of the leaders of 
the religious amd sectional factions.""
Reporters for Time magazine and the Economist were in 
South Vietnam during the 1971 presidential election. Both 
agreed that Thieu had "enough solid support in the countryside 
to win going away."" Dr. Penniman's observations confirmed 
this opinion. The evidence of Thieu's electoral popularity is 
presented on pages 84-86 below.
A more important question, however, is whether the South 
Vietnamese people supported Thieu's war policy. Events 
documented in 1968 and 1972 strongly suggested they did. In 
1968 President Johnson agreed to participate in peace talks 
with the North Vietnamese government and the National 
Liberation Front (the political representative of the Viet 
Cong). President Thieu, however, upset the process by refusing 
to cooperate. Thieu believed that if the NLF were allowed to 
participate it would amount to am admission that they 
legitimately represented some portion of the South Vietnamese 
people and thus should be allowed to participate in a 
coalition government. Thieu preferred to seek a military 
victory rather than negotiate on those terms. Because of this
"Westmoreland, Report, p. 218. 
"Time. May 3, 1970, p. 30.
I
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Stand Thieu vas hailed as a hero throughout Saigon." Time 
reported that the normally quarrelsome opposition press had 
united behind the President. A photograph showed members of 
the South Vietnamese legislature marching in support of 
Thieu's strong pro-war, anti-communist stand.
President Thieu took a similarly strong stand in rejecting 
Henry Kissinger's Paris agreement of October 1972. The London 
Economist reported that just as in 1968 Thieu had "won a lot 
of support this week, even among his political rivals" for his 
strong pro-war, anti-communist stand." Popular enthusiasm 
for the war was strong enough that the elite divisions of the 
military, such as the airborne and the marines, filled their 
manpower quotas from volunteers in 1972. No draft was 
necessary for these units."
Dr. Penniman agreed, stating that "Nearly all members of 
the National Assembly sprang to the defense of South 
Vietnamese independence" during the 1972 Easter Offensive. 
They "led the people in contributing money to the cost of 
defending the nation" in this crisis. Penniman concluded that 
"the vast majority of the South Vietnamese appear to prefer" 
supporting the war effort, rather than allowing a communist 
totalitarian government to conquer them."
"ibid..November 15, 1968, pp. 40-42. 
"Economist. October 28, 1972, p. 18. 
"•Thompson, Peace, p. 112.
"penniman. Elections. pp. 195-96.
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The South Vietnamese people gave conclusive proof of 
their preference in 1975. By then it was clear that the ARVN 
had neither the money to pay its soldiers nor the ammunition 
to fight effectively. The United States had demonstrated that 
it did not intend to re-intervene. The ARVN was in full 
retreat, and in no position to counterattack in any 
foreseeable future. Thus the war was over in areas being 
"liberated" by the North Vietnamese.
The people living in these areas had a clear choice. If 
they rallied to the Communists they could secure a variety of 
benefits. They would be safely behind the front lines, 
physically secure from the war. They would be able to continue 
living in their own homes. Most important, perhaps, they would 
gain favor with the new government by immediately rallying to 
its standard.
If, instead of accepting these benefits, people tried to 
flee the Communists, they exposed themselves to North 
Vietnamese artillery fire, which was constantly intradicting 
all roads. The best hope of those who survived the deadly 
artillery bombardment would have been to find shelter in a 
refugee ceunp near Saigon.
Given these two choices, the people fled south by the 
hundreds of thousands. They unquestionably preferred the 
continued suffering of war under the Saigon government to 
security and peace under the Communists.
Thus here again the liberal interpretation of the war can
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be questioned. What is the evidence that the Thieu regime was 
an unpopular, brutally repressive dictatorship which forced 
the Vietnamese people to continue a war which they would have 
preferred not to fight? One purpose of this thesis, then, 
will be to challenge the assumptions underlying the liberal 
position in the years after the 1968 Tet Offensive.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1 
TIME'S IDEOLOGICAL BIAS
This thesis examines the bias in Time magazine's coverage 
of the Vietnam War. In order to get a sense of the criteria 
used to categorize Time*s articles and measure bias, readers 
should cast themselves in the role of a propagandist. If the 
propaganda editor for a pro-war publication would have wanted 
an article printed, then it was a pro-war article. Conversely, 
if the editor of an anti-war publication would have wanted to 
print it, then it was an anti-war piece. If neither editor 
would particularly have favored an article's publication, but 
would have had no particular objection to its use, then the 
article was neutral. The next few pages more specifically 
define these positions.
Many representatives of the anti-war position came to 
believe that the U.S. involvement in the war had been a 
mistake from the beginning. It had been immoral for America to 
impose its choice of corrupt military dictators on South 
Vietnam. It was objectionable for the United States to use its
35
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massive advantage in technology and firepower against a less 
developed, nonindustrial nation. It was unconscioneUsle for 
Americans to have killed hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese. 
Beyond that it was senselessly impractical because the war 
could not have been won at any reasonable cost. Worse perhaps, 
dissention over the war ripped American society apart. The 
U.S. presence in Vietnam was causing both nations needless, 
senseless suffering. America had little or nothing to gain 
from its continuing involvement in Vietnam, and a great deal 
to lose. The surest way to end the U.S. orchestrated tragedy 
in Vietnam was to end U.S. involvement. From the anti-war 
point of view, there was really only one question about the 
war: how soon could the U.S. withdraw?
Opponents of the war favored publicizing the war's 
tragedies, the My Lai and Kent State massacres in particular. 
An anti-war publicist would have wanted to emphasize the cost 
of the war in lives and dollars. Money wasted on the war could 
not be spent on America ' s legitimate needs and social 
programs. Publications teücing the anti-war view would have 
written about the suffering of U.S. service personnel and 
prisoners of war. The problems of Vietnamese civilians driven 
from their homes into squalid refugee camps would have been 
important. Anti-war forces portrayed the Saigon government as 
a corrupt and repressive military dictatorship. Anti-war 
protest demonstrations in the U.S. were seen in the most 
favorable light.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
It was also very importamt from the anti-war prospective 
to define the war as being hopelessly lost. This was crucial 
because by 1971 the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) 
had taücen over almost all of the combat responsibilities from 
U.S. troops. If the perception had existed among the U.S. 
public that the ARVN could win the war with only U.S. 
financial aid, advisors, and occasional air support, some 
Americans would have endorsed this ongoing aid. Those who 
wished to cut off funds would certainly have faced an angry 
debate. If, however, anti-war forces were successful in 
convincing the American public that the war could not be won 
(the ARVN was incompetent, and the South Vietnamese people did 
not support the corrupt military dictatorship of the Thieu 
regime) then complete American withdrawal would have been the 
only reasonable choice.
On the other side of the issue, pro-war advocates 
believed that the principles of containment applied to the 
Vietnam War. They felt that communism was an evil system, 
which stole the rights and freedoms of the people whom it 
oppressed. Proponents of containment believed that Russia and 
China were aggressive military empires. They used the 
"national war of liberation" as their favorite technique for 
enlarging their empires. Communist agents worked in third 
world countries across the globe in support of these national 
wars of liberation. They armed and trained guerrilla 
insurgents. These small minorities of Communists then tried to
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militarily subjugate the unwilling majority. When the 
Communists won, in North Vietnam for example, they used brutal 
methods to institute collectivized agriculture and maintained 
power through the use of harsh police state tactics."
From this point of view, the U.S. needed to help those 
countries which were threatened by international Communism. 
Helping people fight Communism was morally good in and of 
itself, because it prevented the enslavement and suffering of 
the threatened people. But it was also fundamentally necessary 
to the security of the United States. International Communism 
could only be stopped by force. If the United States could not 
help Asiems, Africans, and Latin Americans fight and contain 
international Communism then eventually America would be 
forced to fight World War Three against the enlarged Chinese 
emd Russian empires.
People who believed in containment wanted to preserve the 
independence of South Vietnam. Representatives of this point 
of view emphasized the fact that ARVN had taken more battle 
casualties than the United States in 1968, and by mid-1969 it 
was teücing at least 80 percent of the allied battle deaths. ^  
War supporters wrote about the improving degree of security 
provided by the ARVN in combination with the new local 
militia, the Regional Forces (RF) and the Popular Forces (PF).
69Douglas Pike, The History of Vietnamese communiap 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 108-109. See 
also Pike, War, p. 71.
^Time. December 12, 1969, p. 15.
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They emphasized the improving stemdard of living of the South 
Vietnamese peasantry and their newly prestigious social status 
after land reform had made them farm owners for the first time 
in the nation's history.
As the United States reduced its presence in Vietnam, 
there would have been some level of assistance which would 
have allowed South Vietnam to sustain its independence from 
the North Vietnamese Communists. In South Korea, for example, 
the U.S. maintained troops and economic assistamce over an 
extended period of time. War supporters wanted to frame the 
debate during U.S. withdrawal in terms of how much continuing 
assistance would have been required to win a Korea-like 
settlement.
Working from these perspectives, this thesis treats those 
combat articles which portray allied troops in positive 
winning terms as pro-war stories. Articles which portrayed the 
Communists in positive winning terms were anti-war.
Peace treaty negotiation stories have all been defined as 
neutral. Technically, perhaps, they should all be counted as 
anti-war. Certainly there were members of the pro-war camp who 
believed that the allies should simply win on the battle field 
and forget about negotiating. There were also, however, many 
war supporters who would have welcomed a negotiated 
settlement, if the terms had been acceptable. Time's articles 
on the peace negotiations were always quite speculative in 
nature. There were never enough concrete details about the
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terms for readers to judge whether they could have supported 
a treaty or not. Thus, for purposes of this paper, they have 
been categorized as neutral.
Using these criteria of classification, from June 1, 
1969, through December 24, 1974, Time published 693 Cl pro­
war, 4047 Cl neutral, and 5,578 Cl anti-war. If one looks at 
the period from September 21, 1970 forward. Time' s bias was 
even more pronounced: 228 Cl pro-war, 2758 Cl neutral, and 
3,916 Cl anti-war.
In June 1971, Time Inc.'s editor-in-chief. Medley 
Donovam, laid out the magazine's editorial philosophy. Donovan 
argued "for total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam" as 
quickly as possible. He continued, "Actually, there are 
grounds for thinking that the South has a fighting chance, but 
. . . the U.S. can no longer stay . . .  to protect or improve 
that chance." Donovan believed that too many Americans had 
already died in Vietnam. "Coming out of Viet Nam means 
removing all American combat and support forces— land, sea and 
air— from South Vietnam, and ending air operations, carrier 
based and Thailand based, over Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia. 
This editorial was not one of a series, it was not balanced by 
a similar pro-war editorial. It represented Time Inc.'s 
editor-in-chief announcing his conviction about the war. In 
the editorial, Donovan explained why he had converted from 
being a war supporter to being an advocate of immediate
June 14, 1971, pp. 28-30.
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withdrawal. Donovan actively promoted his anti-war views, not 
only in Time but also through a series of anti-war speeches. 
As early as 1967, he told a New York University graduating 
class that America ought to "admit that we had attempted 
something beyond our powers" in Vietnam.^
Donovan's view was essentially that of the anti-war 
movement. The U.S. should completely withdraw as quickly as 
possible, even if it meant losing a war which might have been 
hypothetically possible to win. Time outlined this position 
as early as the October 24, 1969, issue. It contained the 
argument that what America required was "a commitment that 
U.S. forces be totally withdrawn regardless of progress in 
Saigon or any other factor . . . .  Bitterness at home is 
likely to grow so severe if the war is continued even at a 
relatively low level that the U.S. system itself is likely to 
be impaired."”
This article represents an extreme form of anti-war 
rhetoric. It completely misrepresents the mood of mass opinion 
in America. The fact is that as U.S. combat deaths fell so did 
support for the anti-war movement. Public opinion polls showed 
consistent support for President Nixon's policy of relatively 
low levels of U.S. combat involvement while helping the South
^Stanley Kamow, Vietnam; A Historv (New York; Viking 
Press, 1983), p. 503.
October 24, 1969, p. 20.
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Vietnamese prepare to defend themselves.” A September 1972, 
Harris poll found that "55 percent supported continued heavy 
bombing of North Vietnam, 64 percent supported the mining of 
the Haiphong Harbor, and 74 percent thought it was important 
that South Vietnam not fall into the hands of the 
Communists.
In a February 1970 article. Time asserted that the policy 
of Vietnamization was immoral because it prolonged an immoral 
war that could not be won.” Here again, only members of the 
anti-war movement felt that Vietnamization was immoral. Most 
Americans consistently supported Vietnamization. In May 1970, 
Time offered the view that "The President is isolated . . . 
not adequately exposed to reasonable opposing views . . .  he 
has not offered the level of moral leadership [which the 
country needs. Thus] the nation disintegrates . . . .  If 
Americans continue on their present path, their epitaph might 
well be that they were a potentially great people."” It 
seems absurd that a respected national publication could have 
been predicting the collapse of the republic if America did 
not withdraw all forces from Vietnam as quickly as possible. 
Yet that is exactly what Time magazine was doing in 1970.
”Hallin. 'Uncensored' War, p. 182.
^Richard Nixon, RN; The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New 
York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 689.
”Time. February 9, 1970, p. 26.
”lbid.. May 25, 1970, pp. 16-17.
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Again, it represents an extreme form of anti-war rhetoric.
In the spring of 1971, Time announced that, "To those who 
have long regarded U.S. involvement in the war as profoundly 
immoral, a victory would be the final outrage."” In May 1972 
Time asserted that the war continued as it did only because of 
President Mixon's "almost obsessive fear of personal 
humiliation in Viet Nam. In November 1972 Time helped 
America "assess the terrible cost of its . . . most
debilitating . . . unwinnable, inconclusive and finally
intolerable war . . . .  The methods we have used in fighting 
the war have scandalized and disgusted public opinion in 
almost all foreign countries.""
It was, however, in the April 5, 1971, issue that Time 
assumed its most extreme anti-war position. Time announced 
that it was sympathetic to the idea that America, as a matter 
of principle, ought to be defeated on the battle field. The 
article began by quoting columnist Arthur Hoope, "The radio 
this morning said the allied invasion of Laos had bogged down. 
Without thinking I nodded and said 'good'. And having said it, 
I realized the bitter truth: Now I root against my own 
country." Time went on to explain, in its own editorial words, 
that rooting for an American defeat on the battle field "is 
not basically a matter of treason . . . .  since it long ago
” lbid.. March 1, 1971, p. 10.
^Ibid.. May 22, 1972, pp. 11-12. 
” lbid.. November 6, 1972, pp. 14-27.
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became clear that an American 'victory' in Viet Nam is 
impossible."*^
Time's editorial philosophy is clear enough. But was it 
simply reflecting what it perceived as public opinion? No, it 
was not. During 1969-1971, polls showed that most Americans 
were angry and frustrated by the length of the war, the number 
of dead, and the cost in dollars. They did not, however, want 
to see America withdraw from Vietnam in defeat.*^ They 
supported President Nixon's policy of Vietnamization, which 
strove to build up South Vietnam's resources to a level at 
which it would be able to defend itself from the North 
Vietnamese Communists. This policy required U.S. combat troops 
to remain in South Vietnam defending the country until ARVN 
units could develop the strength to take their places. As U.S. 
troop strength diminished. President Nixon stated, on more 
than one occasion, that "Air power, of course, will continue 
to be used. We will continue to use it in support of the South 
Vietnamese until [they] have developed the capacity to handle 
the situation themselves."** President Nixon and his policies 
averaged a 57 percent approval rating from the American public 
during his first term in office, 1969-1972.*
* Ibid.. April 5, 1971, p. 12.
*^Louis Harris, The Anguish of Chance (New York: Norton,
1973), p. 70.
**Time. November 22, 1971, p. 24. 
**Hallin, 'Uncensored' War, p. 182.
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Public opinion on the war broke into three groups. A 
noisy minority of Americans continued to actively support the 
war. Time carried stories of pro-war demonstrations on four 
separate occasions scattered through 1969 amd 1970.* I have 
not been able to find any figure for the size of this group, 
as a national percentage.
The second minority group were those who, like Time, 
believed in the goals of the anti-war movement. A poll in June 
1970 showed that 27 percent of the American public were 
sympathetic to the anti-war protest demonstrations (53 percent 
condemned them) .* The anti-war movement then probably 
represented aüaout 27 percent of all Americans. The majority of 
Americans were angry and frustrated, but still supported the 
President.
Public opinion polls frecpiently asked in one form or 
another whether Americans approved of the President's handling 
of the war. In late 1972 a majority of the public responded 
positively to this question.*^ Time, however, responded 
negatively and scolded the American public for disagreeing. 
"By any yardstick, except the polls, the Administration should
lime, October 24, 1969, p. 19; November 21, 1969, pp. 
25-26; May 18, 1970, p. 10; May 25, 1970, p. 16. See also 
DeBenedetti, Ordeal. pp. 258-59.
June 8, 1970, p. 22. See also Harris, Anguish, pp.
65-67.
“^ Harris, Anguish, p. 75.
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be in trouble over its handling of the war."** The article 
then provided detailed criticism of the President's handling 
of the war.
Time indicated on six other occasions that it was aware 
of the huge gulf separating its editorial philosophy from the 
mass of American public opinion. In October of 1969 Time 
eumounced the results of the latest Lou Harris poll: "it is 
remarkaüale [that the] President enjoys considerable public 
support: a majority backs him on the rate of troop withdrawal 
and on the matter of self determination for South Vietnam."*^ 
In September 1970 Time indicated that although Congress had 
passed the Copper-Church amendment in July (ending funding for 
U.S. troops in Cambodia), a filibuster had delayed passage 
until the United States had already evacuated Ceunbodia. "Since 
then the doves have been beaten [on all proposed pieces of 
anti-war legislation, amd] public opinion polls show that 
public support of the President's policies remains strong.
In November 1971 Time indicated clearly that its value 
system (the values of the anti-war movement) were considerably 
more liberal than those of the mass of American opinion. The 
article stated that President Nixon was making heavier use of 
bombing than even President Johnson had. Lamenting that the 
anti-war forces remained dormant in spite of this provocation.
**l4fflg, October 23, 1972, p. 34. 
*^ Ibid.. October 31, 1969, p. 13. 
” lbid.. September 14, 1970, p. 15.
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Time concluded, "The harsh calculation— that it is better to 
sacrifice Vietnamese lives than American ones— seems to 
satisfy the American public . . . .  [But, Time hoped] 
Eventually stronger emotional opposition to the air war may
91build." The difference between Time's position and the mass 
of American opinion was best expressed by sociologist Dr. 
Howard Schuman in his study of attitudes about the war.^ As 
U.S. combat troops played a smaller role and combat casualties 
declined, the issue for members of the anti-war movement was, 
"What are we doing to the Vietnamese?" ; for the mass public it 
was "Are we winning the war?" In other words, for Time and the 
anti-war movement Nixon's use of bombing amounted to a crime 
against humanity. By contrast, the general public consistently 
supported the use of bombing in am effort to win the war.
In the May 3, 1972, issue Time devoted 63 column inches 
to an attack on "the reckless President Nixon [who] risked 
WWIII by mining Haiphong Harbor . . . .  [It was] the act of an 
emperor, a dictator," who acted alone against all advice. Lost 
in the middle of several pages of radical anti-war rhetoric 
Time included three column inches stating that, "A Lou Harris 
survey showed that 59% of Americans backed Nixon's mining 
decision."* If 59 percent supported the President's
* Ibid.. November 22, 1971, pp. 28-30.
^*Howard Schuman, "Two Sources of Anti-war Sentiment in 
America", American Journal of Sociology. 78:3 (November,
1972): p. 513.
May 22, 1972, pp. 11-13
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decision, why did Time give only three column inches to this 
view, while spending twenty times as much print space 
condemning, "the act of an emperor, a dictator," who acted 
alone against all advice?
Finally, on June 12, 1972, Time reported on two-hundred 
"in depth interviews" conducted for the purpose of measuring 
voter reaction to the war and how it might affect the 1972 
U.S. presidential election. Time introduced the topic by 
saying that the "North Vietnamese pressed their military 
advantage [as] the war that will not go away once again preyed 
on the nation's conscience." In a virtual non sequitur. Time 
then conceded that 70 percent of those interviewed backed the 
President's policy on Vietnam, and believed that "Something 
like the negotiated settlement in Korea" was now possible.* 
The public believed that the allies could stop the advance of 
communism in Vietneum, as they had in Korea, because the ARVN, 
with the assistance of U.S. air power but no U.S. combat 
troops, had just turned the tide of battle against the massive 
Communist invasion known as the 1972 Easter Offensive. 
"Something like the negotiated settlement in Korea," with its 
long-term commitment of U.S. forces to guarantee the peace, 
was exactly what Hedley Donovan had argued so emphatically 
against. Thus one sees the enormous distance between Time 
magazine and the average American.
*Ibid.. June 12, 1972, p. 16.
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Time's editorial philosophy appears to have affected its 
war coverage in several ways. First, when events admitted of 
two interpretations. Time gave almost all of its print space 
to that view which best supported the interests of the anti­
war movement. Chapter two will address this subject. Second, 
as Hedley Donovan said, "Actually, there are grounds for 
thinking that the South has a fighting chance." Time's 
reporters and editors were perfectly well aware of the 
evidence that progress was being made toward winning the war. 
Administration spokesmen were doing all they could to bring 
such evidence to the attention of reporters. In the period 
from mid-1969 through the end of the war. Time actually 
printed 123 Cl which told the story of the war being won. 
Unfortunately 123 Cl spread out over 260 plus issues was not 
really adequate to tell the story. The other problem, for 
anyone interested in a balanced picture of the war, was that 
Time printed 5,578 Cl of anti-war material in this same 
period. The details of the story that Time did not tell will 
constitute chapter three. Third, Time factually misrepresented 
what was happening in Vietnam in a variety of ways. Chapter 
four will cover Time's factual misrepresentations.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ANTI-WAR INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS PUBLISHED IN TIME 
AND THE UNPUBLISHED PRO-WAR INTERPRETATION
From mid-1969 on, if the events of the war admitted of a 
pro-war and an anti-war interpretation. Time gave almost all 
of its print space to the interpretation which best supported 
the interests of the anti-war movement. The topics 
illustrating this tendency include: coverage of the
battlefields and villages during the period from 1968-1972; 
coverage of the anti-war protest demonstrations in the U.S.; 
and coverage of South Vietnam's 1971 presidential election.
The coverage of the battlefields and villages was the 
most important in forming an accurate view of the war. In 
early 1968 the Communists launched a massive assault known as 
the Tet Offensive. They captured most of Hue and parts of 
Saigon before being repulsed. Prior to the 1968 Tet Offensive 
Time had supported the Johnson Administration's policy by
50
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maintaining a two to one pro-war bias in its coverage. The 
February 9 issue was the first to carry news of the Tet 
offensive. Beginning with this issue. Time * s bias shifted to 
a four to one anti-war stance, and the battlefield coverage of 
Tet reflected this new anti-war bias.
As spring turned to summer, it became clear that the 
Communists had taken a terrific military beating in the Tet 
Offensive, and Time moved from its four to one anti-war bias 
back to a strong pro-war bias for a short period, before 
becoming virtually neutral for a year. In total. Time printed 
340 Cl describing Tet as a military victory for the Communists 
(printed mainly in February and March 1968) and 177 Cl 
describing the campaign as a military victory for the allies 
(mainly from the short pro-war period in late spring). Today, 
the standard historiographic interpretation of Tet is that 
although the Communists suffered a military defeat, Tet was 
the turning point in the war for them, because it caused the 
American public to stop supporting the war.* Thus Time 
factually misrepresented the Tet Offensive by giving twice as 
much space to coverage representing it as a military victory 
for the Communists.
On March 28, 1969, Time offered the summation of its 
analyses of Tet. Time concluded that the Communists had 
suffered heavy casualties but had been eUsle to replace their 
loses and remain on the offensive. "But they had also won a
*Herring, War, pp. 203-204,241.
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clear cut psychological victory, demonstrating their ability 
to attack almost anywhere in Viet Nam at will and shattering 
all the optimistic assessments of the war in the minds of the 
U.S. public."* This is very much the conclusion of 
mainstream U.S. historiography.
Qualified, newsworthy experts, however, presented a 
differing interpretation of the Tet Offensive. Time devoted 
only 17 Cl to this alternative view, as articulated by John 
Paul Vann, Sir Robert Thompson, and Or. Douglas Pike.
John Paul Vann was the second ranking civilian in the 
pacification/nation building agency. Civil Operations emd 
Rural Development Support, commonly referred to as CORDS. Vann 
had been in Vietnam longer than any Americzm, with the 
exception of Dr. Pike. He had a great deal of personal 
experience in rural South Vietnam. Vemn demonstrated his 
expert knowledge in his loud and public criticisms of the 
state of rural pacification in the early 1960s.* Arguably, 
Vann had as deep an understanding of the war as any American 
and may have been in the best position to judge the state of 
rural pacification.
Vann testified in a 1970 hearing before a Senate 
subcommittee that he believed that the Tet Offensive had been
*Time. March 28, 1969, p. 19.
*United States Senate Foreign Relations Sub-committee on 
Vietnam Hearings; Policy and Prospects. 1970, p. 112. See also 
Neil Sheehan, A Bright and Shinning Lie (New York; Random 
House, 1988), pp. 5-6.
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the turning point in the war.* He, however, contended that 
it had been the turning point at which a war that would have 
been enormously difficult to win became winnaible. Vann 
asserted that the Viet Cong ' s best South Vietnamese guerrillas 
had h o m e  the brunt of the battle for the Communists, amd they 
had sustained crippling loses. He estimated that perhaps two- 
thirds of the Communists' experienced South Vietnamese 
guerrilla cadre had been killed in 1968. This staggering 
manpower loss forced the Viet Cong to withdraw from 
substantial portions of the South Vietnamese countryside. As 
the Communists withdrew, newly trained local defense platoons 
known as the Regional Forces (RF) and the Popular Forces (PF) 
deployed across the country. These 1,000 new platoons used 
aggressive night patrols to bring security to most of rural 
South Vietnam for the first time.
When the Communists were able to refill the ranks of the 
Viet Cong, it was with North Vietnamese guerrillas whom the 
South Vietnamese peasants regarded as invaders. Prior to the 
Tet Offensive, the South Vietnamese Viet Cong guerrillas had 
had access to and support from most of the villages in South 
Vietnam. After Tet, they lost regular access to and support 
from 75 percent of the nation's hamlets, even at night. This 
forced the Communists to fight a conventional war, which would
hearings, pp. 98-113. The next two paragraphs come from 
these pages. See also Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho, 
Pacification (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Center for Military
History, 1980), pp. 6, 17.
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have been very difficult, if not impossible, for them to win, 
if the United States had provided ongoing air support to the 
South Vietnamese.
Sir Robert Thompson agreed with Vann. In December 1969, 
lims reported that "the Cambridge educated Thompson, 53, was 
knighted for devising the strategy that ultimately defeated 
local Chinese Communist terrorists in Malaya in the 1950s. .
. . Viet Nam has been his specialty since 1961." At President 
Nixon's request, Thompson spent five weeks touring Viet Nam. 
He reported that the improvements since 1968 were astounding. 
Though the Tet Offensive was a Communist psychological 
victory, Thompson argued that it was militarily suicidal. 
"'The thing that suxrprised me more than anything else was the 
extent to which the government has regained control in the 
countryside, ' he said . . . 'the war isn't won, but we're in 
the kind of position from which we could win . . . .  It could 
take three to five years before Hanoi is compelled to give up 
her purpose and to negotiate a real settlement. '
Dr. Pike goes further in his interpretation of the Tet 
Offensive. Based on his reading of North Vietnamese sources. 
Pike believes that the battle of la Drang Valley in November 
1965 was a major turning point in the war. In this battle the 
Communists sacrificed between 1,000 and 2,000 men in order to 
test the fighting techniques of the U.S. forces. They 
concluded that the modified guerrilla warfare tactics employed
*Time. December 26, 1969, p. 8.
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at Dien Bien Phu would not work against the superior American 
fire power and mobility. As they searched for another 
strategy, the Communists were under increasing American 
pressure. They, "had not won a single battle of significance 
in two years. Allied fire power was eating deeply into their 
reserves of men and supplies. [Their] desertion rate had 
doubled every six months. . . .  A loss of ideological faith 
was leading to confusion and demoralization among the key 
figures in the South, the cadres."^* Lt. General Ngo Quang 
Truong also describes Viet Cong loses and weakness throughout 
1966 and 1967 as forcing the change in strategy which lead to 
the 1968 Tet Offensive. General Donn Starry reached the 
same conclusion.'* Thus, the Communists were forced into a 
new strategy. They judged their massive 1968 assault on urban 
South Vietnam to be the least unattractive option in a set of 
bad choices. The Tet Offensive was a military catastrophe for 
all the reasons cited, but it was not simply a mistake in 
strategy. It was a gamble forced on Hanoi by their steadily 
deteriorating position in 1966 and 1967.
Time did not quote any of John Paul Vann's testimony 
regarding the Tet Offensive and its effect on rural
'*Pike, War, pp. 121-24.
'®'Lt. General Ngo Quang Truong, The Easter Offensive of 
1972 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 
1980), p. 5.
'^General Donn Starry, Armored Combat in Vietnam (Salem, 
New Hampshire: The Ayer Company, 1982), p. 114.
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pacification, even though Vann had spoken in a Congressional 
hearing open to reporters. Time did interview Vann in July 
1971. He was quoted as denying any knowledge of South 
Vietnamese General Ngo Dzu's alleged connection to narcotics 
trafficking. In May 1972 Time cited Vamn's prediction that 
the coming spring offensive, now known as the Easter 
Offensive, would be an all out invasion. Neil Sheehan 
explained that by 1970, "While many of the reporters Vamn knew 
no longer agreed with his conclusions about the war, he 
retained a special credibility with the press because of all 
he had put in the bank in the past and because he could still 
be frank about the flaws on the Saigon side."'* In other 
words the media was willing to use Vann's expert knowledge as 
a source to criticize the war, but would not publicize his 
overall evaluation. On June 19, 1972, Time gave six column 
inches to reporting Vann's death.'* His interpretation of 
the Tet Offensive did not appear in the magazine.
Time quoted Pike in May 1969 analyzing the divisions 
within the North Vietnamese leadership.'* Pike's assessment 
of the serious problems facing Hanoi, however, were not 
published. Time gave Thompson 17 Cl.
'*Time. July 19, 1971, p. 22-23.
Ibiâi., May 15, 1972, p. 30.
'*Sheehan, Lie, p. 739.
1ÛA
Time. June 19, 1972, p. 24.
'*Ibid. May 30, 1969, pp. 29-30.
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In total. Time published 340 Cl describing Tet as a 
military victory for the Communists, 177 Cl describing it as 
a military victory for the allies, and only 17 Cl explaining 
the pro-war interpretation of the Tet Offensive and its effect 
on the state of rural pacification. Time also periodically ran 
articles asking the question, 'is pacification working'?, and 
invariably concluded that some progress was being made, but 
that it was fragile and was unlikely to succeed before the 
United States was forced out of Vietnam.'* Time did not 
elaborate on who was doing the forcing.
Sir Robert Thompson and John Paul Vann were certainly two 
of the world's foremost experts on pacification. Both agreed 
that Tet had been the turning point at which the allies had 
begun to win the war. Their reasons for believing that the war 
had turned (as stated by Vann and others in over 700 pages of 
transcript in open hearings before the Congress) were 
logically coherent and were supported by a good deal of solid 
verifiable evidence (described in chapter three of this 
paper).
By failing to give the pro-war interpretation of the 1968 
Tet Offensive and its effect on pacification anything like 
equal space. Time prevented its readership from having the 
opportunity to make an informed discission about the war. 
Polls suggested again and again that a majority of Americans
108Ibid.. September 26, 1969, pp. 25-26; February 9, 1970, 
pp. 25-26; October 26, 1970, pp. 47-48; March 15, 1971, p. 
30; February 7, 1972, p. 34.
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would have preferred to have won the Vietnam War if it could 
have been done without sacrificing the lives of U.S. combat 
troops. Vann and Thompson were certain that it could have been 
done. If they were correct, then Time's failure to publish 
this interpretation did a remarkable service for those who 
believed in the goals of the amti-war movement and a 
remarkable disservice to the majority of Americans.
The media also took a strong position denouncing the 
allies' 1970 operations in Ceunbodia. In March 1970, General 
Lon Nol overthrew Prince Sihanouk's government. The new 
regime then closed the port of Sihanoukville to the 
Communists. Sihanoukville had been used to import 80 percent 
of the Communist war supplies destined for the Mekong Delta 
region. Time then reported that since almost all of the 
Communists' supplies would have to come overland from the 
North, "'they're going to have a helluva time sustaining 
themselves in the lower half of South Vietnam. . . . Rocket 
and mortar attacks have become almost a rarity . . . there is 
reason to believe that the Communists are being forced to 
revise their entire strategy for conducting the war.'"'*
North Vietnamese troops responded by stepping up their 
support of the Khmer Rouge and trying to overthrow the 
Cambodian government. President Nixon stated that "My 
immediate inclination was to do everything possible to help
109Ibid.. May 11, 1970, pp. 16-17; June 15, 1970, p. 29.
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Lon Mol.""'* In opposition to the President's desire. 
Secretary of State William Rogers and Secretary of Defense 
Melvin Laird "strongly recommended that we hold back, " because 
if America aided Lon Nol the Communists would believe the 
United States had engineered the coup and that they were 
justified in unleashing a full-scale invasion of Cambodia. On 
April 22, however, Nixon wrote in his diary, "We have really 
dropped the ball on this one due to the fact that we were 
taken in with the line that by helping him we would destroy 
his 'neutrality' and give the North Vietnamese an excuse to 
come in. Over and over again we fail to leam that the
Communists never need an excuse to come in . . .  . the only
government in Cambodia in the last twenty-five years that had 
the guts to taüce a pro-Westem and pro-American stand is ready 
to fall," and the United States had not yet taken any
substantial measures to help it.
Nixon stated, "I never had any illusions about the
shattering effect a decision to go into Cambodia would have on 
public opinion at home.""' He decided to act anyway. General 
Abrams had advised the President that in military terms it 
would be highly advantageous for the allies to respond to the 
North Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Vietnamization would 
significantly benefit if the Communist supply stockpiles were
'"'Nixon, BK, p. 447. The rest of the paragraph comes from 
this page also.
"'ibid., p. 449. The rest of the paragraph comes from 
this page. Page 450 describes General Abrams opinion.
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destroyed and the supply port remained closed.
This put the President in a peculiar position. A pro- 
American government which seemed to enjoyed broad popular 
support had come to power in Cambodia."^ The Communist North 
Vietnamese army occupied a substantial part of Cambodia and 
had begun training Khmer Rouge guerrillas for their war 
against Lon Nol. Nixon believed that in a military sense he 
needed to address the problem. He knew also that the American 
media would take the position, espoused by Communist 
propaganda releases, that he had widened the war by invading 
a neutral country. The President decided to act in spite of 
the media's opposition. Militarily the operation was an 
unqualified success, and ARVN troops continued to conduct 
cross border operations in Cambodia, preventing the Communists 
from regaining access to Sihanoukville.
Lt. General Truong confirmed the importance of the 
Cambodian operation. He stated that the Communist's Central 
Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) issued Resolution Number 9 in 
1969. It "emphasized the strategic importance of the Mekong 
Delta," and ordered the entire NVA 1st Division into the 
Delta. The infiltration "succeeded despite heavy losses" to 
the Communists. After the North Vietnaumese were established in 
the Delta, the South Vietnamese local security forces "were
"4foods, Fulbriaht. p. 634
Time. June 1, 1970, p. 22; June 8, 1970, pp. 30, 35; 
June 15, 1970, p. 29; September 14, 1970, p. 16. See also 
Starry, Armored Combat, pp. 166-81.
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thrown off-balance and the pacification effort declined as a 
result of extensive enemy attacks and shellings. Not until 
after the enemy's sanctuaries beyond the border had been 
destroyed during the Cambodian incursion and his capability to 
resupply from the sea eliminated were these 1st NVA Division 
forces compelled to break down into small elements and 
withdraw.
The American media did not report the effect of the 
Cambodiam operation on the NVA 1st Division in the Delta. 
Instead, the media condemned President Nixon. In response to 
the American media's apparently pro-communist coverage of the 
Cambodian operation, the London Economist wrote, "For years. 
North Vietnam has violated the neutrality of this country—  
with barely a chirp of protest from the rest of the world . .
. . To condemn the United States for 'invading' neutral
Cambodia is about as rational as to condemn Britain for 
'invading' formally neutral Holland in 1944.""*
With the Sihanoukville port closed to the Communists, 
President Nixon hoped that an allied strike against the Ho Chi 
Hinh trail in Laos would damage the North Vietnamese supply 
lines sufficiently to prevent them from launching a 1971 
offensive. The operation, code named Lam Son 719, began in 
February 1971. Time reported that the ARVN attacked with a
"^Truong, Easter, p. 139. 
"*Nixon, BK, p. 453.
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main force of 14,000 men."* Besides this main force, several 
artillery fire bases were lifted by helicopter onto the 
mountain tops overlooking the supply trail in Laos. Time noted 
that the Communists had 35,000 troops arrayed in defensive 
positions around the point of attack. Another 20,000 Communist 
troops were converging on the ARVN's position from other parts 
of Cambodia and Laos. Large numbers of reinforcements also 
poured into the battle zone from the North Vietnamese regular 
army divisions assigned to defend their side of the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ-the border between North and South 
Vietnam). South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu then 
threatened to take advantage of the Communist's vulnerability 
by launching an invasion of North Vietnam itself. "* Time 
reported that China took the threat seriously enough that 
"Premier Chou En-lai retaliated by [declaring that China 
would] 'take all necessary measures, not flinching even from 
the greatest national sacrifices,* to help the North 
Vietnamese" if ARVN forces invaded."’
Time also reported that the ARVN faced some unusual 
problems. The artillery that the U.S. had helilifted in was 
inadequate. The ARVN's "155 mm eleven mile range howitzers are 
often out reached by North Vietnamese gunners with 130 mm
"*Time. February 22, 1971, p. 24.
"^Ibid.. March 8, 1971, p. 21.
"*lbid.. March 15, 1971, p. 28-29. 
110
Ibid.. March 22, 1971, p. 23.
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pieces that can fire a shell 17 miles. [Also] Fog blankets 
fire bases and curtails vital air support.Somewhat over
2,000 ARVN troops were killed, while the Communists lost more 
than 15,000.'^' After two months of heavy fighting the South 
Vietnamese withdrew from Laos.
A reasonable interpretation of Operation Lam Son 719 
might have been as follows. After the Communist supply port of 
Sihanoukville had been cut off in 1970, the Ho Chi Minh supply 
trail became doubly important. If the ARVN had been able to 
maintain permament fire bases on the mountain tops above the 
trail, with forward spotters directing the artillery fire and 
B-52 air strikes, then the North's ability to deliver war 
supplies into South Vietnam would have been seriously 
impaired. Recognizing the danger, the Communists made an all- 
out effort to defend their vital interests, even to the point 
of denuding the defenses of North Vietnam itself. The 
Communist defenders outnumbered the South Vietnamese attackers 
by three or four to one. Bad weather and exceptionally intense 
anti-aircraft fire limited the effectiveness of U.S. air 
support. Yet, in spite of all of this, ARVN forces maintained 
their position in Laos for two months, killing aüaout 15,000 
Communists while losing only around 2,000 of their own dead. 
Thus it would be reasonable to interpret Operation Lam Son 719 
as a strong proof that the ARVN was a competent and effective
'” lbid.. March 8, 1971, p. 20 
'^'Herring, War, pp. 265-66.
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fighting force.
Sir Robert Thompson interpreted Lam Son 719 this way, in 
his 1974 book. Peace Is Wot At Hand. "In the first instance 
the very fact that the South Vietnamese were able to release 
such a force for an offensive operation into the North's 
secure 'rear bases' indicated that the balance of capeüaility 
was changing." To illustrate this point one has only to recall 
that in 1964 the South Vietnamese were on the verge of being 
defeated by the relatively lightly armed Viet Cong guerrillas. 
General Westmoreland commented that in 1965 "The enemy was 
destroying battalions faster than they could be reconstituted 
and faster than we had planned to organize them under the 
ARVN's crash build-up program." At that time ARVN would 
not have been capable of sending a two-division assault force 
to attack Communist sanctuaries in Laos.
Thompson continued, "On the way in the South Vietnamese 
fought well, one Ranger battalion on the northern flank was 
practically decimated by repeated assaults. After receiving 
200 casualties and inflicting three or four times that number 
on the enemy, it successfully withdrew in good order to a 
neighboring position, with all its weapons and carrying its 
wounded. There was no rout." After it had caused as much 
damage as possible the ARVN began to withdraw. "A withdrawal 
in the face of the enemy is probably the most exacting 
operation of war . . . .  The picture of a South Vietnamese
'^Westmoreland, Report, p. 139.
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coming out on the skids of a helicopter was flashed around the 
television screens of the world for days on end. it gave an 
unfair and false picture of the fighting quality of the South 
Vietnamese troops."'^
President Nixon stated that the American military command 
had underestimated the number of Communist troops that would 
be marshalled to repel Lam Son. The United States "failed to 
respond to this unexpectedly intense level of combat with the 
necessary increase in air cover for the invading forces. The 
resulting ARVN casualties were heavy, but they continued to 
fight courageously." As the South Vietncunese withdrew, Nixon 
repeated, "Our air support was inadequate," and under severe 
pressure some men panicked. "It took only a few televised 
films of ARVN soldiers clinging to the skids of our evacuation 
helicopters to reinforce the widespread misconception of the 
ARVN forces as incompetent emd c o w a r d l y . N i x o n  believed 
the press' falsely negative portrayal of Lem Son hurt the war 
effort emong the South Vietnemese whose "morale was shaken by 
media reports" of the battle. In the United States, "news 
pictures undercut confidence in the success of Vietnamization 
and the prospect of ending the war." The military benefits of 
the operation were great enough, however, that Nixon agreed 
with Henry Kissinger's assessment, "If I had known before it
'^Thompson, Peace, pp. 90-91.
'^ *Nixon, EH, pp. 498-99. The rest of the paragraph comes 
from this page.
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Started that it was going to come out exactly the way it did, 
I would still have gone ahead with it."
General Starry agreed that Lan Son 719 "helped to delay 
major enemy operations for the remainder of 1971."'* ARVN 
troops also discovered the Communists ' s oil pipe line, 
destroyed a section of it and were able to supply U.S. pilots 
with its location for future bombing raids. Starry's overall 
appraisal of Operation Lan Som, and other 1971 battles, was 
less optimistic than Sir Robert Thompson or President Nixon. 
He saw these engagements as a military draw which 
"demonstrated that a parity existed in South Vietnamese- North 
Vietnamese strength."'* Even this assessment, however, meant 
that a marked and steady improvement had occurred in the ARVN 
fighting ability.
In 1967 General Westmoreland agreed that steady progress 
throughout 1966 and 1967 had made the ARVN a competent enough 
fighting force that he expected to begin withdrawing U.S. 
forces within two years. Because the South Vietnamese forces 
had doubled in size over a three year period it was impossible 
to know which of the new officers would provide high quality 
leadership in combat until they were so tested. Improvement 
would take time and experience. But in spite of "the thin 
veneer of leadership," Westmoreland believed that "Few
'*Starry, Armored Combat, p. 197 
'*Ibid.. p. 198.
pp. 180-181, 186.
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orgamizations in the world could have done" as well as the 
ARVN under similar pressure.'* westmorelamd "followed a 
policy of maücing myself readily availaüale for interviews."'* 
His interpretation of the war, however, was not published in 
Time.
Neither did Time interview President Nixon, or publish 
his opinion that the media's falsely negative portrayal had 
made Lam Son 719 "a military success but a psychological 
defeat." It devoted merely three column inches to U.S. 
Commanding General Creighton Abrams and Sir Robert Thompson 
praising the ARVN during the campaign.'*
Time's overall interpretation differed from that of the 
war supporters, offering the battlefield analyses that ARVN 
troops were, "getting their asses kicked," that the ARVN 
appeared to be suffering, "an embarrassing defeat in Laos, 
[and that] the allies have paid dearly."'*' The ARVN was 
chased out of Laos and "The last group out . . . barely made 
it. [Thus] last week's banner headlines declaring complete 
victory were in Hanoi's newspapers, not Saigon's."'* Time 
concluded that "Many sophisticated Asians . . . are now
'*Westmoreland, Report, pp. 250-53.
, p. 276.
130limm, February 15, 1971, p. 31.
'*'lbid.. February 22, 1971, p. 24; March 1, 1971, p. 19; 
March 29, 1971, p. 24.
'*Ibid.. April 5, 1971, p. 20.
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privately convinced that Hanoi will prevail."'** All told. 
Time printed 120 Cl of anti-war articles related to Operation 
Lam Son 719, and only 14 Cl pro-war. None of the 14 pro-war 
column inches made an effort to explain how the battle could 
be interpreted as proof of the ARVN's competence.
Time ' s interpretation made it appear that the ARVN could 
not defeat the Communists even with U.S. air support. Thus, 
Time made it easier for undecided Americans to believe, as 
Hedley Donovan did, that the U.S. should completely withdraw 
from Vietnam as quickly as possible. By not publishing a pro­
war interpretation of lam Son 719, Time again deprived its 
readership of the opportunity to make an informed decision 
about the war.
Time's coverage of the 1972 Easter Offensive was similar. 
By 1972, all U.S. troops had been withdrawn from combat. Aside 
from U.S. logistical support (air and artillery) the ARVN 
fought alone. The Communists hoped to take advantage of this 
situation by launching their first full scale assault since 
the Tet Offensive. They invaded with 120,000 troops. Their 
three primary objectives were Hue near the DMZ, An Loc, a 
provincial capital 75 miles from Saigon, and Kontum in the 
central highlands. The Communists lost 100,000 men and failed 
to take any of their objectives.'**
Normally when an invading army suffers a five-sixths
'**Ibid.. March 29, 1971, p. 23. 
Herring, War, pp. 271-75.
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casualty rate and does not take any of its objectives it is 
judged to have suffered a military catastrophe. Certainly the 
October 30, 1972, issue of Aviation Week and Space Technoloov 
interpreted it this way.^^ Administration spokespersons Dr. 
Douglas Pike, sir Robert Thompson, and Dr. Henry Kissinger 
have all published books supporting this interpretation. Each 
of them was a well known, readily available media source. 
Inexplicably, however. Time reached exactly the opposit 
conclusion, stating that "Any illusions about the prospects of 
victory through Vietnamization . . . were shattered by the 
success of Hanoi's Easter O f f e n s i v e . Time gave absolutely 
no space to these administration spokesmen's interpretation of 
the battle.
Part of what Time did not publish was Pike's view that 
the 1972 Easter Offensive, "required the best weapons the 
Communist world's armament factories could produce, and they 
met the challenge. The North Vietnamese armies in the 1972 
offensive had more tanks (410) than the South Vietnamese (296) 
and more long range artillery (130mm and 152mm guns) . . . .  
Several hundred fighter planes were also delivered (MIG 15s, 
MIG 17s, supersonic MIG 21s, and later, the more advanced MIG 
21C and MIG 21D)."*^
"^ Aviation Week and Space Technoloov. October 30, 1972,
p. 7.
November 6, 1972, p. 18.
^^ P^ike, Vietnam, pp. 120, 125.
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In his book. The Easter Offensive, the commander of the 
U.S. Marine advisors, Lt. colonel Gerald Turley, stated that 
the priority North Vietnam placed on victory in the invasion 
could be seen by the commitment of the NVA 308th Division. 
"This unit had conducted the final assault on the entrapped 
French at Dien Bien Phu . . . .  In the long history of the 
Vietnam War, the 308th had left Hanoi to join in only," the 
battle of Dien Bien Phu and the 1972 attack.
Sir Robert Thompson described the Easter Offensive as "a 
massive conventional invasion with fourteen divisions and the 
most modem weaponry, which not one single country in the 
Western world, other than the United States, given the shape 
and topography of South Vietnam, could have defeated alone 
without adequate outside air support— not even Israel.
South Vietnam's problem was that it had a 600-mile long 
border. The Communists were able to mass their fourteen 
divisions under cover of the triple canopy jungle anywhere 
along the border. The ARVN had to defend the forty-four 
district capitals, as well as the various airfields, supply 
depots and military installations scattered across the 
country. Popular Forces platoons were stationed in adaout
10,000 rural hamlets. Given the total size of all their 
military forces (about 1,000,000 men) the South Vietnamese
“^ Lt. Colonel Gerald Turley, The Easter Offensive 
(Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1985), pp. 29-30.
139Thompson, Peace. p. 28.
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could concentrate only about 6,000 to 8,000 troops, even in 
their more important defensive positions. To complicate 
matters, in most places South Vietnam was less than lOO miles 
wide. Saigon was less than 35 miles from Cambodia.
In the Easter Offensive the North Vietnamese brought
40,000 men across the border at each of three points. They 
enjoyed tremendous invading momentum against the relatively 
small number of defenders at the point of each attack. These 
circumstamces would certainly have been expected to carry the 
Communists well into the heart of the country. Because of this 
Robert Komer argued that "We tended to underestimate the great 
value of allowing the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia amd 
L a o s . T h e  South Vietnamese suffered 25,000 casualties 
(almost half of the total number of Americans killed in the 
entire war), in preventing the North Vietnamese from taking 
even their first objectives. It would seem apparent that the 
ARVN fought fiercely in the Easter Offensive.
The London Economist commented: "It is still not
appreciated how much the South Vietnamese Army has, " improved 
in morale because of the Easter Offensive. "Despite all the 
American help from the air the South Vietnamese Army has had 
to fight hard on the ground; in most of the action it has 
held, and in some it has done much better than that. The
'^Komer, Bureaucracv. p. 5. See also Westmoreland, 
Report, pp. 180-81.
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result is a visible improvement in morale.
Lt. Colonel Turley provides a detailed account of what 
went right and what went «rrong in Military Region One (MR-1) 
during the battle. He states that South Vietnamese Brigadier 
General Vu Van Giai, the commander of the ARVN 3rd Division 
which had primary responsibility for the defense of MR-1, put 
the division in a position of extreme vulnerability. On the 
day the Communists launched the invasion, only a few hours 
before the battle began. General Giai initiated a plan to 
rotate the positions of two of the divisions' three regiments. 
"Tactical command posts (CPs) were vacated, unit radios shut 
down," and infantry units were marching in open formation down 
the road "when thousands of artillery rounds struck the 
exposed troops causing instant death and chaos." Thus the 3rd 
division "was temporarily unable to perform as a viable 
fighting force.
Military manuals are specific about the techniques 
required to reduce the risks involved in troop rotations. In 
spite of the fact that he was well aware of the buildup of 
North Vietnamese forces in the region and the high probability 
of an imminent battle, Giai did not take even the most 
rudimentary precautions. Turley asserts that "The timing of 
Giai ' s relief-in-place operation, the unprofessional manner in 
which it was executed and his disregard of the warnings of a
*^^Economist. October 14, 1972, p. 32. 
’*^Turley, Easter, p. 53.
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major attack, inevitably led to the hypothesis of 
treason.General Truong's history agrees with Turley that 
the highest level command decisions which led to the fall of 
Quang Tri Province were disastrously inadequate. After 
Quang Tri fell. President Thieu replaced the command staff for 
the defense of Hue, the next city to the south in MR-l. 
General Giai was eventually arrested and sentenced to prison.
Aside from this problem, the 3rd Division had been 
created fairly recently. Although most of the troops had 
combat experience, they had never fought together as a unit. 
One of the three regiments, the 56th, "had only been activated 
three months earlier, and still was having many start-up 
problems. . . . the quality of the 56th leadership was poor" 
and required time and experience for improvement.Beyond 
these problems, the cloud cover was so low through most of the 
offensive that tactical air support was ineffective. B-52 
strikes were effective in any weather, and were a crucial 
element in the defense, but the use of tactical air power and 
helicopters was severely limited.
The ARVN fire support bases had been located in the same 
positions for several years. They were effectively positioned 
to interdict small unit infiltrations, but the Communist long 
range artillery located north of the DMZ had these bases
, pp. 34-36.
, pp. 252-53, and Truong, Easter, pp. 38-39. 
Easter, p. 47.
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locked in. The North Vietnamese fire was extremely accurate 
and intense. Under the pressure of thousands of incoming 
shells many of the inexperienced ARVN artillery crews 
abandoned their guns, seeking shelter in reinforced bunkers. 
"Thus when it was needed the most, ARVN counterbattery fire 
was drastically reduced because of fear in the gun pits.
In spite of these problems the Marines at outpost E-4 
repelled three infamtry assaults on March 30th, "inflicting 
heavy casualties on their a t t a c k e r s . T w o  similar outposts 
were overrun. Few of their men made it back to the main fire 
base. On the second day of the offensive the Communists 
bypassed outpost E-4 to attack the main fire base Nui Ba Ho. 
The Marines in E-4 "continued to bring fire into the flanks 
and rear of enemy units attacking the Nui Ba Ho perimeter." 
U.S. advisor. Captain Ray Smith, stated that "the heroic 
actions of this platoon inspired the Bravo group [inside the 
main perimeter] to put up even greater resistance to the 
numerically superior enemy force."** They repelled several 
heavy assaults that day. During the second night of the 
invasion. Nui Ba Ho was overrun. Similarly, the 4th Battalion 
at Fire Base Sarge "had acquitted themselves valiantly." Their 
mortar platoon had faithfully provided fire support to the 
troops throughout the battle. "By evening every member of the
*^*Ibid.. p. 61.
p. 66. 
’**Ibid., p. 80.
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platoon had been wounded or killed."*^ After thirty-six 
hours of heavy combat Fire Base Sarge was evacuated. Fire 
Bases A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, C-1, C-2, c-3 and Fuller were all 
overwhelmed by Communist numerical superiorities of three or 
four to one and were evacuated on the second day of the 
offensive. Some conducted orderly retreats; others 
abemdoned their weapons and fled.^ ^^
Although the weather continued to prevent tactical air 
missions, U.S. Naval fire support was effective. "History will 
record that the U.S. destroyers were of immeasurable value in 
holding back the North Vietnamese attack down Highway 1 to 
Dong Ha and Quang Tri City."
Three hundred soldiers had manned Fire Base Nui Ba Ho on 
March 30. Three days later the sixty-nine survivors made it to 
Fire Base Mai Loc. Having "gallantly fought against an 
overwhelming, numerically superior force, then survived a 
desperation march," they ate their first food in over fifty 
hours.
On the fourth day of the invasion Communist tanks were 
approaching the vital Dong Ha bridge. If they had been able to 
race across the Cam Lo River, they might well have overwhelmed
, p. 82.
’*®Starry, Armored Combat, p. 205. 
’^ Vruong, Easter, pp. 24-26. 
^**Turley, Easter, p. 88.
, p. 91.
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Quang Tri City and attacked Hue before an effective defense 
could be organized. Marine advisor Captain John Ripley was 
with the ARVN 20th Tank Battalion, which positioned itself to 
defend the bridge. He stated that the Communist artillery 
assault was easily "the most devastating and destructive 
attack I had witnessed. It virtually tore up Dong Ha leaving 
no area untouched, causing many civilian casualties," killing 
all the livestock and flattening the town.^** Over 1,000 
rounds fell in forty-five minutes.
As the last of the preparatory fire fell on Dong Ha the 
Communist tank column approached the bridge. A South 
Vietnamese sergeant crawled out into the lead tank's path and 
hit it with an M-72 light anti-tank weapon (LAW) . Uncertain of 
what force was opposing them, the North Vietnamese tanks 
spread themselves into a defensive posture, rather than 
crossing the bridge. South Vietnamese Marine Brigade 258 
commanded by Major Binh was all that stood between the main 
North Vietnamese assault column and a clear path to Quang Tri 
City. At this point Bihn and Ripley heard an erroneous radio 
report stating that Dong Ha had fallen and the bridge had been 
crossed. Each then sent simultemeous reports out over their 
respective radio networks to insure there could be no mistake 
about the actual situation. Their message said: "There are 
Vietnamese Marines in Dong Ha. My orders are to hold the enemy 
in Dong Ha. We will fight in Dong Ha. We will die in Dong Ha.
, p. 151.
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We will not leave. As long as one Marine draws breath of life, 
Dong Ha will belong to us.” The 3rd Battalion defended the 
south bank of the river while Captain Ripley called in naval 
fire support. "There was an almost instantaneous response from 
the five U.S. destroyers off the c o a s t . I n  addition, the 
tanks of the 20th Regiment provide accurate fire, quickly 
destroying eleven North Vietnamese t a n k s . T h i s  gave the 
allied defenders enough time to wire and blow up the bridge. 
Of the seven hundred Marines who took up defensive positions 
on April 3rd, only two hundred remained alive when the 3rd 
Battalion was rotated off the front line on April I9th. One 
hundred and fifty of them were wounded. Major Binh had died. 
His prophesy had proved true. The 3rd Battalion had fought and 
died, and the Communists had not crossed the Ceua Lo River. The 
invaders were delayed long enough for the defense of Hue to be 
organized.
On the fourth day of the invasion the largest of the MR-1 
fire bases. Camp Carroll surrendered, giving up 1,800 soldiers 
and twenty-two artillery guns. Turley believed that, "The 
surrender at camp Carroll created a catastrophic void in the 
shrinking defensive line." At other fire bases the defenders 
(in worse condition than at Camp Carroll) had broken through 
the encircling attackers and made it to secure ARVN lines. The
. pp. 153-56.
'^starry. Armored Combat, p. 208. 
Turley, Easter, pp. 233, 256.
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American advisors in fact did break out and were rescued by 
helicopter. Turley wrote that Camp commander "Lieutenant 
Colonel (Pham V«m) Dinh's treacherous act in the surrender of 
his regiment enmasse had an enormous adverse psychological 
impact on the remainder of the besieged South Vietnamese 
u n i t s . G e n e r a l  Truong was much kinder to Dinh, stating 
that, "Troops of the 56th Regiment at the camp valiantly 
endured heavy artillery fires and resisted repeated assaults 
by enemy infantry . . . .  Seeing that his situation was 
hopeless and wanting to save as many of his soldiers ' lives as
159possible," he surrendered.
That night the defenders of Fire Base Mai Loc ran out of 
ammunition. They destroyed their guns, and broke out of the 
defensive perimeter and headed east. They "soon discovered the 
trail was littered with the wounded and exhausted Marines of 
the 4th and 8th VMMC Battalions. These survivors of FBs Sarge 
and Nui Ba Ho and the few stragglers from FB Holcomb had 
simply run out of stamina and collapsed along the trail. 
Throughout the night the 7th Battalion picked up and somehow 
carried every exhausted or wounded Marine they 
encountered."** After making four river crossings they 
successfully reached secure ARVN lines.
On April 9, 10 and 11 the North Vietnamese assaulted Fire
*^*Ibid.. pp. 172-73.
159Truong, Easter, pp. 29-30.
160Turley, Easter, p. 199.
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Base Pedro vest of Quang Tri City. They attacked with several
thousamd infamtry and a tamk battalion. Twenty-three tanks
were captured or destroyed amd over 420 Communists killed,
while the South Vietnamese suffered only sixty-six casualties.
Colonel Turley believed, "There was great significamce to the
South Vietnamese victory at FB Pedro where the NVA tanks lay
shattered and burning. First, it presented the disillusioned
South Vietnamese forces in Quamg Tri Province with their first
real victory in a knockdown, drag-out battle." More
importantly "the defense was all plamned and a successful
counterattack executed by South Vietnamese forces." U.S.
advisor Captain A1 Nettleinhem wrote:
I think the whole credit for repulsing 
the attack belongs to Colonel (Ngo Van)
Dinh. He had his finger on the situation 
at all times. He knew what assets he had 
available and then committed them at the 
crucial moments.
He's a commander in the full sense of the 
word. His subordinate commanders bad 
^e a t  confidence in him, in his 
judgement. The man presented the best 
exemple of decisiveness emd military 
skill that I've ever seen."
On April 18th the South Vietnamese repelled two major 
assults. "As the momentum of the NVA attack increased, enemey 
artillery raked the South Vietnamese positions. However, the 
line held firm as ARVN artillery struck back at the exposed
*^Turley, Easter, pp. 239-41.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
80
NVA infantry causing the attackers to break off" and withdraw 
along the full seven miles of the 3rd Division's western 
defensive line/** Communist artillery resumed heavy shelling 
untill the 23rd when they launched another major assault. 
"Again, the ARVN's western defenses held.
On the 27th the Communists attacked with a full division 
across the entire front. The ARVN troops had been under heavy 
artillery attack for an entire month without being rotated off 
the front lines. When the North Vietnamese broke the defensive 
line at a couple of points some of the exhausted ARVN units 
fled in panic. Communist units attacking from the west 
threatened to take the Quang Tri bridges, cutting off 
thousands of defenders north of the city. "The 2d ARVN 
Regiment rose to the occasion," however, holding the bridges 
long enough to allow the other units to retreat.'*^
USAF Major David Brookbank wrote: "Many ARVN forces held 
while others broke and ran. The ARVN Marines never lost 
fighting effectiveness and had to be ordered to withdraw many 
times to plug gaps in the line . . . .  because they never 
stopped fighting and remained effective, [they] enabled the 
U.S. advisors, cut off at the Citadel, to evacuate."** U.S. 
Marine Major Robert Sheridan observed that as thousands of
p. 254. 
p. 256. 
pp. 261, 262.
**Ibid., p. 285.
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suffering refugees flowed past Brigade 369's headquarters, 
"The Marines gave them food, water, money. The generosity 
could not alleviate the suffering of the people as their 
numbers were too great.
As thousands of ARVN soldiers crossed the My Chanh River 
into Thua Thien Province and retreated towards Hue, Major 
Sheridan turned to his Vietnamese counterpart Colonel Pham Van 
Chung and said, "Well, sir, it looks like everyone else is 
heading south. What are we going to do?" Colonel Chung 
replied, "No, no, we will not go south. We are a good brigade 
and with your help we will kill all the VC along this 
river. As they dug in Major Sheridan reported, "The enemy 
opened the most devastating artillery barrage that the brigade 
had ever received. We thought the whole world was falling 
apart around us. Our vehicles, bunkers, villages and guns were 
being demolished. We wondered if anyone would live to 
fight."’** The survivors used their M-72 LAWs, naval gun fire 
and tactical air support to repel both NVA tank and infantry 
assaults. Colonel Chung was correct; the Communists never 
crossed the My Chanh River to threaten Hue. General Starry 
concluded that, "Although vastly outnumbered [the South 
Vietnamese] had succeeded in slowing the momentum of the 
massive North Vietnamese invasion. With assistance from U.S.
’**Iteid. f p. 287. 
*^Ibid.. p. 298. 
’**Ifeid., p. 299.
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and Vietnamese tactical air forces, they provided the 
resistance that delayed the enemy until enough reinforcements 
could be brought up to halt the offensive."’**
After reorganizing the defenses of MR-i, the South 
Vietnamese began their counterattack. By September 15 they had 
battled their way back to Quang Tri City. In house-to-house 
fighting they suffered over 5,000 casualties, "before raising 
their national colors over the Citadel's destroyed walls.
The stories of the defense of Kontum emd An Loc were 
similar. Some units fought better than others, but all 
suffered heavily under the incessant artillery bombardment of 
the numerically superior North Vietnamese. At the crucial 
moments they held inspite of devastating casualties. Although 
some units broke under extreem duress, the valor and 
sacrifices of most units won the battle.’^’
Time interpreted the battle differently. "Any illusions 
about the prospects of victory through Vietneuaization . . . 
were shattered by the success of Hanoi's Easter Offensive this 
year, when only American air strikes prevented a South 
Vietnamese rout. "’^  Time printed 518 Cl of anti-war coverage 
and only 86 pro-war Cl. The bulk of the pro-war coverage 
described the success of the U.S. Air Force. Time's coverage.
169starry. Armored Combat, p. 212. 
’^ Turley, Easter, pp. 304-305. 
’^ ’Truong, Easter, p. 176-81. 
’^ i m e . November 6, 1972, p. 18.
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moving forward from April 10, 1972, contained the following. 
The Spring Offensive has begun and the Communists are 
delivering "A beating" to the ARVN.’” "The colors of the 
South Vietnamese flag are certainly appropriate-most of the 
people are yellow amd the rest are red. The South 
Vietnamese air force "can't fight amd won't fight."’” 
Actually, Time inquired, why should the Communists negotiate 
in Paris when they are aüoout to win on the battlefield? The 
ARVN troops broke amd ram at Quang Tri, leaving their 
equipment behind. By day these men "looted stores in broad 
daylight. By night gamgs of deserters started fires and fought 
drunken skirmishes in the streets." Can the ARVN even survive. 
Time wondered, "much less defeat the North Vietnamese?" 
Communist General Giap's "strategy of annihilation [is] 
obviously having its effect." Nixon's best hope, in Time * s 
opinion, was that the ARVN might be able to avoid annihilation 
"at least through the seven day Moscow summit" later in May. 
The Communists expected to "crumble ARVN and to topple the 
Thieu regime" by mid-summer. They are "smelling blood in South 
Vietnam."’” Saigon was enveloped in gloom "in the wake of 
the abject ARVN collapse."’”
’”lbid.. April 10, 1972, p. 32.
’”lbid.. April 17, 1972, p. 37.
’”lbid.. April 24, 1972, p. 27.
May 15, 1972, pp. 12, 24, 30. 
’”lbid.. May 22, 1972, p. 15.
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At this point in early June, Time reported that "The 
worst of the ground fighting may be over."’” Time offered no 
explanation as to how the ARVN had survived its "abject 
collapse," but did conclude that the invasion had "drastically 
affected the pacification program [and] badly battered 
ARVN."’” Then, in a paragraph completely out of character 
with its previous coverage. Time printed two Cl stating that, 
"the North Vietnamese offensive has been obviously blunted at 
enormous cost to the Communists."’**
Time's depiction of the abject collapse of the South 
Vietnamese military did not represent the view of the United 
States Marine Corp's advisors to the South Vietnamese Marine 
Corp (VNMC). The senior U.S. Marine Advisor, Colonel Joshua 
Dorsey, stated in 1972 that the South Vietnamese Marines "have 
been in heavy combat over fifteen years. There is little we 
can teach them except, perhaps, how to better utilize their 
supporting arms." Dorsey described the South Vietnamese 
officers as "a band of brothers with an intense loyalty to 
each other. They exhibit great pride in their corps.” Dorsey 
concluded that the VNMC's battlefield performance showed that, 
"They're good. . . . They've been in some hellish fights and 
never buckled. "’*’
’”Time, June 5, 1972, p.28
’”lbid.. June 12, 1972, p. 26; June 19, 1972, p. 25.
July 3, 1972 p. 17.
’*’Turley, Easter, pp. 9-10.
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During April and May, virtually all of Time's coverage 
described the "abject collapse of ARVN." During June, July and 
August as the ARVN counterattack retook lost ground. Time 
published only five column inches of battlefield coverage. 
Instead of covering the ARVN's counter-offensive. Time printed 
76 Cl describing the "swelling multitude of refugees . . . 
condemned to live in camps or in the putrid shanty towns" 
around South Vietnam's cities.**
Time had a choice here. It could have presented the 
refugee problem as resulting from the North Vietnamese army's 
attempts to militarily impose Communism on the South 
Vietnamese people. On September 11, 1972, Time printed a 16 Cl 
story describing the suffering of civilians in the Mekong 
Delta. Fifteen of the column inches described the U.S. policy 
"of massive amd calculatedly destructive airpower. . . . Well 
dug-in guerrillas can frequently survive an attack, but a 
peasant in his field has little chance . . .  a few of the 
victims at present in Dinh Tuong Hospital: A 14 year old boy 
. . . half of his left arm has been blown away and the other 
half is wrapped in a blood dripping bandage. . . .  Le Van Du, 
12, resembles an Egyptian mummy, wrapped from head to foot in 
bandages."
In the middle of the story. Time gave approximately one- 
half of a column inch to the observation that, "To be sure, 
the bombing victims represent only a part of the war
’**Time. June 26, 1972, p. 26.
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casualties. Others are suffering from mortar wounds. Communist 
fired B-40 rockets and AK-47 rifles; some do not know what hit 
them." But, Time concluded, "the bombs are dropping night emd 
day on the friendly Vietnamese of Dinh Tuong."’**
Time's coverage of the battle for Dinh Tuong Province 
provides an interesting contrast to General Truong's account. 
Truong points out that Route 4 was the only paved highway 
connecting the rice growing lands of the Delta with four 
million consumers in Saigon. It was absolutely vital for the 
ARVN to keep the road open. The ARVN 7th and 9th Divisions 
"fought many fierce battles in Dinh Tuong" for control of 
Route 4. In August they "fought a major battle . . . and
completely cleared [the My Tho] area of the enemy . . . .  By 
the end of August, enemy activities in Dinh Tuong Province had 
been seriously impeded by our quick and aggressive reactions 
on the ground and continuous pounding from the air by U.S. 
tactical air and B-52S."’**
Time failed to report the significance or the success of 
these battles. Its coverage was limited to the observation 
that, "The bombs are dropping night and day on the friendly 
Vietnamese of Dinh Tuong." In a similar vein an October 23, 
1972, article quoted a war veteran as saying.
We went into villages after they droped napalm, and the human 
beings were fused together like pieces of metal that had been
’**Ibid.. September 11, 1972, p. 24 
’**Truong, Easter, pp. 151-52.
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soldered. Sometimes you couldn't tell if they were people or 
animals. We have jets that drop rockets, and in the shells 
they have penny nails. Those nails— one nail per square inch 
[over an area] the size of a football field— you can't believe 
what they do to a human being. I was there a year and I never 
had the courage to say that it was wrong . . . .  when you come 
back, you see your own wife, or your own family, then you 
understand what you did . . . you can't believe you didn't 
have the courage to open your mouth against that kind of 
murder.
Beyond doubt war creates great suffering. When the 
Communists built base camps in and around villages, it was 
impossible to attack them without injuring civilians. When 
American planes attacked Iraq's military instalations during 
the Gulf War, civilians were killed. Time, however, did not 
cry out against "that kind of murder" when it happened. Time
had a choice of whom to portray as the "good guys" and "bad
guys" in the Easter Offensive. Time could have placed all or 
part of the blame on the North Vietnamese attempt to 
militarily impose communism on the South. Instead Time chose 
to portray the Americans as the bad guys, and to do so in the 
most graphic, emotion-laden terms.
In this regard Sir Robert Thompson has two stories of 
personal experience from the Easter Offensive. When Communist 
forces attacked villages near An Loc, "In nearly every case
the population fled to the nearest district town." Local
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Regional Force and Popular Force platoons gathered to drive 
the invaders back across the border. "It was on one such 
occasion, when the population fled from the hamlet, that the 
children were placed in a pagoda for safety, but several of 
them sneaüced out to watch the battle. One girl was hit by 
napalm.” The photograph of Kim drew worldwide attention. But 
of 350,000 inhabitants of Hau Nghia province, "only thirteen 
civilians were killed in the whole invasion period."**
Thompson's second story came from An Loc itself. After 
the Communists had been turned back Thompson visited the town 
in June. "With an escort of four gunships we traveled in at 
a height of 7,000 feet to reduce the risk of SA7 missiles and 
then spiralled rapidly down into the town . . . .  When I 
described my visit on the following day to President Thieu he 
immediately asked for a similar flight to be laid on for him. " 
For security reasons the trip was kept secret and no media 
were invited. When Thieu jumped from the helicopter, "the 
Province Chief, who was there to meet the party, broke down 
and wept. The troops in the surrounding bunkers, on seeing the 
President, rushed forward, lifted him up amd carried him into 
town. "’**
Overall, Time printed 518 Cl of anti-war coverage of the 
Easter Offensive and only 9 Cl of pro-war coverage, aside from 
praise for the U.S. Air Force's ability to knock out bridges.
’**Thompson, Peace, p. 108. 
’“ibid., p. 107.
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fuel supplies amd tamks. Despite the fact that the Communists 
suffered a five-sixths casualty rate and took none of their 
objectives. Time interpreted the Easter Offensive to meam 
that, "Any illusions aüsout the prospects of victory through 
vietnamization . . . were shattered by the success of Hanoi's 
Easter Offensive this year, when only Americam air strikes 
prevented a South Vietnamese rout."
A reasonadale alternative interpretation would have been 
that with U.S. air support the ARVN had successfully defended 
South Vietnam from the Communists' best effort. The results of 
the Easter Offensive provided substantial reason to believe 
that South Vietnam would be aüale to permamently maintain its 
independence, without the aid of U.S. ground support, if
America continued its 1972 level of assistance. Time's two
hundred in-depth interviews, described aüaove, gave a good 
indication of what the average American's reaction would have 
been if this interpretation had been offered. Once again. 
Time ' s coverage of the 1972 Easter Offensive helped to promote 
the goals of the anti-war movement and deprived its readership 
of the opportunity to make an informed decision about the war.
Time ' s coverage of the anti-war protest demonstrations in 
the U.S. from mid-1969 followed a similar pattern. From the 
beginning of October 1969, Time carried 429 Cl sympathetic to 
the war protesters and 41 Cl that were critical. Even in the
41 CI criticizing the protests Time was careful to
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differentiate between the good protesters, the "broad-cross 
section" of middle class anti-war demonstrators, and the 
"young extremists [who] marred the peace kept by the 
overwhelming majority of the demonstrators."’*^  
Beginning on October 10, 1969, Time's coverage stated 
that a variety of Congressmen, priests, rabbis, business 
leaders, doctors, and lawyers were supporting the Moratorium 
Day anti-war protests.’** Organizers "happily confessed that" 
support for M-Day had grown so quickly that they were 
scrambling to keep up. Time quoted Secretary of Defense Melvin 
Laird's son saying "everybody should be against the war" as he 
marched in protest. A former Green Beret and Bronze Star 
winner proclaimed, "Now I feel guilty for going over there. I 
feel ashamed. [The war] has screwed me up so bad and screwed 
the whole county up . . . .  I don't think it's worth killing 
American boys on the pretense of helping those crummy 
bastards." Time continued, "Mass protest has been neither 
frequent nor popular at Rice University," but even this 
conservative Southern school had joined in the M-Day 
demonstrations. The organizer at Rice hoped "that Moratorium 
Day will force the Administration to choose whether it will 
remain totally indifferent to the national will." Berkeley 
physics professor William Chinosky had never before 
sympathized with student protest, but even he became an M-Day
’*^ Time. November 21, 1969, p. 23. 
’**Ibid.. October 10, 1969, p. 18.
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organizer, saying, "We simply must get the American people to
begin thinking rationally eibout Viet Nam." A Vanderbilt
University organizer said, "It is a bad war and we have to get
out." In Atlanta, "the thought of the war not ending is just
more than people can take"; while in Houston, "business men
have been especially active" in the anti-war protests.’** In
November Time described the March Against Death:
the protesters carried devotional candles 
and 24-inch by 8-inch cardboard signs, 
each bearing the name of a man killed in 
action or a Vietnamese village destroyed 
by the war. The candles flickered in the 
wind, the funereal rolling of the drums, 
the hush over most of the line of march—  
but ad)ove all the endless recitation of 
names of dead servicemen and gutted 
villages as each marcher passed the 
White House— were impressive drama: 'Jay 
Lee Richter . . . Milford Togazzini . . .
Vinh Linh, North Viet Nam . . .
Joseph Y. Ramirez'. At the capitol, each 
sign was solemnly deposited in one of the 
several coffins, later conveyed back up 
Pennsylvania Avenue in the Saturday 
march. Mrs. Judy Droz, 23, of Columbia 
Mo., was chosen to walk first in the 
March Against Death. Her husband, a Navy 
officer died in Viet Nam last spring.
In April 1971 Time reported that a Massachusetts 
housewife walked 450 miles from her home to Washington D.C. to 
"express forcefully her opposition to the war." She said, "The 
vast majority of the people" she met shared her anti-war 
beliefs. In May 1971 Time reported that an anti-war
’**Ibid.. October 17, 1969, pp. 17-22 
ion
Ibid.. November 21, 1969, p. 24. 
’*’lbid.. April 12, 1971, p. 12.
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protest had drawn 200,000 people, "one of Washington's largest 
ever . . . .  The Washington demonstration was the kind that 
cops could have brought their children to ; at least one 
policeman did . . . .  On the saune day, in San Francisco, 
125,000 demonstrators . . . were led by Bob Silva, a 21 year 
old Viet Nam veteran, with medals dangling from his sports 
shirt, who rode in a wheel chair . . . .  Both demonstrations
192were happily free of violence." When protesters shouted 
"Pig," the police replied, "We don't like the war any better 
than you do." Time also reported on John Kerry, a Yale 
graduate who won a Silver Star, a Bronze Star, and three 
Purple Hearts. Kerry testified before Congress that there was 
"nothing in South Viet Nam that threatens the United States of 
America. To attempt to justify the loss of one American life 
in Viet Neun, Cambodia or Laos by linking such loss to the 
preservation of freedom is to us the height of criminal 
hypocrisy." Time commented, "there was no arguing with the 
conviction with which he spoke."
Given Time ' s coverage one might easily assume that the 
anti-war protest demonstration had a much broader base of 
support than 27 percent of the public. Time appears to have 
been trying to sell the demonstrations to a reluctant 
majority. The 53 percent of Americans who condemned the
192
Ifeiâ*./ May 3, 1971, p. 10.
19X
Ibid*., May 17, 1971, p. 15.
194
Ibid*., May 3, 1971, p. 12.
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protests believed that they damaged the war effort by leading 
the enemy to believe that there was no need to negotiate 
because sooner or later public pressure would force a 
unilateral American withdrawal/^ Time printed only 8 Cl 
representing this majority point of view, while printing 429 
Cl which portrayed the anti-war protesters in the most glowing 
of terms. Thus Time's coverage of the anti-war protest 
demonstrations was biased in such a way as to promote the 
goals of the anti-war movement.
Time ' s coverage of the 1971 presidential elections in 
South Vietnam was equally problematic. President Thieu had 
guided a bill through the South Vietnamese legislature which 
eventually made it impossible for Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky 
to qualify to have his name placed on the election ballot. 
Later, in the face of a general condemnation of Thieu's strong 
arm tactics, the South Vietnamese Supreme Court ruled that 
Ky's name should be placed on the ballot. Ky then declined to 
run. The other candidate who had qualified. General Duong Van 
Minh, also withdrew from the race, forcing Thieu to accept 
'victory' in an uncontested election.
Sir Robert Thompson interpreted the 1971 election this 
way: "As an exiled Northerner Ky never had a chance and his 
whole campaign was designed to [pressure] Thieu into giving
Harris, Ancmish. p. 66-67. The poll question seems to 
have been phrased, "Do you believe the anti-war protests give 
aid and comfort to the enemy?"
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him a suitable appointment . . . .  I happened to be in Saigon 
for the first three months of 1971 and reached the conclusion, 
in which I was not alone, that Thieu had such overwhelming 
support that 'Big Minh' would be unlikely to get 20% of the 
vote. This would have finished him as a political figure.
The London Economist agreed two months before the election 
that, "It is most improbable that General Minh now thinks he 
might win," and Ky had even less support.
Time began its election coverage by asserting, "But can 
anyone beat Thieu? Probably not . . .  he has enough solid 
support in the countryside to win going away."’** Again on 
August 16, Time remarked, "It is widely believed that Thieu 
could win without resorting to dubious p r a c t i c e s . T h i s  
made sense in light of Thieu's popularity with the Catholics, 
the military and the rural peasamtry, who were becoming 
relatively prosperous land owners for the first time in the 
nation's history because of Thieu's land reform and economic 
development program. The President had been able to shepherd 
a revolutionary land reform bill through the legislature which 
"differed very little from the original executive proposals, 
despite a serious attempt by the Lower House to substitute a
Thompson, Peace, p. 13-14.
197Economist. August 14, 1971, p. 26. 
May 3, 1971, p. 30.
August 16, 1971, p. 29.
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much weaker version."^ Dr. Howard Penniman states that the 
prevailing opinion in rural South Vietnam was represented by 
a village chief whom he interviewed. Like most local officials 
he believed that Thieu would have easily won even in a three 
way race against both General Minh and Vice President Ky 
because Thieu, "gave us the land, the fertilizer, the pigs and 
chickens, and provided a school for our children. Few people 
on the land know General Minh and fewer know who Ky is. The 
peasants would cooperate with President Thieu.
As the elections drew closer, however. Time's 
interpretation changed. It ran stories in August, September, 
and October which reported that the elections were being 
reduced "to the level of a farce, a situation which might in 
turn force the U.S. to hasten its withdrawal from Viet 
N a m . T h e  election bore "little resemblance to the 'self- 
determination* that Washington politicians talk of when they 
explain why the U.S. is still in Viet Nam. [It had become a] 
bitter joke, [and a] source of deep embarrassment to 
Washington. [Thieu*s election rigging was] knocking the 
underpinnings from the U.S. contention that it remains in 
South Viet Nam at the request of a freely and democratically
Charles Stuart Callison, LandrTo-The-Tiller In The 
Mekong Delta (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, emd the 
Center for South and Southeast Asia studies. University of 
California, Berkeley, 1983), p. 83.
Penniman, Elections, pp. 135-36.
”^ime. August 23, 1971, p. 22.
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elected government."^ Time concluded that the U.S. should 
suffer no more combat deaths "if the net result of U.S. policy 
is to be an electoral farce in Saigon." Time favored "Senate 
Majority Leader Nike Mansfield's proposal that all U.S. troops 
be legislated out of Viet Nam if the election is not cleared 
up."**
Time could have built on its initial assertion by saying 
that it was unfortunate that President Thieu had been unable 
to resist the temptation to give himself an unfair (perhaps 
insurmountable) advantage by tampering with the election laws, 
but that since he was popular enough to be re-elected in a 
fair election, it was not all that significant. Instead, Time 
chose to interpret the elections to mean that South Vietnam 
was not worthy of receiving further U.S. assistance. Time 
published 175 Cl of anti-war election coverage, and only the 
three early column inches indicated that there might be 
another point of view. Time had once more pursued the anti-war 
perspective.
August 23, 1971, p. 22; August 30, 1971, p. 23
**IbisL.f September 6, 1971, pp. 23-25.
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CHAPTER 3 
TIME'S OMISSIONS
Chapter three addresses the story that Time did not tell. 
Sir Robert Thompson asserted that what had "always impressed 
me with regard to the attitudes of American society, and that 
of the West generally . . . has been its abysmal ignorance of 
the nature and course of the war."*** During the late 1960s 
and the early 1970s administration spokespersons such as the 
director of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development 
Services (CORDS) William Colby and his second in command John 
Paul Vann provided reporters with the details of this 
alternative story, but it did not see print in Time magazine.
During 1967 President Johnson consolidated all of the 
various American agencies which were giving economic aid to 
South Vietnam under the umbrella bureaucracy CORDS. In 1970 
the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Vietnam invited 
the highest ranking CORDS officials, along with a variety of 
military experts, to make their best case for continued 
Congressional funding of the war.
97
^®*Thompson, Peace. p. xiii.
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In these hearings the pro-war argument fell into three 
main categories: the big unit, main force war; local
security from Viet Cong guerrillas ; and economic 
development/nation building. Administration spokespersons 
argued that the Communist main force units had been driven 
away from the bulk of the South Vietnamese people into border 
semctuaries in Cambodia and Laos. Also, local security patrols 
were effectively preventing Viet Cong guerrillas from having 
access to 75 percent of South Vietnam's hamlets, even at 
night. The third prong of the pro-war argument was that the 
peasants living in the government secured hamlets had used 
American developmental aid to greatly increase the number of 
fields which were planted with two crops per year, the rice 
yield per crop, and the farmers' income. Thus, war supporters 
argued, the bulk of the population lived in relatively good 
security and increasing prosperity.
John Paul Vann's testimony carried the authority of 
experience. He had gone to Vietnam in the early 1960s as a 
U.S. military advisor to the ARVN. Once in rural South 
Vietnam, Vann discovered that a majority of the peasantry had 
joined the Viet Cong insurgency. They had not done so because 
they were Communists, or even sympathized with communism. They 
had done so because of their overriding desire for better 
government.
As soon as he understood the situation, Vann became 
sharply critical of the American war effort. He explained to
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reporters that it did not matter how much military pressure 
the U.S. applied, if half of the peasantry still supported the 
Viet Cong, and the other half remained passive, the United 
States was going to lose the war. Vann retired after 
completing his twenty year military service in order to return 
to the United States and publicize his view that the South 
Vietnamese people did not support their government and that 
unless Saigon could be made to provide better government and 
a better life for its people, the war would inevitably be 
lost.** When President Johnson formed the CORDS team in 
1967, Vann joined it to help in the nation building effort he 
believed would win the war. As outlined above, Vann testified 
that the 1968 Tet Offensive had been the turning point in the 
war because of the crippling losses suffered by the South 
Vietneumese Viet Cong and the new local security forces which 
had replaced the Viet Cong across the countryside. At the 
hearings, Vann testified that local security was sufficient to 
enable "most of the civilian population of the delta" to live 
in peace. Hamlets and government installations could expect on 
average to be attacked only once every eighteen months. 
"Actually, of course, there are many places that have never 
been attacked, " and a few that the Viet Cong attacked 
regularly.**^
Marine officer F.J. West had participated in the
**Hearinas. p. 112. Also Sheehan, Lie, pp. 5-6.
p. 90.
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development of local security as a member of a Combined Action 
Platoon (CAP). CAPS were made up of half Popular Forces and 
half U.S. Marines. In his book. The Village. West describes 
the process by which the local security forces with whom he 
worked gained control of a contested village.** When he 
initially joined the CAP, its night patrols faced frequent 
fire fights. One night a company of Viet Cong overrem the 
CAP'S fortified base camp. The defenders casualties were high, 
but eventually the cost of guerrillas killed by night patrol 
ambushes became too great for the Communists. Infiltration 
attempts became rare events. West described the sense of trust 
that developed between the villagers and the CAP. Once, after 
driving the Viet Cong from the town in a relatively large 
scale fire fight, the defenders dramk free at the local bars 
for a week.
Marine Captain Michael Peterson supported West's view of 
local security in his book. Combined Action Platoons. Peterson 
asserted that the morale and the sense of achievement were 
very high in the local security forces. CAP Marines were twice 
as likely as regular Marines to request a second tour of duty 
in Vietnam.**
Sergeant Richard Wallace, a squad leader in a CAP 
platoon, testified at the hearings that, "by working with the
**Francis J. West, The Village (New York: Harper and Row, 
1972).
^**Michael Peterson, Combined Action Platoons (New York: 
Praeger, 1989), p. 26.
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PF every day and sharing their damger and hardships, the 
marines and PF developed close ties . . . .  In fact most 
marines come to feel as if they are part of the village 
community. " Wallace stated that before his CAP was estcüslished 
in 1967, "the VC guerrillas had a free hand in the area," 
gathering food, supplies and recruits. In 1970, however, 
guerrillas no longer received "moral or material support from 
the people. Nearly all the hard core VC supporters have been 
driven out or captured and people are supporting their
legitimate government" without fear of Communist
retaliation.
After mid-1969, when Time interviewed U.S. soldiers, it 
invariably did so as a forum to criticize the war. Time gave 
no space to soldiers like West, Peterson and Wallace who had 
a proud sense of achievement in their work in Vietnam.
Sir Robert Thompson witnessed a local security forces
battle in 1973. "I visited a hamlet on the north bank of the
Thu Thua canal in Long An province, just after the cease fire 
in 1973." This canal was the first physical obstacle in that 
area to the North Vietnamese invading forces. The hamlet was 
defended by a PF platoon and the local Peoples Self Defense 
Force (PSFD-civilians whom the Saigon government had supplied 
with rifles). In the first few days following the cease fire, 
small Communist units attacked hundreds of these hamlets near 
the border, hoping to expand the area under their control. The
'^^ Hearinos. p. 287.
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local forces engaged their assailants, and although casualties 
were suffered and houses were burnt down, the attack was 
driven off. "The villagers were not elated by their victory . 
. . [but] you could see a quiet determination that if it
happened again, and it would, they would do it again. Their 
families were there, their lamd was there. . . . Some would 
die, others would take their place. They would keep the enemy 
out.
General Tram Dinh Tho wrote that while the urban PSFD 
tended to be trigger happy, in mamy villages they performed 
well. "In insecure hamlets and in certain areas under 
religious influence [Catholics, Cio Dai, amd Hoa Hao] the PSDF 
. . . were rather well disciplined. In both cases, they
appeared to be genuinely motivated by the need to protect 
their communities."^’^
In 1967 the U.S. Army developed a rating system to 
measure local security, the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). 
One of the key differences separating 'A* and 'B' hamlets 
from 'C hamlets on the HES questionnaire was that the hamlet 
chief had to be present day and night in the more secure 
hamlets, but only during the day in 'C hamlets.HES asked 
this because it was widely recognized that the Viet Cong made
’^’Thompson, Peace, p. 16.
’^^ ho. Pacification, p. 158.
’^^ Richard Hunt, Richard Schultz, Lessons From An 
Unconventional War (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 60.
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a priority of assassinating local representatives of the 
Saigon government. The strategy was designed to discourage 
people from participating in local government and to show that 
Saigon was not even strong enough to protect its principal 
local officials. In hamlets where the Viet Cong had access at 
night, even occasionally, the hamlet chief and the school 
teacher slept in the fortified compound of the local security 
forces. By 1970 HES rated 75 percent of South Vietnam's 
hamlets as either "A" or "B".^’*
In Vietnam, a village of several thousand people was 
normally comprised of several hamlets of a few hundred people 
each. The largest hamlet, with the local businesses, generally 
sat astride the main tremsportation route, either a road or a 
canal. Smaller hamlets formed rings radiating out from the 
center. Normally the central hamlet had the highest security 
rating, while the outermost ring was least secure. Likewise, 
villages closest to the Communist border sanctuaries were 
least secure. When allied troops made search and destroy 
sweeps, it was the outer-lying (contested) villages and 
hamlets that got caught in the line of fire. By 1970 many 
residents of these contested areas had moved to the more 
secure central villages and hamlets. When interviewers asked 
why they had moved, they most often responded that they wanted 
to escape from the bombing and the fire fights. The second
Komer, "The Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in 
South Vietnam" Journal of International Affairs. (25:1) 1971, 
p. 63.
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most cited reason for moving was the better economic 
opportunity in the government secured areas.Consequently, 
administration spokespersons argued, if 75 percent of the 
hamlets were secure, then somewhat more than 75 percent of the 
rural population lived in day to day security.
In the 1970 hearings, pro-war spokespersons argued that 
urban South Vietnam was more secure than the countryside. 
Donald MacDonald, the Director of the U.S. Aid for 
International Development (AID) mission in South Vietnam 
testified that of the 10,000 AID employees working in urban 
areas none had been killed or wounded during 1969 or 1970. He 
also stated that security had improved greatly since the Tet 
Offensive. MacDonald stated that his wife was safer walking in 
Saigon than she would have been in Washington D.C. or New York 
City.^* Sir Robert Thompson agreed: "It was remarkable that 
during the whole of this period there was hardly a terrorist 
incident in Saigon and I can say with complete personal 
conviction that Saigon was a safer place in which to live and 
walk around both by day and night than most American 
cities."*^ South Vietnam had about 6,800,000 urban residents 
and about 10,800,000 rural inhaüaitants.^’® If virtually all
’^^ Robert Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency (Cambridge, 
M.I.T. Press, 1970), p. 240.
’^^ Hearinas. p. 602.
’^^ Thompson, Peace, pp. 64-65.
’^"Hearings, p. 78.
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of Saigon's 4,000,000 people, and most of the rest of the 
urban South Vietnamese were safe from contact with Viet Cong 
cadre, and 8,600,000 of the rural people resided in secured 
hamlets, then the vast majority of the population was 
reasonaibly well protected from Communist tax collectors and 
assassins.
Pro-war adherents second area of emphasis was the 
increasing prosperity of the peasamtry. The U.S. spent aUbout 
$12 billion on economic development programs in Vietnam. 
Dr. Douglas Pike said in 1969, "in spite of the war and in 
some ways because of it, a surprising amount of nation 
building activity has gotten under way. Economists in Vietnam 
believe that within a year or two after the end of hostilities 
Vietnam will be at the point of economic take-off."^® While 
doing field research in 1967 economist Dr. Robert Sansom found 
that the nation building effort included an ambitious canal 
digging program in the early 1 9 6 0 s . T h e  canals brought 
irrigation water to many new fields. Farmers discovered that 
a small, relatively inexpensive American pump could raise 
water from the canals to the surrounding fields. The hand 
pumps which had been the peasants' only tool required too much
210
Pike, Vietnam, p. 127.
“®Pike, Ear, p. 41.
^’sansom. Economics. pp.151-212. The next two paragraphs 
come from these pages.
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time and energy. The new mechanical pumps greatly increased 
productivity and profit.
Another new tool, the Honda rototiller, was also much 
faster and cheaper to use than plowing with a water buffalo. 
Using the newly available irrigation waters, pumps, and 
rototillers many farmers were able to plant a second rice crop 
each year during the dry season. American fertilizer and 
insecticide also helped to increase the yield per acre. All of 
these things, canals, pumps, tillers, fertilizer, and 
insecticide came to the Vietnamese farmer at below market 
rates. America's $12 billion nation building effort subsidized 
these imports.
In the late 1960s, scientists developed a hybrid strain 
of high yield rice. This "miracle rice" had a shorter growing 
season, which made double cropping (planting two crops per 
year in each field) easier and more attractive. Use of miracle 
rice seed was expanding rapidly in the early 1970s.
The government also sponsored the Self-Help Hamlet 
Development Program. The GVN provided materials and technical 
assistance if the local people asked for it. But because "The 
programs would lead to success [only] when they reflected the 
true aspirations of the population . . . .  projects were 
initiated and managed by the people from start to finish."*^
^^enry C. Bush, Gordon H. Hessegee, and Roger V. Russel, 
The Impact of the Land-to-the-Tiller Program in the Mekong 
Delta (Vietnam: Control Data Corporation, 1972), p. 19.
Tho, Pacification, p. 110.
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Self-help projects included installing irrigation systems, 
constructing bridges, dams and sewage systems, digging wells 
and fish breeding ponds, building enclosures for pigs, cattle 
and chickens, and construction of market places and brick 
factories.
Another government effort, the Animal Husbandry Program, 
taught farmers how to select breeding stock, the advamtages of 
various mixed feeds, and how to treat livestock diseases. The 
GVN provided, free of charge, either forty breeding pigs per 
hamlet or ten breeding chickens per family.^* Similarly the 
Fisheries Program surveyed lakes to determine fish 
suitadsility, dug breeding ponds, taught fish culture, built 
refrigeration rooms, and provided breeding stock. The 
government also made loans for the cost of motor boats amd 
fishing gear.
Pacification programs under the Diem government had been 
impossed from aüaove, and had alienated many rural Vietnamese. 
Thus General Tho believed that local planning was crucial to 
the acceptance of the Self-Help programs in the later stages 
of the war. "Experience showed that when their own interests 
were at staüce, and when they had a voice in the management of 
their own affairs, the people volunteered and willingfully 
cooperated.
In 1970 the Thieu Administration added the last piece to
pp. 122-23. 
, pp. 125-26.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
108
the rural prosperity puzzle by instituting a sweeping land 
reform program and establishing the Rural Development Bank, 
providing the new land owners with credit to buy seed and 
equipment.^ The Land-To-The-Tiller (LTTT) redistribution 
eliminated all plantation sized farms and absentee ownership. 
Most rural peasants became farm owners and directly benefitted 
from the new improvements in productivity amd profit.
During 1971 and 1972, economist Dr. C. Stuart Callison 
and Dr. Henry Bush did field research in rural South Vietnam. 
Both confirmed the new rural prosperity. After thirteen months 
of study Callison concluded that "There is no question that 
the LTTT Program effected a major redistribution of wealth and 
income from the landlord to the tenants. " Hew land owners 
immediately began investing more money in mechanized farm 
equipment, fertilizer, insecticide and high yield rice seed 
than they had as tenants. The effect was that between 1970 and 
1974 rice production increased by 41 percent in the Delta.^ 
The new double cropping with miracle rice was an extremely 
leibor intensive form of agriculture, leading most new owners
p. 143.
^Villiam Duiker, Vietnam Since the Fall of Saiaon 
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, Center for International
Studies, 1980), p. 18; See also Lewy, America. p. 189; General 
Tho, Pacification, pp. 29, 142-143; and Charles Stuart
Callison, Land-to-the-Tiller in the Mekong Delta (New York: 
Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, University of 
California, Berkeley, 1983), p. 82.
^Callison, Land, p. 332.
“’ifeiâ., p. 329.
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to hire non-family labor to help them farm their land. The 
development of South Vietnamese agriculture was creating a 
significant number of new jobs.
In addition to the new farm employment, rural families 
were spending part "of their higher incomes on such things as 
housing materials, construction laübor, basic household 
furniture, local education and other services," thereby 
creating more jobs in the local economy.™ Beyond this, land 
recipients were newly interested in supporting local projects 
to build or improve schools, roads, bridges, canals, 
irrigation facilities, and health clinics.*"
The most significant effect of land reform, however, was 
expected to be political. After the 1968 Tet Offensive, the 
Saigon government's influence in the countryside had been 
rapidly increasing. Even in areas in which they still could 
not live, landlords were increasingly aüale to visit during the 
day to collect rents. Thus, prior to land reform, the 
peasantry had a major incentive to hope that the Viet Cong 
would not be entirely defeated, allowing the landlords to 
regain the oppressive power they had excercised before the 
insurgency.™
But when the Saigon government began issuing land 
ownership titles it had "no small psychological impact on
p. 333. 
” I^bid.. p. 334.
232'ifeid. pp. 35-41, 337.
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former tenants."™ If the GVN won a complete victory, the 
peasantry no longer had to fear the return of the landlords. 
Following the LTTT program the people had less incentive to 
support the Viet Cong, while two strong incentives to support 
the war remained: first, they had a genuine fear of Viet Cong 
terror; and second, the communists imposed high tax rates on 
incomes above the subsistence level, in those areas to which 
they had access.™
Callison concluded that while his research was not 
designed to empirically measure new political support for the 
Saigon government, "it was clear that support for the 
insurgents in the Delta was waning in the early 1970s . . . .  
[and] it would appear the land reform had a stabilizing 
effect."™
Dr. Bush's research was aimed at both economic and 
political effects. He published a paper in 1972 in which he 
listed the consumer goods newly in evidence in the villages he 
studied. These included furniture, radios, motor scooters, 
concrete foundations for homes, all-weather roofs, and 
occasionally even televisions and trucks.™
Bush argued that in peasant cultures land ownership is 
normally a highly valued mark of social prestige, and that
™ Ibid.. p. 337.
f pp.54, 191, 285. Also, see pages 126-32 below. 
™Ibid., pp. 337, 339.
™Bush, Impact, pp. 19-21, 25.
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this was true of the South Vietnamese peasantry. Also, 
government agents had thoroughly indoctrinated the peasants 
concerning the Communists' plans for farm collectivisation. 
Bush asserted that the peaseuitry of a third-world nation can 
normally be expected to support that government which has 
given them land (as well as the supplies and tools to farm it) 
against a government dedicated to teücing their land away. He 
observed that in the villages he studied the new land owners 
strongly supported the Thieu government and its war against 
the Communists.™
The administration spokespersons ' third argument was that 
the big unit, main force war was being won. Communist main 
force armies had been driven into the mountainous jungles, the 
Delta swamps, across the borders to sanctuaries in Cambodia 
and Laos and back into North Vietnam.™ The war was being 
fought primarily in eleven provinces along the borders, and in 
the jungles and swemps. Thirty-three of South Vietnam's 
forty-four provinces had come to experience day-to-day
239security. Colby described having taken an unescorted 
motorcycle tour with Vann, across the Delta. They slept in 
former Viet Cong strong-holds, which had been cleared by ARVN
™Ibid.. p. 57-58, 65-66.
™Hearings, p. 113. Also, Truong, Easter. p. 4-5; Starry, 
Armored Combat, pp. 155-56, 180; and Tho, Pacification, p. 26.
239Komer, "Impact," p. 68.
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units and secured by Popular Force patrols.™
When Lt. Colonel Turley inspected Military Region One, 
just south of the DMZ, prior to the Easter Offensive he found 
"There was a growing feeling of tranquility among the people 
as nearly seven years of heavy fighting appeared to have 
diminished into occasional harassing incidents. Highways long 
closed were open to traffic, which stimulated the rebirth of 
a growing economy."^*’ The markets in Quang Tri City, Dong 
Ha, Hue and Cam Lo "humming with the incessant chatter of 
bargaining Vietnamese, were full of food and wares."
How well did Time represent these views of the war's 
supporters? Time did not cover the 1970 Senate Foreign 
Relations Sub-Committee' s hearings on Vietnam. This is quite 
surprising if one subscribes to the view that news stories 
were selected on the basis of institutional constraints. By 
Herbert Cans' definition the hearings were exceptionally 
newsworthy. Cans states that the holders of high office 
become newsworthy by virtue of their position. Recognized 
experts are newsworthy. People who have been interviewed 
before are newsworthy.
At the 1970 Hearings, Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee William Fulbright presided. Time had
*^®Williaum Colby, Honorable Men (Mew York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1978), p. 284.
™Turley, Easter, p. 19.
242Cans, News, pp. 8-12.
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quoted Fulbright on several occasions criticizing the war in 
Senate debate.™ The Hearings were a major event on 
Fulbright *s calendar, taking several weeks and filling over 
700 pages of transcript. We have seen that Time interviewed 
•John Paul Vann, and quoted him, on more than one occasion. 
Likewise, Director of CORDS William Colby had been interviewed 
and quoted.™ Despite the presence of all of these 
newsworthy personalities and a parade of other expert 
witnesses. Time did not cover the hearings. It published none 
of the Administration's most knowledgeable spokespersons' best 
arguments for continued funding of the war.
In general. Time gave the case for an expanding area of 
security and prosperity very little attention. In his book. 
Honorable Men. Colby described his frustration with the media: 
"Almost every week I invited one of the resident American 
newsmen to accompany me on one of my overnight trips in the 
field . . . .  they rode up canals that had been under enemy 
control a few months before; they drove with the morning 
market traffic over roads no longer blocked by mines. But only 
a few wrote an account of what our program was doing and the 
changes it was bringing to the people in the countryside."™
The reporters Colby took into the countryside had the
™Time. October 10, 1969, p. 17; April 13, 1970, p. 18; 
June 1, 1970, p. 9.
™Ibid.. March 28, 1969, p. 27.
™Colby, Men, pp. 278-79.
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opportunity to verify the Administration's claims. Did the
hamlet chief and school teacher really sleep in their own
homes? Were the farmers using new water pumps and rototillers?
Did their houses really have new concrete foundations? Were
the people sitting on their new couches listening to their new
radios? Were they driving around on their new motor scooters?
One would imagine that even a casual visitor would have
noticed these sorts of things in a Vietneunese village.
Economists Dr. Robert Sansom, Dr. C. Stewart Callison, and Dr.
Charles Bush have all published their research conclusions
stating that these things were happening.
When journalist Robert Shaplen toured the Delta in 1970,
he found that.
There is no doubt that improvements have taken 
place. Many roads that had been closed to traffic 
for years are open again . . . .  There is no doubt 
that many people have moved out of Communist areas 
in the Delta in the last year . . . .  As far as 
economic improvements in the Delta, today one can 
see there thousands more Hondas, sewing machines, 
television and radio sets, and the like, than one 
could a year or so ago, and the current rice crop, 
amounting to more than f ^ e  million tons, is the 
highest in several years.
Dr. Pike stated in 1969 that, "Economists in Vietnam 
believe that within a year or two after the end of hostilities 
Vietnam will be at the point of economic take-off." Historian 
William Duiker did research in Vietnam after the Communist
™Robert Shaplen, "Letter From Saigon", The New Yorker. 
January 31, 1970, quoted in Hearings. p. 149.
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victory. Re found, "In 1975 the urban economy in the South was 
relatively advanced." The work force was technologically 
trained, and marketing systems were in place. "Many towns and 
cities possessed a relatively advanced commercial and 
manufacturing sector. Moreover, the technological level of the 
population was high, and there was a large and dynamic petty 
bourgeoisie. Transportation and communications were quite 
sophisticated. There can be no legitimate doubt that 
significant progress in economic development and nation 
building had grown out of America's $12 billion in economic 
aid. How could the investigative reporters whom William Colby 
was dragging around South Vietnam have missed these signs of 
progress? And yet Time published no stories describing CORDS 
work in positive terms.
South Vietnam's security and prosperity in 1972 provided 
a obvious contrast to the situation which nad existed in 1965. 
When Dr. Penniman visited Saigon in 1971 "friends urged me to 
check with the U.S. embassy" to see which parts of the city 
were safe. Embassy employees told him that he could walk 
amywhere in the city and that "Saigon is safer than either 
Washington or New York." Penniman was pleasantly surprised 
that "It was a situation in striking contrast with that of 
four years earlier [during his last visit] when the city was 
by no means quiet and safe everywhere and no one would have
™Duiker, Vietnam, p. 23.
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advised a visitor that it was."™
Likewise, the Commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, 
General William Westmoreland described a variety of terrorist 
attacks in Saigon after his arrival in 1964, and continuing 
into 1965. Many incidents were aimed specifically at 
Americans. Aside from the Viet Cong attacks "seething local 
political turmoil in Saigon also posed a threat. 
Demonstrations, sometimes violent, by students and religious 
radicals, Buddhists and Catholics, were the order of the
249day." In the summer of 1964 "street fighting between 
Buddhists and Catholics broke out in Saigon. [Driving] the 
roads without heavy armed guard became increasingly perilous; 
American dependents were forbidden to travel by any meems 
other than air."™ Richard Hunt agreeded that in late 1965 
"many district and provincial capitols were inaccessible 
except to an armed convoy with air cover.
In contrast to the situation in 1965, by 1970 
Congressional staff members Richard Moose and James Lowenstein 
were able to travel unescorted throughout the Mekong Delta. 
They rode bicycles. Obviously a dramatic change had taken
™Penniman, Elections. pp. 22.
249Westmoreland, Report, pp. 44-47.
™Ibid.. p. 72, 65.
^ ’Richard Hunt, Pacification (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1995), p. 36.
“Hfoods, Fulbright. p. 551.
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place. The Administration's claims of progress, supported by 
such a vide sampling of evidence, should have been evaluated 
and reported. The claims were easy to verify or deny. Given 
lims's stated editorial philosophy and the tone of their 
normal coverage, one would assume that the magazine would have 
relished the opportunity to demonstrate the inaccuracy of 
published U.S. government claims of rural development and 
prosperity. Yet Time published no analyses of the rural 
economy at all.
The only in-depth story Time published eü3out pacification 
reported on a "D" rated village. Only 5 percent of all South 
Vietnamese villages in which pacification had been tried at 
all had a security rating this low. The article left readers 
with the impression that while some progress was being made, 
it could all be swept away at any time.^ Although this was 
true of "D" rated villages. Major F.J. West did not think that 
was true of the village he had helped to secure. John Paul 
Vann and Sir Robert Thompson certainly did not think that 
pacification gains in the "A" and "B" villages could be undone 
by the Communists, if South Vietnam were given enough 
resources to defend itself from the North Vietnamese main 
force invasion. At the 1970 hearings Vann testified that the 
Communists were capable of massing their troops and capturing 
hamlets on a small scale in 1970, but that it cost them eüaout 
100 men for each hamlet they overran. Since there were
”^Time. October 26, 1970, pp. 47-48.
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thousands of defended hamlets, the Viet Cong and North 
Vietnamese together did not have nearly enough manpower to 
roll back the progress which had been made in local 
security.^*
The Easter Offensive offered strong confirmation of 
Vann's analysis. Just prior to the invasion over 82 percent of 
the nation's hamlets were rated either 'A' or 'B'. Under the 
extreme pressure of the all out assaults against An Loc, 
Kontum, and Hue almost half of the ARVN units in the Mekong 
Delta were transferred from local security assignments to the 
front l i n e s . I n  spite of these troop transfers, and the 
massive nature of the invading forces, the Viet Cong were only 
able to bring the number of 'A' and 'B' hamlets, nation-wide, 
down to 69.9 percent, at the lowest point in October.^*
The Communists' inability to disrupt pacification in the 
heavily populated Delta was due in large measure to the battle 
of Kompong Trach, a small Cambodiaui town just across the 
border. ARVN forces met the NVA's 1st Division and forced it 
"to exhaust its combat potential on Cambodian soil . . . .  
[thus the Communist's] mission to destroy the pacification 
progress in IV Corps [the Delta] was unsuccessful; they caused
^ Hearings, p. 116.
*®Truong, Easter, p. 155.
^^ichard Hunt, Pacification (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1995), p. 256.
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only minor disruption. By December 1972, the ARVN 
counter-offensive had restored the number of 'A* and *B' 
heumlets throughout South Vietnam to 80 percent.^
Time failed to report another crucially important aspect 
of the war; North Vietnam's weakness in 1972. The new weakness 
of Hanoi's position resulted from two techniques used 
initially by the United States in 1972. The first was the use 
of laser guided bombs (smart bombs). Certain railroad bridges 
had been frequently targeted but never hit (because U.S. 
pilots were trying to avoid being shot down by one of the most 
sophisticated anti-aircraft defense systems in the world)
In the 1972 bombings, however, these bridges were destroyed. 
Sir Robert Thompson contends that "between 800 and 1,000 
sorties were flown against the Than Hoa bridge south of Hanoi 
and it was never hit. But now [in 1972] in the first sortie of 
four Phantoms, it was hit at once by a 2,000 lb smart 
bomb." Pike agreed that the North had been much more 
severely deunaged in the 1972 bombings than previously. Laser 
guided bombs had demonstrated "a destructiveness the PAVN 
(North Vietnamese) High Command did not realize was 
possible.
Easter pp. 144-45. 
^ u n t .  Pacification, p. 256.
gem
Pike, Vietnam, pp. 119-20. 
Thompson, Peace, p. 113. 
“ ’pike, Vietnam, p. 97.
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Second, President Nixon mined the Haiphong Harbor in 
North Vietnam. This magnified the North's extremely vulnerable 
logistical position. "Because North Vietnam had no full-scale 
armament factories (as opposed to assembly plants), all of its 
weapons and ammunition," as well as all of its fuel, had to be 
imported.During the Easter offensive, Thompson stated, 
"The consumption of POL (fuel) and ammunition alone was 
running at several thousand tons per day.
Aside from these military needs. Pike stated that, "from 
12 to 15 percent of the rice eaten in the North" was imported, 
along with substantial guemtities of other foods.Thompson 
adds that "the North had to import one million tons of 
cereals" in 1973.“  ^ Beyond this, the USSR was "supplying 
Vietnam with fertilizer, pyrites, various metals, agricultural 
machinery, industrial equipment, motor vehicles, oil products, 
foodstuffs and clothing and fabrics, totaling 220,000 tons" in 
the period from July to September 1971. "Cargo delivered to 
North Vietnam from Soviet ports in the Far East totaled 
350,000 tons" in the same p eriod.North Vietnam had been 
importing between two and three million tons of supplies each 
year. In the wake of the December 1972 bombings they were
9*)
Pike, War, p. 35. 
“^Thompson, Peace, p. 114. 
“*Pike, Wa£, p. 35. 
“^Thompson, Peace, p. 138. 
“*Pike, Vietnam, pp. 115-16.
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unable to tremsport euiything like this quantity of material 
into the country (prior to repair of the transportation 
network).
When the Soviets reacted mildly to the mining and 
bombing. North Vietnam felt aJaandoned. Hanoi's position 
was very serious. Thompson stated that during the Easter 
Offensive, "All regular NVA divisions, except the 316 Division 
in Laos, had been committed and the reinforcements being sent 
forward . . . contained many teenagers with little more than 
three weeks training.Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed this. General Truong 
stated that elements of the ARVN 7th Division defeated the NVA 
207th Regiment in the Delta during November 1972, taking 73 
captives. "Most of these prisoners were teen-agers, ill-fed 
and ill-equipped, some without weapons or éunmunition. They 
disclosed that they had been abandoned by their leaders who 
fled when the fighting became tough. Truong stated that 
the period following their enormous losses in the Easter 
Offensive was the first time in which he had encountered such 
weak Communist forces.
In addition to describing the weakness of NVA troops in
13.
“ ’^Pike, Vietnam, pp. 92-93, 96.
Thompson, Peace, p. 121.
269Aviation Week and Space Technology. March 5, 1973, p. 
^^Truong, Easter, pp. 153-54.
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the South, Thompson further asserted that the 1972 air war 
over North Vietnam had "kept the damage . . . running at a 
higher rate than Hamoi's capacity to repair it. In early 
1973 the food shortages would have begun to take hold. Because 
of the Communist losses suffered in the Easter Offensive, and 
the North's inability to replace its lost men and materials, 
"South Vietnam was in a much stronger political and military 
shape by September, 1972, than it had been before the invasion 
started six months earlier.
Aviation Week and Space Technology supported Thompson's 
analysis. Its October 30, 1972, issue described the Easter 
Offensive as a severe military reversal for the Communists. It 
stated: "Hanoi is negotiating from the weakest military
position it has held in eight years." The North Vietnamese 
army had "literally lost its major military capability in its 
disastrous southern offensive." Host of its tanks, artillery 
and aircraft had been destroyed. Hanoi had "watched its once 
never-ending source of foreign supplies trickle to a halt and 
its once massive supply stockpiles dwindle to anthills" under 
the newly accurate smart bombs. Aviation Week concluded that 
the Communists had suffered "a major military defeat" and 
faced "an economic disaster in the north unless they find some 
way to relieve the unbearable pressure" of their imported 
supplies being cut off. "That is why they are willing to
^^ ’Thompson, Peace, p. 121. 
”^ lbid.. p. 122.
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negotiate now. We hope the American people . . . will
understand the valid and necessary role of applied military 
power in achieving real peace instead of a surrender labeled 
'peace*.
This represents a reasoned and informed expert opinion. 
It is also a view held by our foremost expert on Vietnamese 
Communism, Dr. Douglas Pike. The Broadcast Code of Ethics 
requires that all licensed television stations and networks 
present this sort of opinion in a reasoned and convincing way, 
as well as reasoned opposing views, and allow the viewership 
to form their own conclusions. American Ambassador Martin 
Herz's quantitative analysis of the network news broadcasts in 
late 1972 concludes that this view of North Vietnamese 
weakness was not convincingly reported as required by law.^ ^^
Lt. Col. G.H. Turley's book. The Easter Offensive, agrees 
that "most Americans have little appreciation for the true 
ferocity of the Easter Invasion, or for the indication it gave 
us of the South Vietnamese willingness to fight and die for 
their independence."^^ Thus, the anti-war movement was able 
to convince "Congress to cut off the funds which would have
^^ Aviation Week and Space Technoloov. October 30, 1972,
p. 7.
^^^Ambassador Martin Herz, The Prestige Press and the 
Christmas Bombing (Washington D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy 
Center, 1980), pp. 64-65.
Jaunes H. Webb, quoted in the preface to Turley, Easter, 
p. viii.
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made it possible for them to defend themselves. General 
Tram Dinh Tho agreed: "South Vietnam was lost not because 
pacification had failed but because" it was abandoned by the 
United States in 1973.^
Aviation Week agreed with Ambassador Herz that the 
national television networks and nationally distributed news 
weeklies had not published the pro-war view. In a February 
1973 editorial Aviation Week argued that although the American 
public had not been informed of it, "The Hamoi government is 
aware of the crippling military/industrial damage it suffered" 
in the December 1972 air assault. "About 1,000 sorties were 
flown, each dumping 24 tons of iron bombs with radar guided 
precision that was astonishing by any standards other than 
laser-guidance.
In testimony before Congress Admiral Moorer estimated 
(from reconnaissance photos) that 160,000 tons of supplies per 
month were being imported into North Vietnam prior to the 
December bombing, and that only 30,000 tons per month could 
get through thereafter (until repairs to the transportation 
infrastructure were implemented). Moorer described the damage 
done to bridges, rail yards, electrical generators and power 
grids, fuel storage areas, canal barges, harbor facilities, 
radio transmitters, and airfields. Between the Easter
, p. vii.
277.
278
Tho, Pacification, p. 169.
'Aviation Week. February, 12, 1973, p. 7
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Offensive and the December bombing. Communist losses in 1972
had been devastating. Admiral Moorer concluded "I do not think
that they, as of this moment, have the capacity for what I
would call main force unit action.
Dr. Pike emphasized that "the growing stability of the
6VN [amd the] success of Vietnamization, " along with the
effects of the Easter Offensive, the harbor mining, and the
smart bombs put Hamoi in a position of weakness.
The DVR si^ed the [Paris] agreements because at 
the time it could not do otherwise. It signed 
because of military punishment, having been badly 
mauled in the 1972 Easter Campaign . . . .  It 
signed because of Chinese defection and Soviet 
pressure . . . .  Whatever else they were, the Paris 
agreements were no victory for Hanoi, and were 
certainly not regarded there as such.
President Mixon stated that "Kissinger had brought back 
terms that would achieve our and Thieu's objective while 
allowing the North Vietnamese to save face. To Nixon, the 
Communists' key concessions were: the Thieu government would 
remain in office unless voted out by the South Vietnamese 
people; and although North Vietnamese troops were not forced 
to withdraw from the South "the agreement regulating the 
replacement of forces and closing the border sanctuaries in 
Laos and Cambodia would effectively cut them off from their 
source of supplies." If the Communists abided by the terms of
, March 5, 1973, pp. 12-13.
“®Pike, Vietnam, p. 97.
“’Nixon, BK, p. 692. The rest of the paragraph comes from 
this page also.
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the treaty these troops could not have defeated the ARVN and 
overthrown the Thieu government. Nixon believed that the Paris 
accords "amounted to a complete capitulation by the enemy: 
they were accepting a settlement on our terms."
The London Economist agreed that the concessions which 
the Communists offered on October 8th had "made their weakness 
visible. The Economist concluded that as the victors the 
Americans had a special obligation to be generous with the 
defeated Communists.
President Nixon had no illusions about the good faith of 
the North Vietnamese. He believed "they would observe the 
agreement only so long emd so far as South Vietnam's strength 
and America's readiness to retaliate forced them to."“  ^ In 
that regard Nixon wrote to President Thieu "You have my 
edasolute assurance that if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms 
of this agreement it is my intention to take swift and severe 
retaliatory action.
Thus even with the agreement which was signed, there was 
good reason to believe that, given continued U.S. support as 
stipulated in the treaty. South Vietnam would be eüale to 
maintain its independence. As it turned out, the Communist 
infiltrated enormously more men and materials into South 
Vietnam than the treaty allowed, while the United States (as
^^ Economist. November 4, 1972, p. 18.
“*Nixon, EK, p. 690. 
^ Ibid.. p. 718.
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Watergate crippled Nixon) virtually abandoned South 
Vietnam.
If instead of signing the treaty in early 1973, the 
United States had continued to re-arm South Vietnam, while 
preventing the Communists from resupplying (by harbor mines 
and the smart bombing of the transportation systems) 
throughout 1973, Hanoi's position would have become steadily 
weaker. This would have cost America few if any men or 
airplanes because as, Thompson argues, "By 28 December the 
North's defenses were shattered and the B-52s, if the bombing 
had not stopped the following day, would have been able to 
roam over the North with impunity. Hanoi was no longer eüale to 
track them with radar, its MIG 21s could no longer get off to 
intercept them, and the resupply of SAMs was only a fraction 
of their expenditure in the first few days of the raids (1,242 
SAMs were fired in eleven days). Aviation Week and Space 
Technology supported Thompson: "By the fifth day the Northern 
defenses were beginning to sag and no B-52s were lost for two 
full operational days . . . .  By Dec. 28, the Northern 
defenses were shattered. Thompson concluded that, "The 
whole system was breaking down, including the radio 
communications on which the Communist regime is pazrticularly
“*See page 24 above.
“^Thompson, Peace. p. 135.
 ^“^Aviation Week and Space Technoloov. February 12, 1973,
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dependent for control. At this point the war could have been 
won . . . [if] the bombing and mining [had continued] for as 
long as necessary through 1973. Hanoi simply could not have 
faced this prospect.
Instead of pressing its advantage in late 1972, however, 
the United States abandoned South Vietnam while the Soviet 
Union poured an enormous amount of aid into North Vietnam, 
rebuilding its shattered army. Dr. Pike states: "Estimates on 
the cost of this effort vary but may have been as high as $2.5 
b i l l i o n . T h e  Soviets built highways and oil pipelines 
into South Vietnam to service the sophisticated tanks and 
mobile field artillery they were giving to the North 
Vietnamese. During 1974, the South Vietnamese experienced 
scarcities of money, artillery shells and fuel. Time reported 
on December 23, 1974, that ARVN guns had been limited to two 
artillery shells per day.“® At An Loc, during the Easter 
Offensive, the Communists had been firing 7,000 shells per 
day.“’ Time also reported that the South Vietnamese Air 
Force could no longer fly adequate support missions because of 
aviation fuel shortages. When Time published this story in 
late December 1974, the Communist offensive that would finally 
defeat South Vietnam had already begun. If, upon receiving
““Thompson, Peace, p. 135.
“*Pike, Vietnam, p. 125.
““Time. December 23, 1974, pp. 35-36, 
“’ibid.. January 15, 1973, p. 25.
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news of these shortages, any of Time's readership had wanted 
to supply more shells amd fuel to the beleaguered South 
Vietnamese, it would have already been too late. During the 
period of March 24, 1974, through the end of the year. Time 
printed 5 Cl pro-war and 159 Cl anti-war. During the spring 
and summer, when it would have mattered, Americans did not 
leam from Time magazine that South Vietnam required more 
military aid to counter the massive buildup of North 
Vietnamese forces by the Soviet Union.
In conclusion, after mid-1969, what Time did not print 
was as important as what it did print. The magazine did not 
cover the 1970 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on 
Vietnam. It did not publish amy evidence of economic 
development. Time did not describe the experiences of CAP 
marines like F.J. West and Michael Peterson. It did not 
adequately explain the massive nature of Soviet military aid 
prior to the 1972 amd 1975 Communist offensives. Time did not 
inform the American public of North Vietnam's weakness in
1972. And finally, it did not help readers to understand that 
America's failure to match Soviet aid had left South Vietnam 
unable to defend itself in 1974. These omissions were crucial 
to the pursuit of editor-in-chief Medley Donovan's stated goal 
of convincing the American people that the U.S. should 
completely withdraw all forces from Vietnam as quickly as 
possible.
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CHAPTER 4 
TIME'S FACTUAL MISREPRESENTATIONS
This chapter focuses on several topics on which Time 
factually misrepresented what was actually happening in 
Vietnam in such a way as to promote the goals of the anti-war 
movement. The first subject of misrepresentation was a set of 
scare stories asserting that the U.S. must withdraw from 
Vietnam immediately or face certain dire consequences. The 
second set of stories involved Time ' s misrepresentation of the 
state of economic development and pacification. The last topic 
addressed in this chapter involves Time's portrayal of 
America's Communist opponents in the war.
Perhaps the most obvious misrepresentation Time presented 
to the American public was its picture of the entire American 
military presence in Vietnam as a colony of heroin addicts. 
Time ran a series of articles from December 1970 until June 
1971 in which it explained that good American boys were being 
shipped into a Vietnamese den of iniquity. Lonely and 
frightened, they were seduced by the peer pressure of the many 
heroin addicts already there. "It is one sorry byproduct of
130
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the war that cannot be eliminated by Vietnamization," Time 
warned. "As the U.S. soldiers come home all too often they 
bring their new habits with them."“  ^ The argument in this 
series of articles was that even though U.S. battle casualties 
were relatively low by this point, responsible parents still 
had very good reason to resist allowing their children to be 
sent to Vietnam. Time quoted a U.S. officer as saying, "The 
soldier going to South Viet Nam today runs a far greater risk 
of becoming a heroin addict than a combat casualty. This 
was based on the estimate that 10-15 percent of the homeward 
bound G.I.s were addicted to heroin. Time commented that "the 
dimension of drug addiction among American troops offers one 
more heart-rending reason why the U.S. should get out as 
quickly as possible." As spring turned to summer. Time 
continued to run ever bolder scare stories, eventually 
estimating that as many as one-third of all G.I.s returning 
from Vietnam were addicted to heroin.
In the August 9, 1971, issue a short article reported 
that Dr. Jerome Jaffe, director of the drug eüsuse program of 
the Illinois Department of Mental Health had begun doing 
urinalyses on homeward bound soldiers. About 5 percent of them 
had detectaüale levels of narcotics in their systems, but it
“^Time. March 1, 1971, pp. 14-15. 
“ I^bid.. April 19, 1971, pp. 21-22.
gQA
Ibid.. June 7, 1971, p. 9.
” I^bid.. June 28, 1971, p. 20.
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did not follow that all 5 percent were addicted to 
anything. Some had received injections of narcotics as 
pain killers for their wounds recently enough to show up in 
the urine tests. In the year that these teenagers spent in 
Vietnam, some percentage of their former classmates became 
addicted to drugs in their neighborhoods back home. The early 
1970s are generally recognized as a relatively free era in 
this regard. Time offered no evidence that a greater 
percentage of the teenagers in Vietnam became addicted to 
heroin than their peers back home.
Time spent 97 column inches spread out over seven 
separate issues publicizing the great heroin scare. Time 
stopped printing these stories only when faced with 
irrefutadale proof to the contrary. The rebuttal article got 8 
column inches.Thus, Time had factually misrepresented 
what was actually happening in Vietnam in such a way as to 
promote Hedley Donovan's goal of convincing the American 
people that they ought to push for removal of all American 
forces from Vietnam as quickly as possible.
In a similar type of article. Time played upon American 
racial fears and prejudice. In the September 9, 1969, issue 
Time's reporter asserted that the contemporary African- 
American soldiers were much different than they had been. 
"Before the war went stale and before black aspirations soared
296
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at home, the black soldier was satisfied to fight on an equal 
basis with his white comrade-in-arms . . . .  But now there is 
amother war being fought in Vietnam—  between black and white 
Americans . . . .  Many of today's young black soldiers are 
yesterday's rioters . . . .  Elaborate training in guerrilla 
warfare has not been lost upon them, and many . . . believe 
that Vietnam may prove a training ground for the black urban 
commando of the future." Time took a poll of black G.I.s and 
reported that "45% said they would use arms to gain their 
rights when they return to America." Time warned its white 
middle class readership that if it continued sending black 
soldiers to Vietnam, when they started returning "this fall 
and winter . . . they could constitute a formidaüale force in 
the streets of America, schooled amd tempered in all the 
violent arts as no generation of blacks has ever been.
This type of article probaüsly contributed to white 
America's fear of young black men and may have created a white 
racial backlash against innocent black veterans. Time printed 
no evidence that black veterans were more likely to commit 
racially motivated violent crimes. In the absence of such 
evidence. Time helped to promote racial prejudice while 
factually misrepresenting the war and its consequences. This 
article seemed to give middle class whites another good reason 
to support Medley Donovan's goal of withdrawing all U.S. 
forces from Vietnam as quickly as possible.
Ibid.. September 19, 1969, p. 22
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Time also misrepresented the war in a series of articles 
which analyzed the degree of South Vietnam's economic 
development. As we have seen, three Americam economists did 
field research in rural South Vietnam during the war. They 
found that farm productivity and income had risen sufficiently 
to allow farmers to invest in home improvement construction, 
vehicles, power tools and consumer luxuries. Two respected 
historians confirmed the three economists' findings. Even 
lias's reporters and editors were aware that U.S. aid programs 
had created "an economic infrastructure especially valuable to 
a developing nation . . . [and that] Thieu's land reform
program has already given much of the peasantry reason to back
299him." This four column inch story appeared in August 1973, 
after America had signed a peace treaty and withdrawn from 
Vietnam. President Nixon had already suffered the first 
crippling effects of the Watergate scauidal, and Congress was 
moving to pass legislation designed to sharply curtail the 
Executive Branch's war making ability. There was little chance 
that this good news about the success of nation building would 
affect future U.S. policy.
During the years in which America was deciding how much 
continuing assistance to give Vietnam after U.S. combat troops 
withdrew. Time printed three articles analyzing the South 
Vietnamese economy. The first appeared on August 31, 1970. It 
said that vehicle exhaust fumes
August 27, 1973, pp. 33-34.
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engulf Saigon in a noxious blue haze . .
. . Alleys aure scenes of chaos, as dogs, 
children and chickens scurry amid garbage 
and rubble. Row after row of shacks are 
built on stilts and often are constructed 
from sheets of rolled beer cams. One 
family lives with hundreds of Miller High 
Life emblems as the facade of its
house, while a neighbor may prefer the 
hues of Pabst Blue Ribbon or Budweiser.
Beneath mamy of these dwellings flow 
canals whose black waters reek of raw 
pungent sewage. In the shacks, which have 
no electricity amd little furniture, 
adults and children sleep side by side in 
a single room measuring no more tham 8 ft 
by 10 ft. Even so they are l u c k y  
[compared to the homeless. Although the 
war has created some jobs, what] has 
happened to Saigon is indicative of what 
is happening all over South Vietnam . . .
When the war finally ends. South 
Vietnam is likely to face a severe 
economic crisis . . . [its] cities are
already developing many of the same 
fateful characteristics that have caused 
despair and urban ^ Terrorism in other 
parts of the world.
An October 12, 1970, article said that unless something 
could be done "aüaout Saigon's faltering economy . . .  am 
unhappy U.S. Congress might sharply curtail American aid. 
Congress has reason to be concerned" because of South 
Vietnam's high inflation rate, trade deficit, and overvalued 
currency. "To ease the situation. President Nguyen Van Thieu 
last week decreed a package of reforms aimed at cutting 
inflation to 15% next year - a dubious proposition 
. . . Thieu's reforms may well prove too little and too
““ibid.. August 31, 1970, p. 35.
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late."“ ’ In November 1971, Time carried a short, neutral 
article describing some of Thieu's proposed reforms.“^
Anyone who took Time ' s coverage of the South Vietnamese 
economy to be an objective appraisal would have been forced to 
conclude that the situation was hopeless. Time presented its 
readership with a factually inaccurate picture of the state of 
economic development in South Vietnam, falsely suggesting that 
the anti-war movement was correct: complete withdrawal was the 
only rational choice.
The American economists who did field research in rural 
South Vietnam described President Thieu's land redistribution 
program as one of the most successful of such efforts in the 
history of the third world.*® Prior to the August 1973 
article referred to eü3ove. Time reported on land reform only 
once. On July 11, 1969, Time stated that Thieu had made a 
revolutionary land redistribution proposal, but, "There is, of 
course, the major question of whether Thieu's government can 
muster the political will and managerial skill to succeed in
304the task." Again, Time's coverage of land reform painted 
a factually inaccurate picture which made it appear that 
things were not going as well in Vietnam as they really were.
“ ’ibid.. October 12, 1970, p. 33.
“^Ibid.. November 29, 1971, p. 39.
303Bush, Impact, pp. 85, 57-58, 65-66. Also, Callison, 
Land, pp. 325-41.
304Time. July 11, 1969, p. 29.
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The last topic on which Time misrepresented the war was
in its portrayal of America's Communist opponents. Time
articles described the North Vietnamese leadership as wise
men who had suffered greatly in pursuit of their one goal, the
legitimate right to rule in their own country. Although the
demands of the revolution had forced them to employ harsh
tactics and the war they directed had brought much suffering,
they were still loved by their people:
The face that he [Ho Chi Minh] presented to the 
world was that of an avuncular, slightly shabby 
poet . . .  He impressed most visitors with his 
gentleness, but no man can hold together a 
Communist Party for nearly forty years, as he did, 
without an iron hand . . .  Ho Chi Minh's life was 
dedicated to the creation of a Unified Viet Nam, 
free from foreign control, and the 19 million 
people of his tortured land suffered mightily from 
his total devotion to that vision. Even so, they 
affectionately knew him ^  'Bac Ho' (Uncle Ho). So 
did many in the South. [His North Vietnamese 
followers] possess a serenity rarely seen in Asia.
They always seem to be fighting an invader or a 
natural calamity. The Mongols, the Chinese and the 
floods were all defeated . . . .  General Giap once 
proudly said that the Vietnamese were the only 
people to stop the Mongols. 'We will be the only 
ones to stop the Americans in the 20th century. '
The problem with Time ' s depiction of the North Vietnamese 
was that they were not sacrificing themselves in pursuit of 
their one goal, their legitimate right to rule in their own 
country. North Vietnamese armies had invaded Cambodia and Laos
*®Ibid.. September 12, 1969, pp. 22-26. 
““ibid.. October 23, 1972, p. 42-47.
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in the early 1960s and had been attempting to militarily 
impose their Communist rule on these unwilling peoples 
thereafter. The methods the Communists routinely used to 
prosecute these wars were comparable to the most gruesome 
terrorist acts practiced anywhere in the world.
Historian Guenter Lewy has made a detailed study of 
Communist terror tactics during the war.“" He contends that 
an organized bureaucracy staffed by over 25,000 men "drew up 
target lists" and then assassinated more than 27,000 persons 
and 2ü3ducted more than 42,000. "The mortaring of refugee ceunps 
was a common occurrence," as was laying land mines in the 
rural market roads. A favorite Viet Cong tactic was to fire 
snipper rounds at allied soldiers from a hamlet friendly to 
the GVN, hoping to draw return fire on the innocent 
inhabitamts. "At other times, the VC assaulted villages amd 
hamlets directly with the intention of killing men, women and 
children." The Communists used flame throwers to attack the 
undefended villages of Daüc Son in 1967 and Son Tra in 1968, 
killing 330 and injuring many more. At Phuthan in 1970 they 
methodically dropped grenades into the mouths of the 
villagers' bunkers killing "an estimated 100 civilians."
"Another terror tactic involving the intentional and 
indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians was the shelling 
with 122-mm rockets of Saigon, Danang and other major cities."
307,Lewy, America, pp. 272-77. The next two paragraphs come 
from these pages.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
139
Lewy asserts that the use of terror "constituted an integral 
part of communist strategy." The routine use of atrocity was 
calculated to "drive home the point that the GVN could not 
protect the people under its control," and thus intimidate 
support for the Saigon government.
North Vietnamese armies were still in Ccunbodia and Laos 
subjugating the populations long after the U.S. had retired 
from Vietnam. The bellicose leaders of North Vietnam even 
fought a short war against the Communist Chinese in the late 
1970s. They simply were not the wise, gentle, peaceful people, 
wanting only what was rightfully theirs, that Time portrayed 
them to be. Dr. Douglas Pike stated in 1969: "The rule in 
North Vietnam is as harsh, arbitrary, and intrusive as in any 
totalitarian nation on earth."*® Pike described the process 
by which the North Vietnamese Communists imposed collectivized 
agriculture on the peasantry in these terms: "In the name of 
land reform they set ad>out to destroy a village social 
structure that had existed for a thousand years. Village life 
. . . suddenly was transformed into a jungle of animal rage." 
Hanoi created the People's Agricultural Reform Tribunals 
"which denounced, tried, and jailed or executed certain 
villagers. Tribunals apparently operated on a quota basis." 
They had to produce a certain number of victims. If wealthy 
landlords existed in the village, they were of course 
denounced. In many villages, however, the difference between
*®Pike, Ear, p. 71.
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the richest and poorest inhabitants was slight. In some areas
the wealthiest had already fled. Under these circumstamces
"Party cadres deliberately created a condition of social
pathology by working on the emotions of individual villagers. "
Those who had gained power through the various new tribunals
and committees were encouraged to denounce whomever they most
disliked. "It was not uncommon for an individual owning no
land to find himself listed as an exploiter." Between 50,000
and 100,000 were executed. This land reform amounted to
the exploitation of basically decent people by 
memipulating their emotions so as to surface the 
dark stain of inhumanity that exists in all of us.
This dehumanized the Land Reform ceunpaign far 
beyond mere murder, £md it created within the 
society a subliminal force of which it still has 
not rid itself.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a Russian author who won the 
Nobel Prize for Literature, was sharply critical of the 
Western press for its idealization of Communist regimes. He 
believed that the media was overly critical of Western 
government's actions, while glossing over much worse aibuses 
committed by Communist regimes. He particularly criticized the 
presses' sympathetic attitude toward Viet Cong attrocities 
during the Tet Offensive. "The proven brutal mass murders at 
Hue are only noted in passing, almost immediately pardoned, 
because societie's sympathy inclined to that point of view, 
and no one wanted to go against that inertia. It was nothing
309
Pike, History, p. 108-109,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
141
short of scandalous. yime magazine's coverage is a 
classic example of Solzhenitsyn's point. Time printed 40 Cl 
describing the massacre of 5,700 Communist victims at Hue, 
while publishing hundreds of column inches covering the 
American massacre of just over 200 victims at My Lai.
Lewy states that "The magnitude and ruthlessness of the 
VC terror during the occupation of Hue left a deep feeling of 
revulsion among the people of South Vietnam. General Tho 
wrote that the People's Self-Defense Forces "arose in the waüce 
of the enemy 1968 Tet offensive as a result of the spontaneous 
demand from the people. The attacks waged by the Communists 
during 1968 completely alienated the people who had incurred 
heavy losses [particularly] because of Communist 
atrocities. Sir Robert Thompson asserts that although the 
militant Buddhists around Hue had opposed South Vietnamese 
President Ngo Dinh Diem in the early 1960s, the Communist 
massacre at Hue, "completely altered their stand. Dr. 
Howard Penniman agreed that although the Buddhists had 
conducted anti-govemment demonstrations as late as 1966, 
"events have sharply changed this relationship." Most of the 
civilians whom the Viet Cong had tortured and buried alive had
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "Peace and Violence", 
Aftenposten. Oslo, September 11, 1973, quoted in Thompson, 
Peace, pp. 35-36.
’^’Lewy, America, p. 275.
’^^ o .  Pacification, p. 150.
’^^ Thompson, Peace, p. 11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
142
been Buddhists. "This may well have crystallized the views of 
some who had previously seen little to choose between the 
governments of the North and South. In 1970 the Buddhists 
moved to join the system" by entering a slate of candidates in 
the Senatorial elections.Although American liberals saw 
little to concern them in the torture and murder of thousands 
of Buddhist civilians, apparently the victims' families amd 
survivors did object. Their new participation in government 
was rewarded when their candidates won the largest share of 
legislative seats.
President Nixon stated that during the Easter Offensive 
at both An Loc and Quang Tri "as terrified civilians rushed to 
flee the scene of combat. North Vietnamese troops 
indiscriminately slaughtered thousands of them. Ian Ward 
of the London Daily Telegraph covered the story on Route I 
outside of Quang Tri. Ward called the massacre "an act of 
calculated butchery unprecedented even in this conflict. 
Forward observers for the Communist artillery targeted the 
columns of desperate refugees. Sir Robert Thompson stated 
that, "The casualties along Route I (the stretch of road is 
now known as ' La Route Terrible ' ) were estimated at over
41.
’^^ Pennimam, Elections, p. 195.
^'^Nixon, BK/ p. 586.
’^^ London Dailv Telegraph, quoted in Thompson, Peace, p.
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20,000."*^ U.S. Ambassador Martin Herz confirmed that the 
North Vietnamese had, "deliberately aimed artillery fire at 
thousands of refugees trying to flee southward from Quang 
Tri. Lt. Colonel Gerald Turley commanded the U.S.
advisory team coordinating air strikes and naval gunfire in 
Quang Tri province during the Easter Offensive. He was in 
radio contact with all the U.S. advisors who were moving 
around the battlefield. Turley reported that the Communists' 
battle plan involved the intentional shelling of civilians in 
villages and cities throughout the region. This strategy 
created its intended effect. The roads were clogged with 
desperate, fleeing refugees, making it difficult for ARVN 
units to move during the battle. North Vietneunese artillery 
units had been prepositioned to fire on the various major 
roads, again, to interdict ARVN movements. Their decision to 
shell fleeing civilians was apparently in keeping with their 
war long strategy of intimidating support for the Saigon 
government. Turley's book contains photographs of the 
destruction to military and civilian vehicles along various 
roads of the region.
Turley states that on April 27th the Communist artillery 
began to hit Quang Tri city. "The intensity of the NVA's
^'^Thompson, Peace, p. 41.
^^ ‘nerz. The Prestige Press and the Christmas Bombing, p.
23.
319Turley, Easter, pp. 60, 76, 98, photographs appear 
between pp. 131 and 132.
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bombardments and its indiscriminate shelling of populated 
areas had the desired effect as more civilians were forced 
into the roadways further complicating the movement of 
military vehicles, personnel and supplies . . . .  Taking 
advantage of this helpless mass of humanity. North Vietnamese 
forward observers methodically began to adjust the fire from 
their 130 mm guns all along the lines of unprotected 
refugees. Turley indicates that the memories of the 
Communist's massacres at Hue (just south of Quang Tri) in 1968 
added to the panic. Time did not publish any account of this 
story.
It would not seem difficult to believe that the South 
Vietnamese genuinely hated the Communists, and wanted to 
defend themselves from a Northern victory. The American media, 
however, did not accurately portray the Communists' atrocities 
late in the war, the Southerners' willingness to fight amd die 
for their freedom, or the Northern weakness in late 1972. Thus 
the media's anti-war bias probably contributed to the American 
Congress' willingness to abandon South Vietnam to an enemy 
who, by the standards applied to Bosnia in the 1990s, would 
certainly be considered war criminals.
Time did run a 53 Cl story describing Cambodia's Khmer 
Rouge. The author, journalist Robert Anson, explained that he 
was captured and taken to a Cambodian village, where he was 
held prisoner. He spent several weeks there. As he grew to
^Turley, Easter, p. 259.
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know them he discovered that the Khmer were the nicest of 
people. Anson enjoyed a great deal of conversation with them 
"and in a short time became remarkably close . . .  a bond was 
forming between us. I could almost watch it growing stronger 
daily." Anson described his guilt when he saw that the allied 
assault on North Vietnamese positions in Cambodia had forced 
North Vietnamese guerrillas to teach the Cambodiams "how to 
crawl quietly through the grass, dragging their rifles behind 
them." When he saw the bomb shelter, evidence that his own 
countrymen had tried to kill these honest peasants, his 
feelings forced him to turn away. Anson was deeply touched by 
the gifts his friends gave him when they set him free.^ *^
The import of the article is unmistakable. The message is 
that the Khmer Rouge were such wonderful people that no decent 
man would be willing to go to war against them. This is a 
factual misrepresentation of a people's character. The 
literature on Cambodian history describes them as a 
particularly violent people throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. It should have come as no surprise that 
the Khmer Rouge would slaughter over a million of their 
countrymen when they gained power in 1975. They were 
exactly the opposite of the kind and gentle humanitarians Time
^Viroe. September 7, 1970, pp. 18-19.
“^arl d. Jackson, Cambodia 1975-1978 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 179-208. See also David 
P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1991), pp. 236, 241.
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described. A recent movie, "The Killing Fields" brought their 
well-documented atrocities to popular notice. Time' s portrayal 
of the Communists as the sort of people that no decent man 
could go to war against misrepresented the situation in such 
a way as to promote Hedley Donovan's goal of convincing the 
American people to push for immediate withdrawal of all U.S. 
forces.
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CONCLUSIONS
In the 1970s, the liberal anti-war movement believed that 
it was morally imperative to force a cut off of American funds 
for the defense of South Vietnam. Their underlying assumptions 
were that: 1, the war was already hopelessly lost, and thus 
further assistance would only prolong the suffering and delay 
the inevitad)le Communist victory; and 2, the hated military 
dictator. President Thieu, was forcing the South Vietnamese 
people to continue the war when they would have preferred to 
negotiate peace.
This thesis, however, has shown that substantial evidence 
exists supporting the conclusion that the South Vietnamese 
fought hard and successfully in the Tet Offensive, the 
Cambodian incursion. Operation Lan Som 719, the Easter 
Offensive, and in local security battles. Also, evidence from 
the 1971 presidential election showed that President Thieu in 
fact enjoyed wide popular support. Dr. Howard Penniman has 
demonstrated that Thieu's government was relatively open, 
responsive, and democratic. More importantly, evidence from 
the 1968 and 1972 treaty negotiations showed that the South 
Vietnamese people did in fact want to defend themselves from
147
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the ruthless, externally funded attempt to impose totalitarian 
Communism upon them. The media, however, consistently failed 
to publish the evidence supporting these conclusions. The 
media's failure prevented the American people from having the 
opportunity to make an informed decision eUaout how much 
support should be given to South Vietnam after U.S. troops 
were withdrawn.
A second conclusion which follows from this research is 
that the current mainstream historiographic interpretation of 
the American media ' s coverage of the war is directly 
contradicted by the coverage in Time magazine. For example, 
after October 1969, Time carried 429 Cl describing the anti­
war protest demonstrations in glowing terms and only 41 Cl 
critical of the demonstrations. Even in the 41 Cl which 
criticized the protests Time was careful to distinguish 
between the "radical youths" who caused trouble and the 
responsible adults who were peacefully protesting the 
"shameful and irrational" war. Only 8 Cl represented the 
belief that anti-war demonstrations encouraged the Communists, 
even though polls showed that 53 percent of the American 
public condemned the protest demonstrations while only 27 
percent were sympathetic. The most reasonable interpretation 
of this anti-war protest coverage is that Time was trying to 
sell the protest movement to an unwilling public.
Herbert Cans' book. Deciding What's Hews. contained a 
quantitative analysis of the news aired by the three
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television networks, as well as the news published in Time and 
Wewsweek magazines. He did most of his research in the late 
1960s while the war was in progress. Regarding the media's 
coverage of the anti-war protest demonstrations. Cans wrote 
"Marches and demonstrations are, from one point of view, 
protest activities, but the news almost always treated them as 
potential or actual dangers to the social o r d e r . L a t e r  he 
reiterated, "The anti-war demonstrations of the past decade 
were covered as disorder stories,"^* and again toward the 
end of his book, "The anti-war protests were, for most of the 
war, treated as social disorder news. Cans also asserts 
that journalists did not select news stories based on their 
ideological content, amd "In time of war they do not report 
news that may damage the war effort.
Cans admitted that his "quantitative analysis omitted the 
Vietnam War and all domestic news directly related to the 
war. Although he did not subject this news to a rigorous
formal analysis. Cans felt he had read enough of it to 
understand its import. The fact that Cans drew false 
conclusions about the media's war coverage without having 
analyzed it leaves his methodology open to criticism. The
’^ Gans, Hews, p. 53.
» p. 58. 
’“ifeiâ., p. 280. 
^^ Ibid.. pp. 183-189. 
p. 6.
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quantitative analysis presented in this thesis shows that his 
interpretatation was directly contradicted by the available 
evidence in Time magazine's coverage of the Vietnam War.
In the preface to his book. Paper Soldiers. Clarence 
Wyatt states, "For over twenty years, all have agreed on one 
point— the press was a major factor in the United States' 
failure in Vietnam. " Liberals praised the media for helping to 
end the war, conservatives blamed the press for losing the 
war. However, Wyatt asks: "Is either of these two views
accurate? Both are based on a belief that the press was a 
powerful adversary of the government and the military. 
However, research over the past few years has indicated that 
such a belief is misplaced. Content analysis of newspaper and 
television coverage shows that, more often than not, the press 
reported official information, statements and views with 
relatively little dissent. The evidence presented in this 
thesis directly contradicts this assertion in the preface to 
gQidiçr?.
Wyatt does make clear that the U.S. government engaged in 
a number of activities during the Cold War which it tried to 
keep secret. The U-2 incident over Russia in the late 1950s 
and the Bay of Pigs fiasco during the Kennedy Administration 
provide good examples. Wyatt shows that the press often 
cooperated with the government during these years by
328Clarence Wyatt, Paper Soldiers (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1993) , p. 7.
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suppressing news voluntarily, if the government opposed its 
publication. During the Vietnam War, Wyatt demonstrates, the 
Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon Administrations all used various 
techniques to try to manage the news. During the Nixon years, 
reporters were intimidated and even deported from Vietnam.
The conclusions in Paper Soldiers, however, are not 
supported by the evidence. Wyatt argued that if the founding 
fathers could visit us today they "would be shocked by the 
power that has flowed into the Executive Bremch." A 
fundamental part of the modem Presidents' power has been 
their control of information. "As the Vietnam war showed, the 
ability and inclination of the Executive Branch to restrict 
and manipulate information is largely beyond the press' 
2d>ility to resist."^ This paper concludes that in the 
period after mid-1969 Wyatt was wrong; Time did effectively 
resist Nixon's ability to manage the news.
Daniel Hailin's book. The "Uncensored" War, presents a 
much stronger case than either Paper Soldiers or Deciding 
What's News. Hallin did a quantitative analysis of 779 
television network news broadcasts aired in the years 1965-
1973. From this he concluded that the news coverage changed 
dramatically after the 1968 Tet Offensive. "Before Tet, 
editorial comments by television journalists ran nearly four 
to one in favor of administration policy; after Tet, two to
p. 219.
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one a g a i n s t . D i d  the media's amti-war bias after 1968 
hurt the war effort? Hallin chose to frame the question this 
way: "Could American power have been used more efficiently in 
Vietnam if officials had had more control over the media? 
Perhaps. But the case is by no means as strong as is often 
supposed.
Hallin provides a good analysis of the data available to 
him. However, his sample of 779 broadcasts represents less 
than 9 percent of all television network news broadcasts 
during the period 1965-1973, It is too small to allow him to 
form an accurate judgment as to the degree of bias in the 
total news presentation.
Hallin also did a quantitative analysis of the war 
coverage in the New York Times newspaper for the years prior 
to 1965. This allowed him to make a crucially important point. 
The media's pro-war bias in the early 1960s prevented it from 
reporting the negative things that reporters had discovered on 
the ground in Vietnam. Reporters could see that the U.S. 
government's optimistic reports did not match the actual 
situation which the journalists were observing. The 
media's pro-war bias prevented it from publishing an anti-war 
interpretation of events in the early 1960s. This precluded 
the American people from having the opportunity to make an
^Hallin, "Uncensored" War, p. 161. 
p. 211.
f pp. 8, 9, 214-15, and chapter two.
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informed judgment ad>out what type and amount of assistance 
should have been committed to South Vietnam in the early and 
mid-1960s.
Hallin's conclusions about the early war are excellent. 
Apparently, however, either his sample size was too small to 
draw accurate detailed conclusions, or the television coverage 
was remarkably more pro-war than that of Time magazine; and no 
one who has examined both has reached this conclusion.^ 
Hallin wrote that although the media turned anti-war after 
Tet, it did not turn very hard against the war, and it did so 
only after Congressional and public opinion had moved into 
opposition: "for the most part television was a follower
rather than a leader . . . .  The Nixon administration retained 
a good deal of power to 'meunage* the news." In Hallin*s 
opinion pro-war news coverage largely accounted "for the fact 
that the Nixon administration was able to maintain majority 
support for its Vietnam policies through four years of 
war. A more reasoned)le interpretation would seem to be
^Herz, Prestige Press. Herz quantified the coverage of 
the New York Times. Washington Post. Time. Newsweek, and 
C.B.S. television news on five separate questions dealing with 
the coverage of the December bombings. His results tables are 
printed on p. 19, 29, 33, 35, and 40. On one question C.B.S. 
was more pro-war (or at least less anti-war) at a 6-1 bias, 
compared to Time' s 19-1 coverage. On two questions Time and 
C.B.S. were fairly equally anti-war. On two questions, 
however, C.B.S. and Newsweek were the only media sources which 
provided absolutely no pro-war coverage at all. Clarence Wyatt 
and Herbert Gams both examined the coverage of the various 
national media sources also. Neither of them indicated that 
they found television to be more pro-war than Time.
^Hallin, "Uncensored" War, pp. 10-11.
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that the American people wanted to avoid defeat so badly that 
they were willing to support the President in spite of the 
media's attempts to discourage them.
A more fundamentally important conclusion revealed by the 
research for this thesis is that the mainstream 
historiographic interpretation of the Tet Offensive (that 
although it was a military defeat for the Communists, it was 
the turning point which led to their victory, because it ended 
public approval for American participation in the war) is not 
up-held by the evidence. Tet did not in fact cause the 
American people to stop supporting the effort to preserve an 
independent, non-communist South Vietnam. The evidence on this 
point is indisputeüaly clear.
Politicians are the nation's most sensitive observers of 
public opinion. If there had ever been anything like majority 
support for the anti-war position many candidates would have 
liked to campaign on an anti-war platform. This was never the 
case. In the 1970 Congressional elections: "Three leading 
Senate doves were felled but about that many hawks were 
defeated too . . . .  There was not much change in the house 
[either] . . . .  few candidates had made the war central to 
their campaigns . . . .  it appeared to play only a small part 
in the voting. The one candidate, George McGovern in 
1972, who did make the anti-war position central to his 
campaign lost in a landslide.
^^DeBenedetti, Ordeal. p. 293.
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In June 1972 Time reported that it had conducted a 
detailed interview survey of potential voters. The results 
confirmed that less than one-third of the American people 
believed in the goals eund values of the amti-war movement, 
while 70 percent believed that a Korea-like settlement, 
guaranteeing the permament independence of South Vietnam was 
possible, and they supported President Nixon in his pursuit of 
this conclusion to the war. A September 1972 Harris poll 
confirmed that 55 percent of Americans supported the continued 
heavy bombing of North Vietnam, 64 percent supported the 
mining of Haiphong Harbor, and 74 percent thought it was 
important that South Vietnam not fall into the hands of the 
Communists.^
In October 1972 Henry Kissinger announced that he had the 
basis of a treaty guaranteeing peace with honor to the United 
States. President Thieu, however, refused to sign. He demanded 
the removal of all North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnsun. 
The Communists then insisted that President Nixon repudiate 
Thieu, and sign the treaty which Kissinger had negotiated. 
Instead, Nixon stood by South Vietnam, and resumed prosecution 
of the war while continuing to negotiate for a better treaty. 
During this period in October and November 1972, polls showed 
that a majority of the American people approved of the 
President's handling of the war.
There is no room for debate on this point. It is
^ixon, M #  p. 689.
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indisputably certain that in 1972 the mass public rejected the 
goals and values of the anti-war movement, and supported 
President Nixon's efforts to secure an independent, non­
communist South Vietnam.
Another conclusion that follows from this thesis is that 
North Vietnam was in very serious trouble in 1972. They 
required 100,000 tons of imported food per month to feed their 
people. In the wake of the Christmas bombings they were able 
to transport only 30,000 tons of cargo (which had to satisfy 
their needs for both food and war supplies) per month into the 
country. It seems probable that continued bombing of the 
transportation routes would have reduced their ability to 
import goods even further. Continued bombing would have cost 
few if any American lives or airplames because virtually all 
of North Vietnam's radar dishes and surface-to-air missile 
sites had been destroyed. There were no functional runways 
left for their MIG aircraft to take off from. They had few SAM 
missiles left, and they were limited in their eüaility to bring 
new missiles into the country. Their inventory of tanks, 
artillery, fuel and ammunition had largely been destroyed, and 
five-sixths of their army had just been killed or disabled. It 
is difficult to see how they could have continued to prosecute 
the war in 1973 at a level which would have threatened the 
stability of the South Vietnamese government.
In spite of these facts the most widely used textbook for 
Vietnam War classes, George Herring's, America's Longest War.
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Stated that "the American effort to create a bastion of anti­
communism south of the seventeenth parallel was probably 
doomed from the start." Herring made absolutely no attempt to 
describe North Vietnam's weaJcness in late 1972, as if this 
evidence were so obviously meaningless that history students 
had no reason even to be informed of it. Herring, in fact, 
positively asserts that in his judgment the Communist 
negotiating position had in no way been weakened by the events 
of 1972.^
In a similar vein, the section of America's Longest War 
on pacification includes absolutely no discussion of the 
economic progress described by three economists, two 
historians and a host of journalists and experts. On this 
topic Herring concluded that, "Instead of rethinking a policy 
which had brought no results, Nixon clung stubbornly," to his 
pacification strategy in 1971.^
In addition to this. Herring's conclusions regarding the 
Tet Offensive and its effect on pacification, the Cambodian 
incursion. Operation Lan Som 719, the Buddhists' attitude 
toward Saigon and the Communists, the anti-war protest 
movement, and the media's coverage of the war are all 
essentially no different than the anti-war interpretation 
offered by Time magazine. Herring's conclusions either 
completely ignore or directly contradict the analyses of Or.
^^Herring, War, p. 275. 
^ibid, p. 265.
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Douglas Pike, Dr. Robert Sansom, Dr. C. Stewart Callison, Dr. 
Charles Bush, Dr. Gunter Lewy, Dr. Howard Penniman, Dr. Lucian 
Pye, Dr. John Roche; media sources, the London Economist, and 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, the experts who worked 
longest in South Vietnam Sir Robert Thompson, John Paul Vemn, 
General Donn Starry, Lt. Col. G.H. Turley, and Ambassador 
Martin Herz. One would not be aware, from reading Herring, 
that many of these individuals existed. Herring never suggests 
that any alternative interpretation has been published.
All of this material forms a disturbing pattern which 
requires some explanation. One possible interpretation is that 
the authors of the mainstream historiography of the war were 
among the one- third of all Americans who had come to believe 
in the goals and values of the amti-war movement. They began 
their research with a strong anti-war bias. The nature of bias 
is that it prevents individuals from noticing evidence which 
undermines the premise of their beliefs. Thus Herbert Gans and 
Clarence Wyatt were ad>le to extensively examine Time 
magazine's coverage of the war, and then reach conclusions 
which were directly contradicted by that coverage. In much the 
saune way the historical community failed to notice that the 
mainstream interpretation of the Tet offensive has been 
directly contradicted by the availaüale evidence for an entire 
generation. Similarly, the most widely used text for 
university Vietnam classes appears to represent the liberal 
anti-war interpretation of events, to the exclusion of all
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evidence undermining that interpretation.
It was in the self interest of the liberal anti-war 
community to reach the conclusion that Tet 1968 had turned the 
American public against the effort to sustain an independent, 
non-communist South Vietnam. The liberals' stated desire to 
end all U.S. participation in the war, even if it meant a 
Communist victory, was easily justifiable if they were simply 
leading the majority of the American people. Their actions 
would not be as acceptable if it were the case that supporters 
of the anti-war movement, a minority of less than one-third of 
the American people, had gained control over virtually all 
sources of information, media and university, and they had 
used that power to impose a misleading, falsely negative 
interpretation of the war on the majority of the public, who 
unlike the liberal community did not prefer an American defeat 
to Vietnamization.
A substantial portion of the evidence used to support the 
historical community's anti-war interpretation comes from a 
seemingly unimpeachable source, the officers of the U.S. Army 
itself. Logically it appears that these men were in a position 
to know what was happening, and they had to overcome their 
natural pro-military bias in order to offer journalists and 
academic researchers an honest view of events. General 
Westmoreland disagreed. "If a man had the money and could 
maintain his grades, he could defer service until he finished 
college and even graduate school." This policy "had serious
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effects for the United States Army." Campus anti-war militancy 
had closed down some ROTO programs, and limited the number of 
students willing to join those still operating. ROTC programs 
were thus uneüt>le "to provide officers in the numbers needed."
To fill the gap: "As a man finally completed his
education and at last submitted to the draft," the army 
inducted a lot of men with master's and doctoral degrees who 
did not want to be in the army, much less in Vietnam. They had 
spent years on campus, and many had developed strong anti-war 
views. "The deferred man often brought his anti-war militancy 
with him when he finally got into uniform . . . .  many tried 
to discredit authority by fighting haircut regulations, 
publishing and distributing underground newspapers, sponsoring 
or participating in protests, trying in any way possible to
339foment unrest." Thus there was a substantial pool of 
officers who brought a strong anti-war bias to Vietnam. 
Accademic researchers who were looking for evidence to support 
an anti-war interpretation would not have had trouble locating 
their end-of-tour reports for use as source material.
The question of Sir Robert Thompson's suitability as a 
historical source is of particular interest. His 
interpretation of the war prior to 1968 is virtually identical 
to the liberal academic view. Thompson's book. Wo Exit From 
Vietnamr was published before the Pentagon Papers. It was 
written in a period during which Time magazine still supported
339Westmoreland, Report. pp. 298-99.
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the war. Thompson's criticisms were based not on previous 
authors, but on his personal understanding of the war. He 
believed that if the overall aim of American foreign policy 
was "to promote peace, freedom, progress and prosperity 
throughout the world," then the strategy followed in Vietnam
340was counterproductive. Thompson argued that if a great 
power is to intervene in a local conflict without damaging its 
international prestige, its actions must be justifiable and 
acceptable to the great majority of people in its own country, 
the country subject to intervention, emd world wide public 
opinion. Furthermore, the resources committed must be of a 
limited scope. The commitment must be sustainable until 
success has been achieved. The methods of intervention must 
also be broadly acceptable. For example, the United States 
could have defeated the North Vietnamese by using nuclear 
weapons, but that would not have advanced the overall aims of 
U.S. foreign policy or America's international prestige and 
leadership.*^
The strategy America followed in Vietnam prior to 1969 
failed on all counts. President Ngo Dien Diem was clearly not 
acceptable to the majority of South Vietnamese in the late 
1950s and the early 1960s. When America stepped up its 
involvement in 1965 the cornerstone of its strategy was to 
inflict enough pain on the Communists to force them to give up
340Thompson, No Exit, p. 108. 
^^Ibid.. pp. 108-109.
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their purpose of conquering South Vietnam. The methods used to 
achieve this goal were intensive bombing and a war of 
attrition. The American troops' mission was to put enough 
'seaurch amd destroy' pressure on the Communists to break them. 
This strategy, however, required hundreds of thousamds of men, 
and over a million tons of bombs. This was not acceptaOale to 
a majority of Americans or other peoples around the world.
By 1968 the aunount of power being applied exceeded amy 
possible benefits. Thompson believed that "Not one of the four 
American Presidents concerned would have become involved in 
Vietnam if they could have foreseen what the eventual 
commitment would be. The most particularly
counterproductive method America used was bombing North 
Vietnam. "When the oil depots round Hamoi were hit [in 1966] 
the British Government, which up until that time had fully 
supported United States policy in Vietnam, " no longer condoned 
the American tactics, or the suffering they brought to the 
civilian population. "World-wide controversy was kindled and 
dissent within the United States itself became one of the 
vital factors," in America's ability to continue the war.^^ 
While the bombing had only a minimal effect on the Communist 
aüaility to infiltrate men and supplies into the South, it had 
the psychological effect of rallying the whole North 
Vietnamese population to a highly intense participation in the
, p. 110.
, pp. 95, 50.
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war effort.^
Another problem with the bombing campaign and the massive 
build-up of American troops was the logistical support network 
it required. "The vast complex of supply depots between Saigon 
and Bien Hoa has to be seen to be believed. They could not be 
measured in acres but only in tens of square miles."** It 
required a significant percentage of the available troop 
strength just to guard the airfields and supply depots. By 
1968 America had dropped over 1,000,000 tons of bombs and lost 
close to eight hundred aircraft, without producing a 
demonstraüaly convincing beneficial result.**
On the ground the war of attrition required too many 
American men and casualties. Hanoi had a large enough 
population base and the political will to accept 100,000 
killed or disabled per year over an extended period of time. 
The American public, however, was not willing to accept the 
number of casualties recpiired to win such a war. Even those 
peoples around the world who believed in containing Communism 
did not believe the Vietnam War was worth its cost in human 
misery. Also, American tax payers were not willing to foot a 
$30 billion a year bill.*^ Beyond this, the massive American 
presence had a variety of negative impacts on the people of
p. 140.
**Ibiâ., p. 141.
, p. 96. 
pp. 56-61.
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South Vietnam. In the final analysis, by the end of 1967 none 
of the American efforts had made a significant impact on the 
insurgency's rural resource base. If necessary the Communists 
could decline battle emd simply wait until the costs forced a 
unilateral American withdrawal. ** Thompson had a wide 
variety of more specific criticisms, most of which seem valid 
in retrospect.
Given the American people's unwillingness to accept the 
costs of a war of attrition on a long-term basis, the moral 
outrage of people in many nations, and the United States 
military's apparent determination to continue doing "more of 
the same," Thompson states, "It was my own view in June, 1968, 
that the United States had lost the war."
In his analysis prior to 1968, Thompson had anticipated 
the liberal anti-war interpretation of events, and done so in 
a more detailed and knowledgeable way than many other authors. 
While he continued to deplore the American tactics of the 
early war, his opinion of who would eventually win changed 
after mid-1968, because of Communist loses in the Tet 
Offensive, the CORDS effect on pacification, the 
Vietnamization program, and the effects of harbor mining, 
smart bombs, and the Easter Offensive.
The mainstream academic community has not considered 
Thompson to be an acceptable source in spite of his detailed
p. 34. 
^^Ibid.. p. 179.
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analysis in agreement with their interpretation prior to Tet
1968. George Herring mentions Thompson only in connection with 
a 1962 counterinsurgency program and to denigrate the amalysis 
he presented to President Nixon in 1969. Herring wrote that: 
"With no place else to go, Nixon eagerly and uncritically 
embraced Thompson's conclusions."**
John Vann has been treated in much the same way as
Thompson. Neil Sheehan states that although he was a
creditable source prior to the Tet Offensive, by 1969 "Vann 
had invested so much of John Vann in the war that he had to 
talk himself into believing," that his side was winning. He 
was unable to accept "the truth eUaout the war," —  that 
progress was not being made and it was still irretrieveüaly 
lost.*’
The question which arises here is whether it is
reasonable to believe that these men, who had such a deep and 
insightful understanding of the war prior to 1968 could have 
actually lost their ability to make accurate judgements in
1969. If Vann and Thompson were deluding themselves, they were 
not alone. Many other observers believed the war had turned in 
the allies' favor. Dr. Douglas Pike, Dr. Robert Sansom, Dr. 
Stuart Callison, Dr. Howard Penniman, Dr. John Roche, General 
Donn Starry, Lt. Colonel Gerald Turley, General William 
Westmoreland, William Colby, General Tran Dihn Tho, and Lt.
*°Herring, War, pp. 95, 251. 
* ’sheehan. Lie, pp. 743-45.
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General Ngo Quang Truong have all published books supporting 
the view that the allies were winning the war. Many conclude 
that South Vietnam lost primarily because it was abandoned by 
the United States. Is it the mainstream historical contention 
that all of these sources have been so completely discredited 
that it would be improper to present their interpretation to 
students in a balanced text? Where this line of reasoning 
appears to break down entirely is with the London Economist. 
When subjected to quantitative analysis, the great bulk of its 
war coverage falls in the neutral category. It consistently 
referred to the war as a tragedy for a variety of reasons. Yet 
it firmly believed the Communist's negotiating offer in 
October 1972 was an admission of defeat.
Either all of these sources were so hopelessly incapable 
of thinking rationally about the war that their interpretation 
does not even need to be presented to students in a baleuiced 
text, or the liberal authors of the mainstream historiography 
have taken such a strong anti-war bias that they have excluded 
legitimate evidence which undermines their interpretation.
Is there any indisputable, hard evidence to support the 
pro-war interpretation? Yes, there is. The ARVN's performance 
unquestionaUüly improved. In 1965 the relatively lightly armed 
Viet Cong were "destroying battalions faster than they could 
be reconstituted."*^ In 1972 the massive Communist invasion 
killed 25,000 South Vietnamese soldiers, but did not destroy
*Hfestmoreland, Report, p. 139.
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any fighting units. The ARVN was strong enough to turn the 
invasion and then counterattack. It could not have done so in 
1965. It would seem that the ARVN had unquestionably improved.
Likewise, in 1965 "many district emd provincial capitals 
were inaccessible except to an armed convoy with air 
cover. In the 1970s unescorted Americans were eüole to 
bicycle and motorcycle around rural South Vietnam. The 
Communist position would seem to have been unquestionably much 
weaker.
Perhaps the most important improvement in South Vietnam's 
position was due to the Land-to-the-Tiller program. It removed 
a major incentive for the peasamtry to work against the final 
defeat of the Viet Cong, and added a great incentive for the 
people to support the Saigon government. Two field research 
studies concluded that land reform was in fact reducing 
support for the Communists and increasing support for the 
Saigon government. The allied nation building effort was 
unquestionaübly improving the standard of living in rural South 
Vietnam. Our normal expectation would be that land reform and 
increasing incomes should have created greater loyalty and 
commitment to the Saigon government in the future.
Thus there would seem to be very solid evidence that the 
position of the allies was improving between 1965 and 1972. 
The ARVN unquestionably demonstrated that (with U.S. air 
support) in 1972 it was capaible of defeating the Communist
^^ H^unt, Pacification, p. 36.
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maximum effort. With continued American air support, advisors 
and money, presumably they should have won again in 1975, or 
whenever the Communists launched their next invasion. The 
hypothesis that the ARVN could not have won in 1975 would 
require that a historian speculate that the continuing 
positive trend of South Vietnamese performance would have 
reversed in 1973, and that the ARVN would have become so much 
weaker that they would have lost in 1975 even with continued 
American support.
It is an enormously different thing for a historian to 
present the evidence of improving South Vietnauaese performance 
and then speculate that it would have reversed, than to simply 
state that the allied effort was doomed from the start. In 
making the assertion that no progress was being made toward 
winning the war, George Herring has implicitly judged that all 
of the pro-war sources listed above have been so completely 
discredited that they do not need to be considered. Either all 
of these source have been so discredited, or the mainstream 
historiography of the war has rejected legitimate historical 
sources and a valid interpretation.
Along this seune line, a most important conclusion of this 
thesis is that the American media's falsely negative 
representation of the war probably deprived President Nixon of 
the public support he needed to continue the harbor mining and 
transportation route bombing in 1973. This continued aid would 
have cost America little, and would have been vital to South
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Vietnam's prospects for survival. Although polls clearly 
showed that a majority of the public supported Nixon's efforts 
to preserve South Vietnam's independence in 1972, this broad 
approval had limits. For example, the December 1972 bombing 
demonstrated the media's ability to affect public opinion. 
Even though the bombing severely damaged the Communists' 
capacity to prosecute the war, and the entire twelve day 
assault caused fewer civilian casualties than the Communist 
artillery barrage on the refugees fleeing Quang Tri, the 
American press described the December bombing as an 
unconscionable act. Time stated that the "brutal" Richard 
Nixon launched "the bloodiest air strikes ever . . . .  Hanoi's 
claims of high civilian casualties" were plausible. "The 
American resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam has made 
the world recoil in revulsion. Time's quotes "condemned 
the bombing as a crime against humanity on the moral scale of 
such NAZI atrocities as the death camp at T r e b l i n k a . T h e  
B-52 was described as "a cruel weapon [used] to terrorize the 
North Vietnamese . . . .  the bombings will not soon be 
forgotten or forgiven by many Americans, by much of the rest 
of the world," or by the Communists. Time predicted that 
negotiations would become more difficult because of the air 
war. Another quote stated that: "Mr. Nixon is no longer, and
January 1, 1973, p. 10. 
^^ I^bid.. January 8, 1973, p. 10. 
“^ ibid.. January 8, 1973, pp. 12-14.
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will never again be, a respectable man." Ambassador Herz's 
quantitative analysis of the news concluded that all the 
national media sources took a similarly biased position.
The media coverage of the bombing significantly reduced 
President Nixon's approval rating on his handling of the 
war.^^^ How could it have been otherwise? If any percentage 
of the American people put any credence at all in the media's 
view, it must necessarily have damaged public support for the 
President.
Beyond this. Congressional attitudes toward the war were 
influenced by media coverage amd public opinion. Nixon's 
private interviews with influential Congressmen convinced him 
that there was a real possibility that the legislative branch 
would cut off funding for the war in January 1973 if he did 
not have a peace treaty in hand.^^ Thus although the allies 
were militarily in a position of maximum strength in late 
1972, the President felt he had to take a treaty which was 
good enough, rather than hold out for a better one.
The December bombing, however, was not the first instance 
of media coverage hurting the war effort. The press's falsely 
negative coverage began with the 1968 Tet Offensive. Time 
spent 340 Cl reporting the false interpretation that this 
battle was a military victory for the Communists. Peter 
Braestrup's book. Big Story, shows that the entire American
^^^Herring, War, p. 281.
“^ Nixon, EK, pp. 701-02, 742-43.
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media, television as well as print, treated Tet in the same 
way.”’
Howard Schuman's research indicates that this was 
critically important to the mass public's support for the war. 
"Just before the Tet attacks in January 1968, with American 
leaders confidently predicting victory, the number of self 
described hawks outnumbered doves by two to one. But two 
months after Tet the proportion of doves in the country 
slightly exceeded that of hawks . . . .  The shift in the space 
of just 60 days represents probably the largest and most 
impoxrtant cheunge in public opinion during the entire war."”®
Time also described operation Lam Son 719 in falsely 
negative terms. After the supply port of Sihanoukville had 
been closed to the Communists, the Ho Chi Minh supply trail 
became their only access to much of South Vietneun. They 
reacted vigorously to Lan Som's threat to their vital 
interests. The Communists outnumbered the South Vietnamese by 
three or four to one, and yet the ARVN held its position 
astride the Ho Chi Minh trail for two months, inflicting 
15,000 casualties while edasorbing only 2,000. Inexplicably, 
Time failed to report any of the reasons for seeing this 
battle as proof of ARVN's competence, and instead interpreted 
it to mean that South Vietnam could not win even with U.S. air
359
Peter Braestrup, Bia Storv (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1983).
360Schuman, "Two Sources," p. 515.
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support.
Likewise, in its interpretation of the Easter Offensive 
Time failed to report the massive nature of Soviet assistance 
to North Vietnam, amd the overwhelming power of the invasion 
force. Almost all of Time's coverage made the ARVN seem weaüc 
and helpless. When the allies turned the tide of battle. Time 
stopped reporting it.
In exactly the saune way. Time refused to publish the 
success of America's economic development and nation-building 
prograun in South Vietnaun. Three economists and two historians 
verified the observations of numerous experts regarding the 
success of this effort. Nevertheless, Time reported precisely 
the opposite—  economic failure— on those few occasions when 
it mentioned the economy at all.
Again Howard Schuman's research indicates that the 
media's falsely negative coverage probably had a critical 
impact on public support for the war. Schuman found that those 
who supported the anti-war movement did so on moral grounds. 
They reacted most strongly against American offensive moves 
such as the bombing, the Cambodian incursion. Operation Lan 
Som 719, and the mining of Haiphong Harbor.”  ^ In contrast, 
the mass public showed majority support for each of these 
moves. When members of the general public were asked the open- 
ended question of why they were angry about the war, the most 
frequently stated response was that it was not being won.
5A1
Ifeidw pp. 519-26.
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These respondents seldom mentioned moral concerns. The mass 
public simply ignored Time's thousands of column inches of 
moral reasons for opposing the war.
The most reasonable conclusion one can draw from this 
research is that if Time had published 5,000 column inches of 
stories written by the experts who believed that progress was 
being made in Vietnam, such as F.J. West, William Colby, John 
Paul Vann, Sir Robert Thompson, the London Economist. Aviation 
Week and Space Technology. Dr. Robert Sansom, Dr. C. Stewart 
Callison, Dr. Charles Bush, Dr. Howard Penniman, and Dr. 
Douglas Pike, the American people would have had an entirely 
different and more positive view of their nation's involvement 
in Vietnam.
Because of these facts, I would speculate that the 
media's falsely negative coverage (and its effect on public 
opinion) probably had a direct influence on the outcome of the 
war. North Vietnam was in a weaker position in late 1972 than 
at any previous point. If America had continued to prosecute 
the war throughout 1973 at the same level as it had in 1972 
(economic aid, advisors, and air support) there is good reason 
to believe that Hanoi would have been forced to accept a peace 
treaty much more advantageous to South Vietnam.
Public opinion polls in 1972 clearly established that a 
majority supported President Nixon's efforts to secure a peace 
treaty which, if adhered to, would have preserved South 
Vietnam's independence. It stands to reason then that if the
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American people had been given a fair appraisal of the 
Communist weakness in late 1972, very likely a majority would 
have supported South Vietnamese President Thieu in his demand 
that all North Vietnamese troops leave South Vietnam before 
the mines were removed from Haiphong Harbor, the 
transportation route bombing was stopped, and the peace treaty 
was signed. If a later Communist invasion had occurred in 
violation of the peace treaty, mining emd bombing would 
presumably have been just as effective again.
Thus the media's falsely negative portrayal of the war, 
its failure to document the advances in the South Vietnamese 
economy, and its refusal to present the American public with 
the evidence of North Vietneun's weakness in late 1972 probeUale 
deprived President Nixon of the public support he needed for 
the sustained use of air power and harbor mines in an attempt 
to win the war.
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